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ABSTRACT  
   
A pressing question in public policymaking is how best to allocate decision-
making authority and to facilitate opportunities for input. When it comes to science, 
technology, and environmental (STE) policy decisions, persons impacted by those 
decisions often have relevant information and perspectives to contribute yet lack either 
the specialized, technical knowledge or the means by which to effectively communicate 
that knowledge. Consequently, due to a variety of factors, they are frequently denied 
meaningful involvement in making them. In an effort to better understand why this is so, 
and how this might change, this dissertation uses an activity systems framework to 
examine how three factors mediate the circulation of information in STE public 
engagement mechanisms.  
In this project, I examine the transcripts of a 2015 administrative hearing and 
community meeting about the Santa Susana Field Lab—a former nuclear- and rocket 
engine-testing facility 30 miles from Los Angeles, where an experimental nuclear reactor 
suffered a partial meltdown in 1959. Specifically, I identify (1) who was designated as an 
"expert" versus a member of "the public," (2) the structural features, and (3) the stylistic 
features of participants' remarks at these events; and I study how these factors mediated 
the flow of information at each. To do so, I view "expert" and "public" as what Michael 
McGee has termed ideographs, and consider the structural and stylistic features that prior 
scholarship has identified to impact information flow.  
Based on my analysis, I theorize that role designations, structural features, and 
stylistic features work together to mediate whose, what, and how information flows in 
public engagement mechanisms. Based on my findings, I also suggest that this mediation 
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impacts policy outcomes. As such, I contend that better understanding the relationships 
among these mediational means, information flow, and policy outcomes is an important 
step towards developing public engagement mechanisms that most effectively use the 
relevant knowledge and other insights of all who have a stake in policy decisions. 
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PREFACE  
 This project spawns from my interest in the complex, sometimes daunting, but 
vitally important process of public policy-making in the realm of science, technology, 
and the environment (“STE”). More specifically, my interest in this particular project 
began in college when I volunteered for a nuclear policy group called Committee to 
Bridge the Gap. Through this work, I learned that in 1959 a nuclear reactor suffered a 
partial meltdown fewer than 10 miles from where I grew up; some say this meltdown 
released more radiation than the accident at Three Mile Island (see, e.g., Morgenstern, 
Beebe-Dimmer & Yu, 2007, p. 11). I learned that the soil and groundwater on the site 
(the Santa Susana Field Laboratory (SSFL)) remain both chemically and radioactively 
contaminated, and that how and to what degree to clean it up are subjects of ongoing 
disputes—scientific, legal, administrative, and political. During my time at Committee to 
Bridge the Gap, I attended several hearings and community meetings regarding SSFL, 
and was struck by the sometimes seemingly dismissive tone of the designated experts and 
decision-makers, the exasperation of community members trying to gain information and 
be heard, and the hostility between them. Over a decade later, my continued interest in 
SSFL and the designated expert/non-expert dynamics surrounding its cleanup has led me 
to pursue a research trajectory of STE public engagement mechanisms,1 and a study of 
these mechanisms in the context of the SSFL cleanup controversy is a fitting first step. 
                                                
1 I define and explain my use of this term on page 2, below. 
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CHAPTER 1 
STUDYING FACTORS THAT MEDIATE INFORMATION FLOW:  
TWO PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT MECHANISMS 
 In July 1959, an experimental nuclear reactor just 30 miles from downtown Los 
Angeles suffered a partial meltdown, releasing unknown but potentially vast amounts of 
radioactivity into the atmosphere. The accident was not made public until 1979, when a 
group of students at UCLA discovered an Atomic Energy Commission (the U.S. 
Department of Energy’s predecessor) report that, among other things, included a 
photograph of a partially melted fuel rod captioned “melted blob” (see Fig. 1, below) 
(Sahagun, 2010, p. 1). Since that time, the site of the accident—the Santa Susana Field 
Laboratory (“SSFL”)—has been the subject of contentious, complex, and ongoing 
disputes regarding its health impacts on former site workers and surrounding community 
members, and regarding its future cleanup. SSFL is owned by a combination of federal 
(National Aeronautic Space Agency (“NASA”)) and private (The Boeing Company 
(“Boeing”)) entities. It is located less than two miles from residential neighborhoods; 
over 150,000 people live within five miles of the site, and over 500,000 live within ten 
miles of it (Kuehl & Brownley, 2007, p. 2). In addition, the science behind the accident 
and its subsequent impacts—specifically, the precise amount of contamination released 
from the accident and its health and safety risks—is both complex and not entirely 
known. The cleanup involves a broad range of stakeholders, including: designated 
scientific experts on issues such as epidemiology, hydrology, civil engineering, and 
nuclear physics; local, state, and federal decision-makers; local residents; and the private 
company that will bear its costs. It also invokes a wide variety of state and federal 
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environmental laws governing chemical contamination, radioactive contamination, water 
quality, and the legal, bureaucratic, and political processes by which the cleanup plan is 
determined and undertaken. These factors make SSFL a prime locus of study for 
examining STE public engagement mechanisms. 
 
         Figure 1: Excerpt from AEC Report 
 At the beginning of this project, I offer a historical overview of SSFL, but my 
focus is neither the history of the accident itself, nor how it was handled. Nor do I deal 
with the many legal issues surrounding the accident and subsequent cleanup efforts, 
though these aspects of SSFL are ripe for rhetorical study. Instead, in this project I use an 
activity systems framework to explore whether and how three factors mediate the flow of 
information in two public engagement mechanisms regarding SSFL. In the following 
section, I explain these concepts in the context of the theoretical framework I use to 
conduct my study. 
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 I. Theoretical Framework 
  I.a. Public Engagement Mechanisms 
 I use the term “public engagement mechanisms” throughout this study, which I 
have borrowed from Gene Rowe and Lynn J. Frewer. Rowe and Frewer (2005) use the 
term “public engagement” as an umbrella term that encompasses what they see as three 
distinct types of interaction between mechanism sponsors and participants, distinguished 
based on the way information flows between them: (1) public communication—where 
information is conveyed unilaterally from the initiative’s sponsors to the public; (2) 
public consultation—where information is conveyed from members of the public to the 
initiative sponsors but only following a process initiated by the sponsor; and (3) public 
participation—where information is exchanged bilaterally between members of the 
public and the sponsors and this dialogue transforms the opinions of initiative sponsors 
and participants (pp. 255-56). Rowe and Frewer define “public engagement mechanisms” 
as the methods intended to enable public engagement.  
 In this project, I examine two public engagement mechanisms regarding SSFL: a 
public hearing (the Water Board hearing) and a community meeting (the Work Group 
meeting), discussed below in section III.a. Rowe and Fewer (2005) identify both of these 
mechanisms as public communication mechanisms that rely on the public to come to the 
information and in which participants are thus self-selected, where information is 
communicated face-to-face, and where that information varies to some—but usually 
small—extent based on the questions participants ask (p. 278). Both the Water Board 
hearing and Work Group meeting generally fit this definition, but to what extent, and the 
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implications thereof, are explored in Chapter 4, which addresses the structural 
Mediational Means at play in each of these mechanisms. 
  I.b. Activity Systems Theory 
 Activity systems theory posits a basic “meditational triangle” consisting of: (1) an 
actor in that activity system, called the Subject; (2) the purpose or Object of activity in 
that system; and (3) the Mediational Means, Instruments, or Tools that mediate how a 
Subject achieves the Object (Witte & Haas, 2005, p. 138, explaining the model set forth 
by A.N. Leont’ev) (see Fig. 2). “Mediate” in this sense means to impact or affect. As 
Witte and Haas explain, Mediational Means “stipulate certain local conditions to which 
the operations embedded within the actions constituting the activity […] must meet and 
respond” (2005, p. 147). In other words, Mediational Means dictate to some degree what 
rules an actor (Subject) in a given activity system must abide by or what conditions an 
actor must respond to. As such, Mediational Means can restrict, expand, or otherwise 
alter how a Subject achieves an Object. It is important to be aware that there are different 
kinds of Mediational Means. Some, such as gender, are fixed and static, and cannot be 
changed, while others, such as the style a Subject uses when speaking, are dynamic. 
Further, Mediational Means often overlap with and impact one another. 
 
Figure 2: Witte and Haas’s depiction of “the components of practical human activity” 
underlying Leont’ev’s theory of activity (Witte & Haas, 2005, p. 134). 
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  Yjro Engestrom expanded on this theory by adding three additional components: 
Rules (norms and conventions for acting), Community (those who address the same 
object), and Division of Labor (how tasks, power, and status are apportioned between 
community members) (Witte & Haas 2005, p. 138; Higgins, Long, & Flower, 2006, p. 13 
citing Engestrom 67) (see 
  
Figure 3: Engestrom’s Depiction of Mediation in Activity Systems (Witte & Hass, 2005, 
p. 138).  
Fig. 3). When STE public engagement mechanisms are viewed in the framework of 
activity systems, the Subjects can be understood as the participants in the mechanism, the 
Object as increasing the flow of information in that mechanism, and the Mediational 
Means or Instruments as those factors that impact how information flows in that 
mechanism. Note that although Engestrom’s additional components are worthy areas of 
study regarding STE public engagement mechanisms, here I take up only the Subject, 
Object, and Mediational Means, for feasibility reasons. Later work should, of course, 
consider the roles of Community, Rules, and Division of Labor in STE public 
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engagement mechanisms. I ground my project in activity systems theory because it 
provides me with a useful framework within which to consider multiple, concurrent 
factors as Mediational Means that work together to mediate the flow of information in 
STE public engagement mechanisms. 
  I.c. Mediational Means at the Water Board Hearing and Work Group  
  Meeting 
 In this project, I focus on three potential Mediational Means at the Water Board 
hearing and Work Group meeting: (1) whether participants in each of these public 
engagement mechanisms are designated as “experts” or members of “the public”; (2) the 
structural features of each mechanism; and (3) the stylistic features of participants’ 
remarks in each mechanism. I chose to focus on these three Mediational Means because 
they are factors that STE scholars have repeatedly identified as important to the flow of 
information in STE public engagement mechanisms.  
 Prior scholarship exploring these Mediational Means has treated each one 
independently, and has not expressly used an activity systems frame (see, e.g. Hartelius, 
2010, p. 166, Hikins & Cherwitz, 2011, p. 292, and Jasanoff, 2012, p. 393 regarding what 
makes someone an “expert”; Rowe & Frewer, 2005, pp. 262, 264 regarding structural 
variables that are likely to impact the effectiveness of an engagement mechanism; and 
Killingsworth & Palmer, 1992, p. 173 regarding stylistic features that typify various 
kinds of engagement mechanisms). Here, in contrast, I begin to theorize that these three 
Mediational Means—which occur concurrently in public engagement mechanisms—
work together, rather than in isolation, to mediate information flow. This notion has 
implications for both the future of SSFL cleanup efforts as well as for other STE public 
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engagement mechanisms. It is my hope that future scholarship will explore additional 
meditational means so that researchers can begin to develop a more complete picture of 
public engagement mechanism activity systems, which is necessary if public engagement 
mechanisms are to be developed that most effectively utilize the input of all who have a 
stake in policy decisions. 
 In the next section, I offer a brief historical overview of SSFL, to provide readers 
context for the NPDES permit renewal controversy.  
II. Historical Context 
 II.a. SSFL 
 SSFL is a former nuclear- and rocket engine-testing facility approximately 30 
miles northwest of downtown Los Angeles, on the boundary between Los Angeles and 
Ventura counties (Kuehl & Brownley, 2007, p. 2). As can be seen in Figure 4, below, it is 
located in the middle of several residential areas. As explained in a California state 
legislature bill regarding SSFL’s cleanup,2 “[t]he location of SSFL was chosen [in the 
late 1940s] for its remoteness in order to conduct work that was considered too dangerous 
to be performed in more densely populated areas. In subsequent years, however, southern 
California’s population has mushroomed. Today, more than 150,000 people live within 
five miles of the facility, and at least half a million people live within 10 miles” (Kuehl & 
Brownley, 2007, p. 2). 
                                                
2 The California legislature passed this bill but before it took effect, Boeing successfully 
sued to have it invalidated as unconstitutional (Boeing). 
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Figure 4: Site Map of SSFL from EnviroReporter.com, an investigative journalism 
website 
 The 2,850-acre SSFL site was established in the late 1940s by the federal Atomic 
Energy Commission, which contracted with a company now owned by Boeing (North 
American Aviation’s Rocketdyne division) to operate the site (Weston Solutions, Inc., 
2007, p. 3). SSFL is divided into four regions—Areas I through IV—plus two 
undeveloped buffer zones (Weston Solutions, Inc., 2007, p. 2) (see Fig. 4, above). During 
SSFL’s operational years, Areas I, II, and III were primarily used by Rocketdyne for 
missile and liquid rocket engine research, assembly, and testing, while Area IV housed 
the site’s nuclear reactor development activities (U.S. Department of Energy, 2003, p. 1). 
  9 
Area IV—an approximately 290 acre region—was used to build and operate the first 
commercial power plant in the United States (California Energy Commission; Weston 
Solutions, Inc., 2007, p. 2).  
 Since the 1950s, the Department of Energy has leased 90 acres of Area IV from 
what is now Boeing. Between 1956 and 1988, the Department of Energy operated at least 
ten nuclear reactors, a plutonium fuel fabrication facility, and a “hot lab” for processing 
spent fuel rods there (Kuehl & Brownley, 2007, p. 2). One of the Department of Energy’s 
main projects was the Sodium Reactor Experiment (“SRE”), which used sodium instead 
of water as a cooling agent for the radioactive fuel, and used an organic coolant called 
tetralin to cool the pumps that brought the sodium to the reactor core (Sandia National 
Laboratories, n.d., p. 1).  
 In 1996, Boeing became the primary owner of SSFL. Today, NASA owns the 
451.2 acres that comprise Area II and a portion of Area I, and Boeing owns the remainder 
of the site (NASA, 2007, p. 2). The Department of Energy continues to lease 90 acres of 
Area IV from Boeing (Weston Solutions, Inc., 2007, p. 2). As such, NASA, Boeing, and 
the Department of Energy are all legally and financially responsible for the cleanup of 
their respective portions of the site. The cleanup is necessary in large part because of the 
partial nuclear meltdown described in the next subsection. 
 II.b. The 1959 Partial Nuclear Meltdown 
 On July 13, 1959, the SRE experienced an unexplained “power excursion” in 
which the reactor’s operators lost the ability to control it. After several hours, the 
operators managed to shut down the reactor in a “scram” (emergency shutdown), and 
restarted it a few hours later. High radiation readings, power excursions, and scrams 
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continued for the next two weeks until operators shut down the SRE for good. At that 
point, one third of the SRE’s nuclear fuel rods had experienced melting. Because the 
radioactivity levels during the accident were higher than the SRE’s instruments could 
measure, and some of the instruments malfunctioned, the amount of radioactivity 
released into the environment is unknown, though some nuclear scientists have estimated 
that it was as much as 240 times that released in the Three Mile Island disaster of 1979 
(Senate Committee on Environmental Quality, 2007, p. 4). Further, because this was an 
experimental reactor, it had no containment dome so the radioactive gases were released 
directly into the air (Senate Committee on Environmental Quality, 2007, p. 4).  
 II.c. Other Sources of Contamination 
 The SRE accident was not the only source of contamination at SSFL, although it 
accounts for approximately 90% of the site’s radioactive contamination (Boeing v. 
Movassaghi, Ninth Cir. 11-55903 JFW, hereinafter, “Boeing”). In 1964 and 1969, two 
other nuclear reactors suffered damage to 80% and 35% of their fuel, respectively. There 
were also multiple nuclear fires at the hot lab. In addition, radioactively and chemically 
contaminated reactor components covered with sodium were routinely reacted in an open, 
unlined pit (the “sodium burn pit”) for decades, releasing contaminants into the air and 
surface runoff offsite (Boeing). Further, one waste disposal procedure at SSFL consisted 
of shooting barrels of toxic substances with shotguns to make them explode and burn 
(Boeing). Moreover, as part of the tens of thousands of rocket tests conducted at SSFL, 
hundreds of thousands of gallons of trichloroethylene (“TCE”), were used to flush out 
rocket engines, and seeped into the surrounding soil and groundwater (NASA, 2007, p. 
2). TCE is a chemical linked to adverse health effects on the central nervous system, 
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immune system, and endocrine (hormonal) system (U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, 2007). These activities resulted in the release of contaminants that have been 
shown to pose risks to human health. 
 II.d. Health Impacts 
 Several studies have found that the contaminants at SSFL have had negative 
impacts on human health. A UCLA School of Public Health study found that former 
nuclear workers at SSFL had an increased risk of dying from cancers of the lungs, upper 
digestive tract, and blood and lymph system (Morgenstern, Froines, Ritz, & Young, 1997, 
p. 56). A University of Michigan study found that rates of bladder, blood and lymph 
tissue, upper digestive tract, and thyroid cancers in persons living within a two-mile 
radius of SSFL were similarly elevated (Morgenstern, Beebe-Dimmer, & Yu, 2007, p. 4). 
These studies and others like them have further spurred calls for cleanup of the site. 
 II.e. The Cleanup 
 As a result of the chemical and nuclear activities that took place at SSFL, the 
site’s soil and groundwater are contaminated with a variety of harmful substances. 
Among these are radioactive contaminants called radionuclides, which have been linked 
to cancer; a chemical called perchloroethylene, which has been linked to cancer, liver and 
kidney damage, and adverse effects on the nervous system; and TCE (Office of Pollution 
Prevention and Toxics, U.S. EPA, 1994; Water Board Tr. p. 249).3 Although the extent of 
chemical contamination at SSFL has not been fully assessed, NASA, the Department of 
Energy, and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency estimate that there are more than 
                                                
3 The main radionuclides at the site today are cesium-137, strontium-90, and plutonium-
239. Other radionuclides at the site are tritium, plutonium-238, iodine-131, cobalt-60, 
thorium-228, and uranium-235 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency “SSFL”). 
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500,000 gallons of TCE beneath the site (NASA, 2007, p. 2). Today, the only activities at 
SSFL are related to decontamination, decommissioning, and environmental remediation 
and restoration (Water Board Tr. p. 251). It is from these activities that controversies 
involving “experts,” “the public,” Boeing, and decision-makers have emerged. 
 The history of cleanup efforts at SSFL is complex and contentious for several 
reasons. First, the parties responsible for the cleanup consist of both federal agencies 
(NASA and the Department of Energy) and a private company (Boeing).4 Second, there 
is both chemical and radioactive contamination at the site, which are governed by 
multiple federal laws including the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act and the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, as well as 
several other federal and state laws including the Clean Water Act, the National 
Environmental Protection Act, and the California Environmental Quality Act. Lastly, the 
site is subject to regulation by federal, state, and local agencies including the Department 
of Energy, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, California Department of Toxic 
Substances Control,5 and the Water Board. In addition to these factors, and in some ways 
because of them, cleanup efforts—which began in 1989—have been stalled due in part to 
disagreement over the appropriate cleanup standards (Water Board Tr. p. 249). Among 
                                                
4 The Department of Energy and NASA are barred from transferring their interests in the 
site until they conduct further environmental reviews of cleanup operations (Department 
of Toxic Substances Control Public Participation Plan, 2009, p. 12; Boeing). Boeing has 
unsuccessfully tried to sell its ownership interest and thus remains majority owner of the 
site (NASA, 2007, p. 1). 
 
5 The Department of Toxic Substances Control is the arm of California’s Environmental 
Protection Agency that enforces state and federal hazardous waste laws including the 
California Environmental Quality Act, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, and Toxic 
Substances Control Act, among others. 
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the holdups has been a proposed cleanup plan by the Department of Energy that, 
according to the federal Environmental Protection Agency, would have left the site too 
contaminated to be safe for unrestricted residential use, and instead safe only for 
restricted day hikes (Assembly Committee on Environmental Safety and Toxic Materials, 
2007, p. 4). In addition, several years ago the California state legislature passed a law (SB 
990) that would have required SSFL to be cleaned up to levels suitable for suburban 
residential or rural residential (i.e. agricultural) use, and would have made the sale or 
transfer of the property before such standards were achieved a crime (Boeing), but 
Boeing successfully sued to invalidate the law (Boeing). All of these factors have 
contributed to ongoing controversies over the cleanup of SSFL. 
 II.f. Boeing’s NPDES Permit 
Separate from the controversies over the cleanup of contamination at SSFL, 
Boeing is subject to the Clean Water Act’s requirements for water leaving its portions of 
the site. The Clean Water Act requires a NPDES permit for any “discharge of pollutants” 
into “navigable waters” of the United States (Clean Water Act § 502). In this case, this 
means that the Water Board sets limits on the permissible amount of pollutants in 
stormwater runoff from SSFL, and prohibits Boeing from discharging pollutants into U.S. 
waterways without a NPDES permit. The Water Board has been issuing NPDES permits 
to Boeing at five-year intervals since it took ownership of SSFL.   
Because of the technical challenges of regulating this runoff (because SSFL is 
located in two watersheds, the drainages are very steep, and the runoff caries soil and 
sediments contaminated from both past site activities and naturally occurring materials), 
the Water Board ordered Boeing in 2007 to assemble an “independent panel of experts” 
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(which the Water Board calls “the Expert Panel”) to provide technical oversight and 
recommendations for stormwater treatment requirements throughout the site (Water 
Board Tr. p. 250; Boeing SSFL NPDES Compliance Program, 2008, p. 1). To select this 
panel, Boeing retained the consulting firm Geosyntec Consultants (“Geosyntec”). After 
soliciting statements of qualification from prospective panelists, Geosyntec, in 
consultation with Water Board staff, submitted a list of six names to Water Board staff, 
which Water Board staff approved (Boeing SSFL NPDES Compliance Program, 2008, p. 
2). Collectively, the six panelists hold five PhDs, five current or former professorships, 
three  “Professional Engineer” certifications, and three private consultantships (Boeing 
SSFL NPDES Compliance Program, 2008, pp. 2-3).  
 II.f.i. The Water Board Hearing 
Most recently, on February 12, 2015, the Water Board held a public hearing 
regarding the renewal of Boeing’s NPDES permit for SSFL (Water Board Tr. p. 245). At 
this hearing, Water Board staff, representatives from Boeing, the Expert Panel, and a 
number of public interest organizations (“the Organizations”) made presentations, 
followed by the legally required opportunity for “public” comments (Water Board Tr. pp. 
246-247). The Water Board then asked questions of the presenters, followed by 
deliberation and a vote on the tentative permit (Water Board Tr. p. 247). Prior to the 
hearing, the Water Board prepared and circulated a tentative NPDES permit for both 
Boeing and “the public” to comment on (Water Board Tr. pp. 268-269). The transcript of 
this hearing, obtained via request to a Water Board employee, is one of the two 
components of the data set for this study. 
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 II.f.ii. The Work Group Meeting 
Shortly before the Water Board hearing, on February 5, 2015, the Work Group 
held a quarterly meeting in which it discussed the tentative NPDES permit and upcoming 
Water Board hearing. Several of the people who spoke on behalf of the Organizations at 
the Water Board hearing also spoke at the Work Group meeting. The transcript of this 
meeting, made from video recordings posted on the Work Group’s website, is the second 
component of the data set for my study.6 
The Water Board hearing transcript and Work Group meeting transcript comprise 
the data set for this study.7 In the analysis that follows in the subsequent chapters of this 
project, I cite excerpts of the Water Board hearing transcript as “Water Board Tr. [page 
number].” For the Work Group meeting, there is a separate transcript for each speaker, so 
I cite those as “[speaker last name] [page number].” 
III. Research Questions 
 Both the content and format of the Water Board hearing and Work Group meeting 
invoke notions of expertise, knowledge, and “the public.” They also designate distinct 
roles and opportunities for participation for “the public,” “experts,” and decision-makers. 
                                                
6 I use a transcript of this meeting, rather than the video recording, so that I am 
conducting an apples-to-apples comparison of the Water Board hearing (which was not 
videotaped, only transcribed) and Work Group meeting. I have not viewed the Work 
Group meeting video recordings in order to ensure that my analysis is only of the words 
of the presenters at both the Water Board hearing and Work Group meeting, rather than 
on the words of presenters in one mechanism and the body language, intonation, and 
other visual cues of presenters at the other.  
 
7 The Water Board hearing transcript is available by request pursuant to the contact 
information at http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/losangeles/board_info/minutes/2015/03-13-
15.pdf. The Work Group meeting videos are available at 
http://www.ssflworkgroup.org/video/. 
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As such, these events serve to inform one of the most significant problems to vex 
scholars of rhetoric, communication, and science and technology policy in recent years: 
Persons lacking either specialized, technical knowledge about STE decisions, or the 
means by which to effectively communicate that knowledge, are impacted by those 
decisions, yet due to a variety of factors they are often denied meaningful involvement in 
making them. At the heart of this transdisciplinary problem are several fundamental 
matters for contemporary deliberative rhetoric, including: 
(1) Who is deemed an “expert” or a member of “the public” (either explicitly or 
implicitly) in a given STE public engagement mechanism, and why. 
(2) Whether, and if so, how these role designations mechanism mediate the flow 
of information among participants in an STE public engagement mechanism; 
(3) Whether, and if so, how structural features of an STE public engagement 
mechanism mediate the flow of information among participants; 
(4) Whether, and if so, how stylistic features that persons designated as “experts” 
and “the public” use in a given STE public engagement mechanism mediate 
the flow of information among participants; 
(5) What impacts—if any—these potentially mediating factors have, both 
independently and as concurrent coexisting meditational means, on visible and 
measurable outcomes in a given STE public engagement mechanism. 
Each of these questions matters for the following reasons: 
 Prior scholarship indicates that who is deemed an “expert” versus a member of 
“the public” matters for two primary reasons. First, designated experts tend to be treated 
very differently than the “lay public” in STE public engagement mechanisms. Until 
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recently, the default public engagement mechanism has been what Rowe and Frewer call 
public communication: it has been top-down, with information and decisions flowing 
one-directionally from decision-makers and designated experts to members of “the 
public” (Waddell, 1995a, p. 205; Simmons, 2007, p. 87). Second, members of “the 
public” frequently possess different kinds of knowledge and bring to the table different 
considerations and perspectives than those traditionally labeled “experts” (Flower & 
Heath, 2000, p. 44; Collins & Evans, 2002, p. 238). Taken together, these two facts mean 
that valuable, relevant knowledge is often excluded from STE decisions. As I explain in 
more detail below, what studying these concepts in relation to SSFL allows me to 
understand better is what factors lead one to be granted expert status in a case study of an 
STE public engagement mechanism (explored in Chapter 4). By examining the features 
of those persons granted expert status in both the Water Board hearing and Work Group 
meeting, we see that expertise is a highly context-dependent notion, reaffirming the work 
of several rhetoric and STE scholars (see, e.g. Hartelius, 2010, p. 166; Hikins & 
Cherwitz, 2011, p. 292; Jasanoff, 2012, p. 393). Defining what “expertise” means in a 
particular mechanism is the first step in tracing how that expertise mediates information 
flow in that mechanism. This knowledge, in turn, can aid both the designers of and 
participants in a public engagement mechanism in maximizing participants’ contributory 
potential.  
 How STE public engagement mechanisms are structured matters. The structural 
components of these mechanisms mediate information flow among participants and thus 
set the stage for how decision-makers, “experts,” and “the public” interact (e.g. via one-
way transmission of information from designated experts and decision-makers to “the 
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public,” or true two-way communication) (Waddell, 1995a, p. 205). They determine who 
gets to offer input into a decision (Waddell, 1995a, p. 205). They affect how and to what 
degree people are able to participate (Coogan, 2006, pp. 683-84). And they frame the 
issues for deliberation in ways that ensure consideration of some aspects of a controversy 
while excluding others (Stirling, 2012, p. 4). Further, certain structural variables impact 
the effectiveness of public engagement mechanisms (Rowe & Frewer, 2005, pp. 262, 
264). This project views these structural features as one of several Meditational Means 
that affect how information flows over the course of activity. 
 Lastly, differences in the stylistic features of presentations by those deemed 
“experts” and those deemed part of “the public” matter because they impact how well a 
speaker’s message resonates with his or her audience (see, e.g., Collins & Evans, 2002, 
pp. 255-256). Examining the stylistic features used by speakers at the Water Board 
hearing and Work Group meeting takes this research a step further by providing a 
concrete, real world locus of study in which to not only shed light on what it means to be 
a recognized expert in a particular STE public engagement mechanism, but also to 
understand stylistic features as one of several Mediational Means that mediate the flow of 
information in a public engagement mechanism.  
 In these ways, this study begins to answer important questions for deliberative 
rhetoric and science and technology policy.  
IV. Data Set, Methodology, and Limitations 
 I designed this study to contribute to the continuing discussion among deliberative 
rhetoric scholars about how to maximize the flow of information—and thus create 
meaningful opportunities for persons lacking technical STE knowledge, accreditations, or 
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specialized language to participate—in STE public engagement mechanisms. 
Specifically, I sought to begin to understand whether, and if so, how “expert” and non-
expert role designations, structural features, and stylistic features come together to act as 
Mediational Means that mediate the flow of information in STE public engagement 
mechanisms. 
 IV.a. Data Set 
 The data set for this study is: (1) the transcript of the February 12, 2015 Water 
Board hearing; and (2) the transcript of the February 4, 2015 Work Group meeting. I 
selected these materials for several reasons. First, these engagement mechanisms are 
about the same issue, but have different structures. Second, both designated experts and 
members of “the public” participate in each mechanism, and some of the same people 
speak at both mechanisms, but in different roles. Examining these mechanisms in tandem 
thus provides a rich opportunity to analyze the discourse of the designated experts and 
“the public” surrounding the same issue in different structural settings. In addition, it 
allows me to explore whether the same actors change the way they talk about the same 
issue when they present as designated experts versus as non-experts, and offers insights 
into how these actors approach communication and persuasion when faced with differing 
audiences and public engagement mechanisms. These insights aid in understanding how 
the design and structure of such mechanisms can affect participants’ behaviors and 
messages in them, which in turn may impact substantive outcomes. 
 IV.b. Methodology 
 At the start of this project, I knew I wanted to explore the ways that designated 
experts and “the public” performed in public engagement mechanisms surrounding 
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SSFL. Having volunteered for Committee to Bridge the Gap, I had previously attended 
Water Board hearings and Work Group meetings, and had seen firsthand the power 
differentials between the “certified” and “uncertified” experts (Collins & Evans, 2002, p. 
260) in these public engagement mechanisms—though I lacked the terminology to 
describe this difference then. Through my training as a lawyer, I had gained awareness of 
structural differences in various administrative public engagement mechanisms. And 
through my work as a graduate student in Rhetoric and Composition, I was cognizant of 
the importance of stylistic choices in communicating a message to one’s audience. For 
this project, I chose to use an activity systems frame—explained above in section I.a.— 
to integrate each of these concepts into one study in which I could consider whether and 
how these factors work together as Mediational Means.  
 To begin to do this theorizing, I realized I needed to break my project into two 
steps. First, I needed a way to identify the role designations, structural features, and 
stylistic features at play in each of these mechanisms. Only once I had identified these 
Mediational Means could I consider whether, and if so, how they mediate the flow of 
information at the Work Group meeting and Water Board hearing. 
 To facilitate the first step of this research—identifying the role designations, 
structural features, and stylistic features at the Water Board hearing and Work Group 
meeting—I turned to three separate means of analysis. In each, scholars considered how 
one of these factors worked independently to mediate information flow in STE public 
engagement mechanisms, although they did not describe their work in an activity system 
frame. First, to identify who was designated as an “expert” or a member of the “public” at 
the Water Board hearing and Work Group meeting, I looked to Michael McGee’s 
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ideograph analysis—especially as implemented by David Coogan. McGee and Coogan’s 
ideograph analysis allow me to consider what <expert> and <the public> mean in these 
public engagement mechanisms—that is, who qualifies as an expert or “the public” in 
each mechanism (McGee, 1980; Coogan, 2006).  
 Second, to identify the structural features of these two public engagement 
mechanisms, I applied Rowe and Frewer’s work on structural variables that impact the 
effectiveness of public engagement mechanisms (Rowe & Frewer, 2005, pp. 262, 264). 
Through a review of multiple case studies, Rowe and Frewer theorize that public engage 
mechanisms that maximize the following structural variables are most effective (or, in 
activity systems terms, that these variables mediate the flow of information in a public 
engagement mechanism): (1) the number of participants; (2) the relevant information 
elicited from those participants; (3) the relevant information provided by sponsors; (4) the 
transfer of information to, and processing by, recipients; and (5) the aggregation of all 
relevant information from participants. I also consider a sixth variable: (6) the degree to 
which ostensibly independent designated experts are perceived as such. Using Rowe and 
Frewer’s work allowed me to identify and name key structural features of the Water 
Board hearing and Work Group meeting that Rowe and Frewer’s work suggests serve as 
meditational means in STE public engagement mechanisms.  
 Third, to examine the stylistic features used by participants at the Water Board 
hearing and Work Group meeting, I employed the tools that Jamie Killingsworth and 
Jacqueline Palmer use to rhetorically analyze Environmental Impact Statements in 
Ecospeak (Killingsworth & Palmer, 1992). Specifically, I looked for the following 
features that Killingsworth and Palmer have identified as means by which authors 
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distance themselves from their subject matter and audiences: passive voice; 
nominalizations; strings of noun modifiers; and acronyms (Killingsworth & Palmer, 
1992, p. 173). I also looked for technical language; narrative; precise language; and 
deferential language, as these features also impact how accessible one’s message is for 
different audiences (Rowe & Frewer, 2005, p. 273; Dahlstrom, 2014, p. 13615). This 
analysis allows me to consider what the designated experts and “the public” do in these 
mechanisms—that is, what stylistic strategies each group invokes in performing their 
designated “expert” or “public” roles. This lays the groundwork for considering stylistic 
features as a mediator of information flow in STE public engagement mechanisms. 
 In each of the body chapters that follow, I include a “methodology” section in 
which I explain each approach in detail before I apply it. 
 Conducting each of these analyses provides me the bases from which to move to 
the second phase of my analysis: to consider how role designations, structural features, 
and stylistic features serve as Mediational Means to mediate the flow of information in 
two real-world public engagement mechanisms. As demonstrated in Chapter 2, much 
research exists on “expert” and “public” role designations in public engagement 
mechanisms, as well as on their various structural and stylistic features. How these 
designations, structural features, and stylistic features combine as concurrent Mediational 
Means in these activity systems, however, has not been explored. Combining 
McGee/Coogan’s ideograph analysis, Rowe and Frewer’s structural variables, and 
Killingsworth and Palmer’s rhetorical analysis offers an avenue by which to do so. 
 IV.c. Study Limitations 
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 While this study makes some valuable contributions to our understandings of 
participants’ “expert” or “public” role designations, participants’ stylistic features, and 
the structural features of STE public engagement mechanisms as mediators of 
information flow, it has several limitations. Several key ones are noted here. First, it 
cannot and does not assess causal relationships among these factors, but attempts to begin 
to lay the groundwork for future studies that can. Second, because the scope—both in 
terms of duration and subject matter—of the SSFL controversy is so vast, this study is but 
a snapshot of one small aspect of this larger picture. Because this study explores only one 
moment in time in this decades’ long controversy, and addresses only one sub-
controversy among the multitude that surround SSFL, it does not account for how notions 
of <expert> and <public>, or stylistic features of participants’ remarks, have changed 
over time or amongst sub-controversies. In McGee’s terms, this study explores the 
ideographs of <expert> and <public> synchronically but not diachronically, and is thus 
incomplete (McGee, 1980, p. 16). Exploring the impact of the circulation of discourse 
over time on these issues is a worthwhile endeavor, but one that is beyond the scope of 
this project. As a result, the contributions of this study come with the caveats that they 
neither account for changes in these issues over the duration of the SSFL controversy nor 
assess these issues within the context of the larger picture of the SSFL controversy as a 
whole. Third, there is certainly a multitude of Meditational Means in STE public 
engagement systems, and this study considers only three factors—role designations, 
structural features, and stylistic features. It is important to stress that this project is not 
intended to be comprehensive, but rather to encourage scholars to view Mediational 
Means in conjunction, rather than isolation, when evaluating the flow of information in 
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STE public engagement mechanism. Fourth, as explained above, this study does not 
address the Rules, Divisions of Labor, or Community in the Water Board hearing or 
Work Group meeting, but rather considers only the original components of activity 
systems theory—the Subject, Object, and Mediational Means. This, of course, paints an 
incomplete picture that can be made more robust through future work. Finally, because 
the data set for this study is transcripts, it does not account for the impacts of factors such 
as body language and intonation.  
V. Personal Background 
 Like all researchers, in conducting this analysis I bring with me my own 
experiences, perspectives, and biases. Of particular relevance here are my experiences as 
a former volunteer for Committee to Bridge the Gap, an attorney, a Los Angeles resident, 
and an emerging Rhetoric and Composition scholar. Through my work at Committee to 
Bridge the Gap, I observed firsthand several Water Board hearings and Work Group 
meetings, so although here I am only reviewing the transcripts of two recent proceedings, 
I have witnessed past proceedings in person, and have watched these controversies 
develop over the past decade. As a lawyer, I was trained to analyze deposition and trial 
transcripts, and spent four years doing so. As a resident of Los Angeles, I am particularly 
concerned with the resolution of the cleanup controversies surrounding SSFL. Lastly, as 
an emerging Rhetoric and Composition scholar, I have spent several years studying 
rhetorical techniques in written and oral texts. Through these experiences, I have 
developed the analytical tools that this study’s transcript analysis demands. 
VI. Chapter Overview 
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 This chapter has provided a brief history of SSFL and the controversies over its 
health impacts and cleanup efforts, focusing especially on the sub-controversy that is the 
subject of this study: the renewal of Boeing’s NPDES permit under the Clean Water Act. 
It has also set forth the research questions I use this sub-controversy to explore, the 
methodology I use to address those questions, and the limitations of this study.  
 In Chapter 2, I review existing literature on ideas of knowledge, expertise, the 
“public,” and STE public engagement mechanisms, and position my project in relation to 
it.  
 In Chapter 3, I conduct an ideograph analysis of <expert> and <public> to show 
readers how these concepts are understood and enacted at the Water Board hearing and 
the Work Group meeting, which allows me to explore how these role designations served 
as Mediational Means in these mechanisms. Specifically, in this chapter I apply existing 
scholarship about knowledge and expertise to consider which speakers were “certified” 
experts via formal credentials or training versus “uncertified” experts via firsthand 
experience (Collins & Evans, 2002, p. 260), what types of expertise (e.g. “contributory,” 
“interactional,” or “referred”) each speaker demonstrated (Collins and Evans, 2002, p. 
257), and what kinds of knowledge (e.g. quantitative versus qualitative) each speaker 
possessed (e.g. Stirling, 2012, p. 4). In doing so, I offer some ideas as to why some 
people were granted expert status in each of these engagement mechanisms and others 
were not, and consider how these role designations mediated the flow of information in 
each mechanism. 
 In Chapter 4, I examine the structural components of the Water Board hearing and 
Work Group Meeting as Mediational Means. By “structural components,” I mean 
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components that impact the: (1) the number of participants; (2) the amount of relevant 
information elicited from those participants; (3) the amount of relevant information 
provided by sponsors; (4) the degree to which information is transferred to, and processed 
by, recipients; (5) the degree to which all relevant information from participants is 
aggregated; and (6) the degree of perceived independence or collusion of an engagement 
mechanism’s sponsor.  
 In Chapter 5, I analyze the stylistic features of participants’ presentations at the 
Water Board hearing and Work Group meeting as Mediational Means. Specifically, I 
look at speakers’ use of: (1) passive voice; (2) nominalizations; (3) strings of noun 
modifiers; (4) acronyms; (5) technical language; (6) narrative; (7) precise language; and 
(8) deferential language. I compare both the presentations of the speakers who spoke at 
both the Water Board hearing and the Work Group meeting, as well as the presentations 
of the designated experts and non-experts at the Water Board hearing. 
 I conduct each of these inquiries to lay the groundwork for theorizing that (1) the 
designated “expert” and “public” roles of mechanism participants (explored in Chapter 
3); (2) the structural features of a mechanism (explored in Chapter 4); and (3) the stylistic 
features a presenter uses in that mechanism (explored in Chapter 5) serve as Mediational 
Means that mediate the flow of information in that mechanism. In Chapter 6, I offer a 
brief summary of my body chapters and consider how these Mediational Means may 
have mediated information flow by looking at who was granted expert status as well as 
whose feedback the Water Board incorporated into the final NPDES permit. 
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CHAPTER 2 
REVIEWING LITERATURE THAT INFORMS THIS STUDY OF MEDIATIONAL 
MEANS 
 To answer the questions set forth in Chapter 1, I situate my study in relation to 
literature related to public engagement mechanisms and their capacity to maximize 
participants’ contributory potential. Accordingly, in this chapter I review existing 
scholarship on notions of “public,” “expert” and “knowledge,” and the public’s current 
and suggested role in STE policymaking processes. I conclude this chapter by situating 
within this existing body of work this project’s concern with role designations, structure, 
and style as Mediational Means in two public engagement mechanisms. 
I. “Public” 
 Research abounds regarding what role the public should play in policy decision-
making processes. The general consensus seems to call for increasing the public’s role in 
decisions that affect them. However, what and who exactly constitutes “the public” are 
more contested issues.  
 I.a. “Public” As Continually Existing 
 Ideas vary on whether “the public” is stable and continuously existing regardless 
of what issues arise, or whether instead publics form around particular controversies and 
exist only as long as those controversies persist. Subscribers to the notion of the “public 
sphere” see it as an always-existing forum for people to discuss various issues. For 
example, Jurgen Habermas (1962) understood this space as a realm of social life where 
people set aside differences in status and discussed issues of “common concern” without 
state, church, or economic influence (p. 36). To Habermas, it is not that the public sphere 
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was a discursive space where people were presumed equal, but rather where their 
inequalities—social, economic—were irrelevant (p. 36).  
 Some scholars have taken issue with Habermas’s conception of the public sphere 
as a place where status is disregarded, issues of “common concern” are discussed,” and 
that is accessible to all. These scholars see this understanding of the public sphere as 
idealistic, unrealistic, inaccurate, and detrimental to marginalized groups. For example, 
Nancy Fraser (1990) argues that disregarding status differences usually benefits dominant 
groups and disadvantages subordinate ones (p. 64). Scholars also criticize Habermas’s 
vision of the public sphere as a place to discuss matters of “public concern,” suggesting 
that the distinction between “public” and “private” matters is an artificial one. Fraser 
(1990) offers the example of domestic violence, which was once considered a private 
matter but is now generally accepted as a public one (p. 71). Relatedly, Benhabib (1992) 
points out that deeming certain matters as “public” relegates issues that typically affect 
subordinated groups, such as issues that impact women like reproduction and caring for 
the sick or elderly, to the private realm and prevents them from being publically 
deliberated (p. 91). Echoing these concerns, Robert Asen (1999) has pointed out that 
restricting deliberation to matters of common concern, and making a priori distinctions 
that deem certain topics “public” and others “private,” excludes voices and suppresses 
difference (p. 116). Furthermore, the bourgeois public sphere authorizes an assertive 
approach to critical-rational discourse, an approach that skews access toward economic 
and cultural privilege; consequently, the cultural conventions associated with the public 
sphere implicitly extend membership only to those speakers who abide by and embody 
those conventions (Asen, 1999, p. 126). In addition, Elenore Long (2008) points out that 
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putting aside personal interests and differences to deliberate for the common good may 
actually be doing participants a disservice because self-interests can be a useful tool for 
developing cooperation and identification in community organizing (p. 113, citing 
Alinsky). Although they do not label them as such, these scholars identify role 
designations (Fraser’s critique of disregarding status differences), structural features 
(Benhabib, Asen, and Long’s discussions of public/private realm distinctions and 
suppressing difference), and stylistic features (Asen’s focus on the favoring of assertive 
and confrontational styles) of the public sphere as Mediational Means that mediate 
information flow within it in various ways. 
 I.b. “Public” as Controversy-Based and Transient 
 In contrast to Habermas’s notion of an always-existing public sphere, some 
scholars conceptualize a “public” as created around a controversy, and existing only so 
long as that controversy exists. John Dewey (1954), for example, argues that a public 
“comes into being” only when people are faced with “indirect, extensive, enduring and 
serious consequences of conjoint and interacting behavior” and have a common interest 
in controlling them (p. 126). Similarly, for Gerard Hauser (1999), a public is created 
when people come together to engage in an ongoing dialogue about a specific issue (p. 
64). He defines a public sphere as “a discursive space in which strangers discuss issues 
they perceive to be of consequence for them and their group” (p. 64). For Hauser (1999), 
a public is defined by the ongoing dialogue about an issue, rather than by the identity of 
the group engaged in that dialogue, or the formality with which that dialogue takes place 
(p. 108). For example, under this view, the public created by the SSFL controversy 
consists of persons who engage in dialogue about it, even if they initially do so only in 
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small informal discussions. This public would include community members, public 
interest groups, scientists, and decision-makers, and its makeup may continually change 
depending upon who continues to participate in such dialogue. Hauser (1999) proposes 
that a public’s effectiveness can be determined by its adherence to several “rhetorical 
norms”: (1) how permeable its boundaries are (i.e. whether people outside the core 
participants can join in the discussion); (2) whether participants are actively engaging the 
issue and other publics surrounding it rather than passively listening, absorbing, and 
applauding; (3) whether participants use the contextualized language particular to that 
discourse community to render their respective experiences intelligible to one another; 
(4) whether the public appears believable to its own members and outsiders; and (5) to 
what extent diverging opinions are tolerated, which is necessary to maintain a vibrant 
discourse (pp. 77-79). 
 Like Dewey and Hauser, Michael Warner (2002) also sees a public as temporary 
and issue-based. For Warner, a public is created and sustained by the attention people pay 
to the issue through the reflexive circulation of discourse (p. 62). Once that attention and 
circulation cease, so too does that public’s existence (Warner, 2002, p. 62). For Warner 
(2002), a public is not a material body but rather a space for sustaining the circulation of 
discourse (p. 62). Warner identifies several key features that allow a public to exist. 
According to Warner (2002), a public: is self-organized; is a relation among strangers, 
whose identities cannot be known in advance because they come together as a public only 
through participating in it; is comprised of both personal and impersonal speech; is 
created through mere attention, and ceased when that attention ceased; the social space 
created by the reflexive circulation of discourse—it is the understanding and use of a text 
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over time, not the text itself, that creates a public; and must be sustained through regular 
intervals of publication, because circulation over time changes both the text’s and the 
public’s character (pp. 50-62).  
 These days, contemporary publics often form around “public scientific 
controversies” (Crick & Gabriel, 2010, p. 207). In much the same way that Dewey, 
Hauser, and Warner see publics as “coming into being” around particular issues, Crick 
and Gabriel (2010) describe public scientific controversies as “ethical or political 
conflicts that help call into existence a scientific dispute that potentially has direct 
bearing on [the conflict’s] resolution” (p. 207). Such conflicts arise when technical 
authorities, public interests, and political exigencies intersect, and they “embed 
epistemological disputes over knowledge-claims within pragmatic contexts of public 
opinion formation to achieve intersubjective consensus on broad-based policies that are 
legitimated through shared understandings of complex problems” (Crick & Gabriel, 
2010, p. 203). In other words, these conflicts—which occur at sites of intersection 
between citizens, scientists, and legislators—provide unique opportunities for discussions 
and shared understandings of issues of common concerns to a variety of stakeholders.  
 These scholars view publics as grounded in dialogue around particular 
controversies, and as existing only as long as that dialogue continues. This understanding 
of publics highlights the importance of information flow within them, and of exploring 
what factors function as Mediational Means to impact that flow. 
 I.c. Ways to Make Publics More Effective Spaces for Engagement 
 Across various schools of thought, scholars have sought to make publics more 
effective spaces for engagement. While these suggestions differ, two unifying strategies 
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emerge: first, to value difference rather than disregard or bracket it; and, second, to 
approach difference as a resource for problem-solving, rather than to treat difference as a 
hindrance to group consensus. These strategies broaden and maximize participants’ 
contributory potential.. 
 Some scholars focus on minimizing preset, universal rules of discourse in favor of 
giving particular discourse communities’ members the power to set their own rules. Asen 
(1999) suggests using thin, rather than thick, discursive norms (p. 123). Thick discursive 
norms prescribe rules of proper conduct for discussion before dialogue begins (Asen, 
1999, p. 116). This external rule-setting assumes a subject with a fixed set of desires that 
cannot be modified by the actual participants in a discussion (Asen, 1999, p. 116). Thin 
discursive norms, in contrast, set in advance only the minimum rules needed for 
participants to decide proper conduct themselves (Asen, 1999, p. 116). This deliberative 
model allows participants to decide for themselves the goals of their dialogue by 
minimizing the prescriptive exclusion of styles, topics, and forums, and by allowing 
participants to raise questions about justice and fairness (Asen, 1999, p. 117). Similarly, 
Hauser (1999) proposes using “critical norms,” which are derived from actual discursive 
practices rather than prescribed in advance, and allow arguments to be judged based on 
how well they resonate with the particular population discussing the issue, rather than by 
a universal standard of reasonableness (p. 61).  
 Like Asen, Benhabib (1992) advocates for a deliberative public sphere that 
includes marginalized voices. By deliberation, she means a “procedure for being 
informed” in which everyone has equal opportunities to speak, equal rights to question 
the assigned topics of conversation, and equal rights to challenge the rules of the 
  33 
discourse procedure and how they are applied (p. 31). The benefits of a deliberative 
process, Benhabib (1992) explains, are that it allows for multiple perspectives, which 
leads to more robust and better-informed decisions, and that requiring participants to 
articulate their views in public prompts them to support their positions with good reasons 
or risk dismissal of their views as unsupported (pp. 33-34). Leon Mayhew (1997) echoes 
this sentiment in his criticism of professional communicators. Mayhew explains that 
professional communicators use rhetorical techniques designed to avoid having to defend 
their claims, which precludes meaningful discussion of policies and issues (pp. 42, 71). 
Relatedly, Long (2008) explains that eliciting situated knowledge from a variety of 
stakeholders can help participants see their own situated knowledge in terms of the larger 
landscape, which allows them to better assess the problems with which they are faced (p. 
205). From this perspective, a deliberative, more inclusive public sphere is not only 
procedurally fairer, insofar as it allows for more equal opportunities to participate and be 
heard. In addition, according to these scholars, it allows for substantively better outcomes 
as a result of more robust and meaningful deliberation and consideration of a wider range 
of perspectives. 
 Fraser offers a different but related solution to the bourgeois public sphere’s 
exclusionary nature. She argues that a single public sphere erroneously homogenizes 
many different publics and that because of this, we must pluralize the public sphere with 
“subaltern counterpublics” to give voices to the many distinctive groups that comprise 
modern societies (Fraser, 1990, p. 67). Doing so offers a way to counter the tendency of a 
singular public sphere to allow for hegemonic domination by the majority ideology 
(Fraser, 1990, p. 67).  
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 Echoing Fraser, Asen, and Benhabib, Elenore Long, Linda Flower, and Shirley 
Heath stress the value of recognizing and utilizing, rather than ignoring or suppressing, 
difference in a public. Like Benhabib, Long, Flower, and Heath see differences—in 
power distribution, cultural backgrounds, views, and experiences—as opportunities for 
richer, better-informed, more robust policy outcomes (Long, 2009, p. 14; Flower & 
Heath, 2000, pp. 51, 52). A variation on Benhabib and Mayhew’s view that presenting 
one’s views to others is a way to ensure that those views are supported and strong, Long, 
Flower, and Heath see value in articulating one’s purposes, positions, and assumptions to 
people from different backgrounds. They term this process “intercultural inquiry,” and 
find its value in how it requires one to continuously revise those purposes, positions, and 
assumptions (Higgins, Long, & Flower, 2006, p. 67; Flower & Heath, 2000, p. 53). 
Pittsburgh’s Community Literacy Center (the CLC) offers an example of one such site 
for this process—a counterpublic that engages alternative, often suppressed discourses. 
From the CLC, as well as Flower and Heath’s community think tank, we learn three 
strategies to engage dialogue, foreground participants’ experiences, and promote 
understanding. First, seeking the “story-behind-the-story” reveals participants’ situated 
knowledge and the significance of particular events to those participants (Long, 2009, p. 
23; Flower & Heath, 2000, p. 51). Second, seeking “rival hypotheses,” wherein multiple 
participants are asked to share differing opinions, creates opportunities to consider the 
complexity of a given issue and challenge assumptions (Long, 2009, p. 23; Flower & 
Heath, 2000, p. 43). Lastly, examining “options and outcomes” allows participants to 
translate rival hypotheses into suggested plans for action (Long, 2009, p. 23; Flower & 
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Heath, 2000, p. 52). Each of these strategies offers a way to utilize and value, rather than 
suppress and ignore, the heterogeneous nature of publics.  
 The effectiveness of these participant-centered strategies demonstrates what many 
successful entrepreneurs already know: in policy-making, as in knowledge industries, the 
greatest asset lies in people, and this “community expertise” should be treated as a 
valuable resource (Flower & Heath, 2000, p. 44). This fact necessitates a 
reconceptualization of where expertise “naturally” resides, and of how and by whom 
knowledge is constructed (Flower & Heath, 2000, p. 53). For example, in the case of 
university service learning programs, we must flip the traditional script of history, which 
views college students as the experts who impart skills and knowledge on community 
members one-directionally. Instead, we must understand these partnerships as just that—
collaborations in which those with more power—the students—conduct work with, rather 
than about, those with less power—the community members (Flower & Heath, p. 45). 
Doing so entails viewing the public as composed of diverse persons with valuable 
knowledge of their own to contribute, rather than as a homogenous group of mere 
receptacles for experts’ knowledge.  
 Not only do we need to recognize the public as heterogeneous and competent, but 
we must go a step further and move away from the dominant treatment of the public as 
mere laypersons, consumers, or stakeholders. When we view members of the public as 
laypersons, we see them as passive recipients of knowledge who need to be educated and 
informed. Public engagement processes based on this view aim to create an informed 
populace that trusts institutional structures and scientific expertise via a one-way model 
of knowledge transmission (Wickson, Delgado, & Kjølberg, 2010, p. 757). This is the 
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model Flower, Heath, and others (e.g. Andy Stirling, discussed in more detail below) 
caution against. Similarly, engagement processes that view the public as consumers 
involve a unidirectional flow of information designed to promote acceptance of existing 
products or of the development of future products, such as in the case of genetically 
modified foods (Wickson, Delgado, & Kjølberg, 2010, p. 757). Viewing the public as 
stakeholders leads to more inclusive public engagement processes, but this view is still 
insufficient, according to Wickson, Delgado, and Kjølberg (2010) (p.757). Instead, we 
must view the public as composed of citizens—that is, as dynamic, self-defining actors 
who not only have the right to be informed and make choices as individual consumers, 
but also have a duty to inform, consider, and represent others (Wickson, Delgado, & 
Kjølberg, 2010, p. 758). This entails reconceptualizing members of “the public” as 
heterogeneous individuals who have a duty to share their knowledge, visions, and values 
with researchers and decision-makers, and to ensure that the interests of themselves and 
those not directly represented in the decision-making process (e.g. future generations, 
animals, and the environment) are taken into account (Wickson, Delgado, & Kjølberg, p. 
758). Such a reconceptualization sets the stage for designing STE public engagement 
mechanisms that give “the public” opportunities to access and share information that are 
on par with those that designated experts currently enjoy. Doing so, however, requires 
one to consider what Mediational Means mediate this information flow, and how—the 
subject of this project. 
 In seeking to make “publics” more effective, some researchers focus less on 
making the public more inclusive and representative, and instead point to improving 
communication to combat what they see as the public’s loss of focus on important issues. 
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Habermas (1962) attributes this loss of focus to two factors: the media’s increasing 
influence over the public sphere, combined with its consolidation in the hands of a 
powerful few (p. 160). These factors, he argues, have caused a breakdown in the 
democratic and deliberative nature of the public sphere, which has led the public to care 
more about consumption and entertainment than politics (Habermas, 1962, p. 160). 
Similarly, Dewey (1954) sees the public as distracted and overtaken by powerful forces 
like special interests and entertainment, which has made public communications about 
issues difficult (p. 321). Mayhew (1997) also sees the demise of a public sphere as a 
space for good faith, two-way discourse, replaced by a “New Public” that is subject to 
manipulation by lobbyists and “professional persuaders” (p. 43). He argues that people 
lack the time and energy to filter through the “manipulative efforts of professional 
persuaders,” which preclude true deliberation in which speakers would have to defend 
their claims—or, in Mayhew’s terms, citizens are unable to test speakers’ “rhetorical 
tokens” (p. 254). Both Habermas and Dewey note the importance to publics of strong 
means of communication, and Dewey (1954) suggests that perhaps one day technology 
will be used not to distract the public from, but rather to improve communication about, 
important issues (p. 142). Dewey (1954) also stresses the importance of local 
communities as places where people can become active participants in conversations 
about issues that impact them (p. 219).  
 While the suggestions posited by each scholar for making “publics” more 
productive sites for engagement vary, each entails at its core a way to broaden and 
strengthen participation in decisions by those impacted by them. Ideas about how to 
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determine whether these efforts are successful also differ, as discussed in the following 
subsection. 
 I.d. What is a Successful Public? 
 While some scholars’ suggestions for improving publics seem geared towards the 
ultimate goal of achieving outcomes that incorporate a broader range of perspectives and 
that have been thoroughly deliberated, others are quick to point out that substantive 
outcome changes and duration of a public are not the only measures of its success (e.g. 
Long, 2008, pp. 73, 116; Crick & Gabriel, 2010, p. 220). Instead, the processes a public 
goes through in identifying and describing problems, listening to others’ perspectives, 
exploring alternative ways of naming and describing these problems, and imagining 
strategies for addressing them, are valuable in and of themselves (Long, 2008, p. 73). 
Similarly, Crick and Gabriel (2010) reject the production of legislation as the measure of 
a public scientific controversy’s success, positing instead that it is the long-term influence 
of its communicative processes—what communicative, collaborative, and participatory 
procedures and forums it creates—that makes it successful (p. 220). Dave Guston (2014) 
likewise sees success as broader than impacting laws and regulations. He explains that 
changes in the ways issues are framed, the vocabulary used to discuss them, and the 
substance and procedures involved in policymaking around them, are also viable and 
important measures of policy impact (p. 56). 
 While the yardstick for a successful public thus varies, the unifying theme in each 
of these ideas is that acknowledging difference rather than disregarding it, treating it as a 
valuable resource for meaningful dialogue, and using it to provoke reflection, revision, 
and understanding in those involved in a policy decision is beneficial to both the decision 
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itself and the people impacted by it. This concept is tied to the idea of expanding notions 
of expertise to include local and experiential knowledge, and modifying our 
understandings of the traditional divisions between “experts” and “the public,” discussed 
in the next section. 
II. Expertise and Knowledge 
 Traditionally depicted as the more knowledgeable counterbalance to the “lay 
public,” experts also play an important role in public engagement mechanisms. How one 
defines expertise has implications for allocations of power, input, and decision-making 
authority in a given mechanism, all of which impact both the mechanism itself as well as 
its outcomes. Most scholars agree that having expertise involves the possession of some 
sort of specialized knowledge (an issue taken up in more detail in section II.b., below), 
but opinions differ as to whether there are other factors at play in achieving and 
demonstrating expert status.  
 II.a. What Is Expertise and How Does One Acquire It? 
 Just as scholars differ in their ideas of who or what constitute a public, they 
likewise vary in their views of what makes someone an expert. Some see expertise as 
solely a matter of possessing specialized knowledge, while others consider how one’s 
audience receives and views them as an explicit criterion for being an expert. Still others 
focus more on what experts do—how they approach and interact with the issue at hand—
than on what knowledge they possess or how they are perceived by others. As explored 
further in this study, these differences matter because who we designated as experts in a 
given STE public engagement mechanism has significant implications for how 
information flows in that mechanism. 
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  II.a.i. Expertise as What Someone Has: Possession of Knowledge 
 Carolyn Miller (2003) sees expert opinions as “judgment[s] based on knowledge 
and experience” (p. 177). Similarly, Harry Collins and Robert Evans view expertise as 
knowledge acquired through experience. While expertise is frequently recognized using 
the heuristic of a degree, certification, or other formal training, Collins and Evans argue 
that it is actual experience, not the formalism of a degree, that qualifies one as an expert. 
In other words, the focus in evaluating expertise should be on scientists as specialists 
regarding the particular issue at hand rather than as generalists in possession of formal 
credentials (Collins & Evans, 2002, p. 260). Frank Fischer (2000) echoes this sentiment 
when he argues that we need a new understanding of experts as “specialized citizens” (p. 
46). According to Fischer (2000), this notion appropriately emphasizes that experts are 
merely ordinary citizens for everything outside their areas of expertise, and that 
knowledge is not generalizable beyond a specific context (p. 44). Fischer (2000) explains 
that such an understanding of expertise opens a place for citizens to participate in 
scientific inquiries (p. 47). To demonstrate this point, Collins and Evans (2002) offer the 
example of Brian Wynne’s study of the relationship between scientists and Cumbrian 
sheep farmers after Chernobyl ( p. 255). Although the farmers possessed experiential 
expertise regarding the sheep’s ecology and behavior, they lacked the formal certification 
of the scientists, which made the scientists reluctant to take their advice (Collins & 
Evans, 2002,pp. 255-256). Collins and Evans (2002) explain that this is not an example 
of “lay expertise,” a term they reject as contradictory and counterproductive, but rather of 
the interaction between two communities of experts, one of which lacks formal 
certification (p. 270). 
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 Collins and Evans (2002) distinguish between three types of expertise: 
“contributory,” “interactional,” and “referred” (p. 257). By “contributory expertise,” they 
mean the type of expertise that allows one to make substantive contributions to the actual 
decision at issue (Collins & Evans, 2002, p. 254). If one has “interactional expertise,” in 
contrast, they are able to interact with the participants in a scientific debate, though they 
may not be able to make substantive contributions to it. Interactional expertise is 
particularly important for uncertified contributory experts, who may have valuable 
experiential knowledge to contribute but lack the technical language of the decision-
making discourse community, making it difficult for them to communicate that 
knowledge in ways that will resonate with others (Collins & Evans, 2002, p. 256). This 
focus on sharing one’s knowledge in a way that his or her audience values and respects is 
reminiscent of Simmons and Grabill’s discussion of “nonexpert citizens” lacking the 
“performative” aspects of expertise (Simmons & Grabill, 2007, p. 422). Simmons and 
Grabill (2007) explain that citizens must “understand the particular institutional systems 
(rhetorical situations) in which they find themselves—to know how to ask questions that 
will uncover rules, procedures, protocols, and values. […] And they must be able to 
produce the professional and technical performances expected in contemporary civic 
forums” (p. 422). While Simmons and Grabill focus on ways citizens can develop these 
abilities themselves, Collins and Evans recommend that those lacking interactional 
expertise use spokespersons or institutional translators who possess it to increase their 
chances of impacting technical decisions (Collins & Evans, 2002, p. 256). Returning to 
Wynne’s Cumbrian sheep farmer example, they explain that the sheep farmers possessed 
contributory expertise, but lacked the interactional expertise necessary for the scientists to 
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hear them, and suggest that the farmers may have been more successful if they had a 
mediator who did (Collins & Evans, 2002, pp. 255-256). Lastly, Collins and Evans 
(2002) use the term “referred expertise” to describe contributory expertise about a 
different issue than the one at hand (p. 257). For example, they discuss a scientific project 
manager who lacks contributory expertise in the particular science at issue, but possesses 
contributory expertise about other issues Collins & Evans, 2002, p. 257). This manager, 
Collins and Evans tell us, will do a better job, and have more authority and legitimacy, 
than one without referred expertise, because he or she understands what is involved for 
the scientists he or she is managing in contributing to their science (2002, p. 257; 2007, p. 
65). Given their emphasis on experience, it is not surprising that Collins and Evans 
(2007) view the acquisition of expertise as a social process; tacit knowledge, which they 
explain as the deep understanding of an issue, can only be gained through social 
immersion in groups who possess it, rather than through the degree process (p. 3). 
 Collins and Evans (2002) also distinguish between possessing political rights 
versus expertise regarding an issue by asking us to imagine that a group of London 
financiers bought the Cumbrian farm shortly before the Chernobyl explosion and 
employed the farmers to tend to them (p. 261). In this scenario, the financiers would 
possess political rights in decisions about the sheep, but all the expertise would lie with 
the farmers (Collins & Evans, 2002, p. 261). Sheila Jasanoff (2003), however, takes issue 
with this distinction, arguing that policy is made through the negotiations between 
science and society, making any distinction between the two difficult to discern and not 
in line with the actualities of science policy-making processes (p. 394). 
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 At the same time that Collins and Evans (2002) stress the importance and value of 
experiential knowledge in developing and assessing expertise, they caution against 
relying solely on local experiential expertise, pointing out that while locals may be 
experts on a decision’s or activity’s local impacts, they may lack expertise about its 
effects on the larger population (p. 267). They offer the example of a mining community, 
where local residents have expertise on the disadvantages to the local population but may 
lack expertise on the advantages to the larger population (Collins & Evans, 2002, p. 267). 
Echoing this concern, James W. Hikins and Richard A. Cherwitz emphasize the 
importance of both breadth and depth of expert knowledge. They explain that an expert 
must have not only focused knowledge of the issue at hand but also broader knowledge 
of collateral issues that influence and are influenced by the exercise of that focused 
knowledge (Hikins & Cherwitz, 2011, pp. 302-303). Otherwise, a myopic focus can lead 
to “ineffectual expertise or unanticipated consequences” (Hikins & Cherwitz, 2011, p. 
303).  
  II.a.ii. Expertise as How Someone Is Received: Societal Recognition 
 Others focus not only on the experience or knowledge one possesses in assessing 
expertise but also on how that experience or knowledge is received by others. For 
example, Carolyn Miller focuses on what makes an audience perceive someone as 
credible as an expert. Miller (2003) explains that ethos is usually established through 
one’s moral values or character, but that due to the nature of risk assessment, which 
values the technical and quantitative over the evaluative and qualitative, an STE expert’s 
ethos comes instead from his or her experience grounded in technical, specialized 
knowledge (p. 200). This shift stems from risk assessment’s “technicizing” of problems, 
  44 
whereby the central question changes from “how safe is safe enough”—an evaluative, 
values-based question focused on “safe enough,” that members of the public are quite 
competent to answer—into a technical one focused on “how safe” that requires 
specialized knowledge to answer (C. Miller, 2003, p. 197). Miller (2003) cautions that 
this conflating of ethos and logos can lead to a loss of trust in experts (p. 202). Miller’s 
focus on logos as the means by which an expert gains audience acceptance demonstrates 
that she understands expertise not just as the possession of knowledge but rather as the 
audience’s acceptance of one’s expertise through his or her demonstration of that 
knowledge.  
 Camille Limoges also focuses on audience acceptance as a means to establish 
expertise. However, Limoges argues that audiences assess an expert’s credibility not by 
their individual attributes like their own experience-based specialized knowledge, like 
Miller, but rather from the strength of the networks with which they are associated. This 
is because Limoges (1993) views expertise not as the education of the public by experts, 
but rather primarily as a collective learning process through which experts’ data is 
assessed and used by others, earning experts the credibility required to perform as experts 
(p. 418). This notion echoes Frank Blackler’s focus on knowing as something people do 
rather than as on knowledge as something people have (see “Knowledge” section, 
below).   
 Johanna Hartelius also understands expertise as the combination of specialized 
knowledge and audience acceptance. She explains that an expert must obtain the public’s 
consent and trust to succeed in earning legitimacy and authority (Hartelius, 2010, p. 32). 
For Hartelius (2010), expertise is a rhetorical construct that is both social and contextual 
  45 
(pp. 150, 250). “‘Experts’ are not merely autonomous repositories of factual info; they 
are embedded in ‘social and discursive contexts’ whose unfolding meanings are evoked 
by audiences, creating and legitimizing expertise” (Hikins & Cherwitz, 2011, p. 292, 
citing Hartelius, 2010, p. 166). She identifies six “congruities”—her term for strategies 
used to solve challenges—that experts share: they identify themselves within larger 
networks; they possess techne—a specialized skill or knowledge set; they possess expert 
pedagogy—that is, they take a stance on teaching the objects or process of their 
knowledge; they take a stance on whether the public should defer or participate in 
discussions about a given issue; they create a sense of urgency that requires their 
expertise; and they relate their expertise to everyday life (Hartelius, 2010, pp. 164-166). 
It is through these actions, Hartelius explains, that experts establish themselves as such, 
by both demonstrating specialized knowledge and rhetorically persuading others of their 
legitimacy and authority. James Fleck also incorporates notions of power and authority 
into his explanation of expertise. He defines expertise as a “trialectic” of: (1) 
knowledge—the “technical ‘substance’ of expertise”; (2) political and institutional 
power; and (3) economic tradability (Fleck, Faulkner, & Williams, 1998, pp. 144-49). 
Frank Fischer echoes this idea when he traces the view of those with scientific but not 
local knowledge as experts back to colonial beliefs in “the need to convert and improve 
the ‘uncivilized savages’ of the underdeveloped world and to abolish their primitive, 
‘childlike ways’” (Fischer, 2000, p. 195, quoting Jiggins, 1989). For these scholars, 
merely possessing specialized knowledge is not enough to be viewed as an expert; one 
must also be granted societal and/or institutional recognition as such. 
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 Jasanoff (2003) also stresses the social and contextual nature of expertise, 
explaining that it is not merely “held in the heads and hands of skilled persons who have 
had extensive experience with a given issue,” but rather is “acquired and deployed in 
particular historical, political, and cultural contexts” (p. 393). As such, expertise is 
context-specific and what qualifies as expertise in one country or regarding one issue 
may not in another place or situation. At the same time, Hikins and Cherwitz (2011) 
stress that experts are only perceived as such if their opinions align with reality (p. 294). 
Accordingly, while notions of expertise are relative and context-dependent, they cannot 
reject notions of “truth” and “objectivity” (Hikins & Cherwitz, 2011, p. 296). Collins and 
Evans (2002) begrudgingly echo the sentiment that expertise requires not only knowledge 
but also societal acceptance when they note that acquiring expert status may have little to 
do with the possession of real and substantive expertise (p. 265), and reject formal 
certification as an accurate gauge of expertise, discussed further below (p. 260). In these 
ways, attaining expert status is as much about one’s audience as oneself.  
  II.a.iii. Expertise as What Someone Does: Engagement with Information 
 Still other scholars distinguish between experts and others based not on what 
knowledge they possess or how it is received, but rather by how they approach and 
interact with the issue at hand. For example, for Cheryl Geisler (2013), the difference 
between experts and non-experts is that experts create and transform knowledge, while 
lay people merely obtain and display it (p. 81). In other words, students and laypersons 
are taught to think of knowledge as a body of truths, to treat texts as authoritative and 
autonomous, and to merely absorb and regurgitate information. Experts, in contrast, 
challenge and argue with texts; they actively engage with, rather than passively receive, 
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information about the issue at hand. Geisler (2013) sees this distinction as a deliberate 
effort by professionals—those with power—to exclude others and ensure that they alone 
can understand and interact with the specialized content of their field (p. 94). Fischer 
(2000) echoes this sentiment when he writes that, “[t]he issue of citizen participation in 
inquiry is perceived by many professionals as a threat to their status and authority” (p. 
261).  
 How one acquires and demonstrates expertise is contested. In the next subsection, 
I discuss one important component of that acquisition and demonstration: possession of 
knowledge. Just as with “expert” designations, understanding what knowledge is valued 
in a given STE public engagement mechanism has implications for how information 
flows in that mechanism. 
 II.b. Knowledge 
 Most scholars agree that the possession of specialized knowledge is at least part 
of what makes one an expert. Thus, in order to understand how those without specialized 
knowledge might come to be considered experts it is important to explore what is meant 
by the term “knowledge.”  
  II.b.i. Knowledge Is Contextual 
 Just as scholars like Carolyn Miller, Jasanoff, and Hartelius stress the contextual 
nature of expertise, many scholars likewise focus on the contextual nature of knowledge. 
Bruno Latour, for instance, explains that what we understand as scientific knowledge is 
heavily dependent on time, instruments, people, and institutions. He stresses that science 
is tentative and knowledge is iterative, in part because it is situated in communities of 
practice and culture, and also because it is, like all other human endeavors, contingent 
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upon history (Latour, 2007, pp. 6-7). In other words, knowledge, especially in the 
scientific realm, is continually developed and revised with the benefit of hindsight, and 
such development and revision are dependent on the historical contexts in which they 
occur.  
 Michel Foucault also notes the crucial role context plays in determining what is 
counted as knowledge in a given society. He explains that knowledge is created through 
discourse, but that the discourse that gets counted as knowledge is the discourse of the 
powerful. He writes, “knowledge is a matter of the social, historical and political 
conditions under which, for example, statements come to count as true or false” 
(Foucault, 1972, p. 26). Foucault sees knowledge not just as a thing that people possess, 
but as a part of a particular discursive practice that becomes privileged due to the power 
of its users. Similarly, Fleck defines knowledge as “information given significance by 
human agency,” and explains that “the power associated with formal knowledge is partly 
a reflection of past proven utility, and is partly dynamically coupled with current 
tradability (Fleck, Faulkner, & Williams, 1998, p. 155). In other words, whether 
information counts as knowledge is dependent on its usefulness in a given context. 
 While Foucault, Latour, and Fleck focus on the creation of scientific knowledge 
as contextual, Brian Wynne posits that the understanding of scientific knowledge is 
likewise context-dependent. He explains that scientific knowledge is never experienced 
as “pure knowledge” (Wynne, 1991, p. 115). Instead, people understand it in conjunction 
with supplementary experiential knowledge regarding situation-specific factors like one’s 
local environment, hobbies, occupation, or illnesses, or institutional or social knowledge 
(Wynne, 1991, p. 115; see also Scheufele, 2013, p. 14043). For example, if scientific 
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knowledge is already embedded in organizational procedures, a worker may feel the need 
to learn only the procedures and not the scientific knowledge itself (Wynne, 1991, p. 
116). Accordingly, Wynne (1991) argues that public uptake of scientific knowledge is 
based not on intellectual capability (p. 116). Rather, it depends more on social-
institutional factors, especially those that impact one’s perception of the usefulness of 
that knowledge or how that knowledge accords with one’s personal experiences (Wynne, 
1991, p. 116). Similarly, Sarah Davies’ (2011) research has shown that people use three 
sets of tools in weighing and evaluating emerging technologies: personal experience, 
analogies and comparisons to ideas with which people have more familiarity, and fiction 
and popular culture (p. 320).  
 Massimiano Bucchi (2008) takes a related stance, arguing that factual information 
is “but one ingredient of lay knowledge” that interweaves with other elements like value 
judgments, trust in scientific institutions, and perceptions of one’s own ability to put 
scientific knowledge to practical use to “form a corpus no less sophisticated than 
specialist expertise” (p. 60). Bucchi (2008) further explains that lay knowledge is filtered 
by factors such as the selective perception of media messages, an audience’s previous 
motivations and attitudes, and “communication intermediaries”—those who relayed 
information to them (p. 66).  
 Relatedly, risk communication scholars Vincent Covello and Peter M. Sandman 
identify several psychological and social factors that influence how people process 
scientific information about risk assessment. Instead of viewing this information in a 
vacuum, people interpret it in conjunction with their own beliefs, perceptions, and 
knowledge about the risk, such as whether it will personally affect them, how much 
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media attention it receives, if it will affect children, if it has catastrophic potential, if it is 
controllable, if it is voluntary undertaken, and if it is reversible (Covello & Sandman, 
2001, pp. 164-178). Accordingly, one person’s understandings of a risk may differ starkly 
from another’s depending on a host of contextual factors. 
 For these scholars, knowledge is not universal and objective. Instead, it is context-
dependent and a reflection of the environment in which it develops. 
  II.b.ii. Multiple Kinds of Knowledge 
 While many people conceive of knowledge as something that people have, 
Blackler, not unlike Foucault, sees knowing as something people (and organizations) do 
(Blackler, 1995, p. 1). This is similar to the way that Limoges sees expertise as a process 
rather than a message (Limoges, 1993, p. 418). For Blackler, knowing is a cultural 
phenomenon, and the focus should be on knowledge systems—that is, on ways of 
knowing and doing, rather than on knowledge as a commodifiable object of possession. 
Blackler (1995) identifies five prominent conceptions of knowledge from a review of 
organization studies literature. First, “embrained” knowledge is dependent on conceptual 
skills and cognitive abilities; this abstract knowledge is privileged in Western cultures, 
and is the kind of knowledge typically taught in Western schools (p. 2). Blackler (1995) 
also identifies several types of tacit knowledge: embodied, encultured, and embedded. 
“Embodied knowledge” is action-oriented, and learned by doing, such as through 
internships, rather than through general knowledge of abstract rules (p. 2). This is the 
type of experiential knowledge that Collins and Evans posit should be used to assess 
expertise, rather than the embrained knowledge typically used to do so today. 
“Encultured” knowledge is shared understandings that are part of cultural meaning 
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systems (Blackler, 1995, p. 2). This knowledge is socially constructed, heavily language-
dependent, and open to negotiation (Blackler, 1995, p. 2). It is different from embodied 
knowledge in that it is about ideas and understandings rather than actions like problem-
solving techniques. This type of knowledge brings to mind Hartelius’s and Jasanoff’s 
emphasis on the social and contextual nature of expertise. “Embedded” knowledge differs 
from embodied and encultured knowledge in that instead of residing in people, it resides 
in systemic routines, such as an organization’s rules, routines, or processes (Blackler, 
1995, p. 2). Lastly, “encoded” knowledge is information that is decontextualized and 
conveyed by signs and symbols, such as that found in manuals (Blackler, 1995, p. 3). 
Blackler (1995) takes issue with what he sees as the increasing commodification of 
knowledge in today’s society, and focuses on the contextual, pragmatic, mediated nature 
of knowledge—how people “do” knowing by using and altering information in context-
specific ways (p. 3). 
 In some ways a type of both embedded and encultured knowledge, local 
knowledge for many scholars is an important and often undervalued resource. Higgins, 
Long, and Flower (2006), for instance, explain that local knowledge is a “rich, 
experientially based resource for interpreting and problematizing familiar abstractions 
and stock solutions to problems that are not yet fully understood” (pp. 19-20). Similarly, 
Crick and Gabriel (2010) explain that although citizens may lack “encyclopedic 
knowledge,” they “possess intimate understandings of their lifeworlds,” which puts them 
in a unique position to know how policy decision might impact their environments and 
makes them especially motivated to seek outcomes that limit redress problems within 
them (p. 220). The idea that local knowledge is equally as valuable as other types of 
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knowledge echoes Collins and Evans’ argument for experience- rather than credential-
based expertise, as well as Bucchi’s explicit stance that “lay knowledge is not an 
impoverished or quantitatively inferior version of expert knowledge,” but rather it is 
qualitatively different (Bucchi, 2008, p. 60).  
 In these ways, we can understand knowledge as broader than the traditional view 
as an objective, universal object acquired through schooling. Instead, we see that what 
counts as knowledge depends very much on the context in which it has been developed 
and is being used, and that there are many different kinds of knowledge that are not 
always equally valued in STE policymaking. These understandings about knowledge 
have implications for how information flows in STE public engagement mechanisms. 
III. Public Communication and Participation Mechanisms in STE Public Policy 
 In recent years, both public communication (meaning discussion and circulation 
of issues, information, and ideas not necessarily tied to particular decision-making) and 
public engagement in decision-making processes (meaning the involvement of the public 
in actual decision-making processes) in STE have experienced a shift from top-down 
approaches to more participatory ones. Still, debates and research abound regarding both 
the best ways to communicate about scientific issues with “the public” as well as the 
appropriate levels and types of public participation in STE public policy decisions. 
 III.a. Public Communication and Understanding of STE Issues 
  III.a.i. “Scientific Literacy” 
 Many scholars agree that public understanding of STE—often referred to as 
“scientific literacy”—is a prerequisite to effective public participation in STE policy. Jon 
D. Miller (1998), for example, explains that healthy democratic systems require a 
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significant number of citizens to have an understanding of science (p. 205, quoting 
Durant, Evans, & Thomas). Traditional scientific literacy is generally understood as the 
ability to read and write about science and technology, and is usually assessed via lists of 
questions posed in isolation without much context (J. Miller, 1998, p. 204).   
 Several scholars take issue with what scientific literacy is traditionally understood 
to mean. For example, Benjamin Shen proposes three categories of scientific literacy, 
rather than the singular one measured by traditional scientific literacy tests. Practical 
scientific literacy, Shen (1975) explains, is the most urgently needed but most neglected 
type, and involves information about science issues that impact people’s daily lives, such 
as health and nutrition (p. 46). Civic scientific literacy, in contrast, aims to instill citizens 
with greater awareness of science and science-related issues so they will feel comfortable 
bringing their “common sense to bear” on these issues and “participate more fully in 
democratic processes of an increasingly technological society” (Shen, 1975, p. 48). 
Echoing Stirling’s call for citizen involvement in the early stages of scientific policy 
decisions, Shen (1975) explains that, “how a technological project is implemented is 
mainly a job for experts, but the more basic decision of whether a project is to be 
undertaken must rest with citizens and their representatives” (p. 48). Shen (1975) sees the 
keys to increasing civic scientific literacy as: (1) more public exposure to science via 
more effective schooling and increased quantity and quality of scientific reporting in the 
media; and (2) analysis of “the science behind specific science-related public issues” in 
“plain English for the average citizen”—that is, in language that does not require 
specialized knowledge to understand (p. 48). Lastly, cultural scientific literacy is 
motivated by the desire to know something regarding science, not to solve practical 
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problems but as an end in itself, like art appreciation (Shen, 1975, p. 49). While cultural 
scientific literacy appears to lack utilitarian value, it helps bridge the gap between 
scientist and non-scientist “cultures” (Shen, 1975, p. 49). 
 Jon D. Miller expands on Shen’s work regarding civic scientific literacy. Miller 
(1998) explains that civic scientific literacy must be understood as a multidimensional 
concept that involves: (1) a vocabulary of basic scientific constructs sufficient to read 
competing views on a scientific issue in a newspaper or magazine; (2) an understanding 
of the process or nature of scientific inquiry; and (3) some level of understanding of the 
impact of science and technology on society (p. 205). 
 William Kinsella makes a strong argument as to why traditional notions of 
scientific literacy are not necessarily useful if the goal of such literacy is participation in 
STE policymaking. He contends that citizens do not need the same depth of technical 
knowledge as specialists to participate effectively in STE public policy decisions, but 
rather only a “working vocabulary of science terms and concepts, and an overall 
understanding of how technical reasoning operates” (Kinsella, 2004, p. 92). Kinsella 
(2004) explains that such a working knowledge cannot and should not replace “technical 
or policy professionals’” knowledge, but that it can provide the public with “an adequate 
foundation for genuine dialogue with those specialists” (p. 85). If such a working 
knowledge is in fact sufficient for meaningful public participation in STE policy, 
traditional notions of scientific literacy seem inappropriate insofar as such participation is 
the goal. 
 Other scholars offer critiques not just of how scientific literacy is defined but also 
of how it is assessed. As Brossard and Lewenstein (2010) explain, due to power 
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relationships between those with the particular knowledge measured by scientific literacy 
surveys and those without it, most of the questions asked to the public to assess their 
scientific understanding have no context and ignore other forms of knowledge that may 
be relevant to people in their everyday lives (p. 13). This is problematic because people 
learn best when facts and theories have meaning in their personal lives (Brossard & 
Lewenstein, 2010, p. 13). Accordingly, Lewenstein (2003) suggests formulating these 
assessments with greater attention paid to other forms of knowledge that may be relevant 
to people in their everyday lives (p. 3). 
 For these scholars, the predominant singular vision of scientific literacy and non-
contextual mode of its assessment are too narrow. They privilege certain types of 
knowledge, reify traditional power dynamics, and underestimate citizens’ knowledge and 
understanding, all of which neglect the relevance and value of the “public’s” input into 
STE policy decisions. 
  III.a.ii. Public Communication Mechanisms 
 Just as Shen discusses several types of scientific literacy with different aims (e.g. 
enabling citizen participation in STE policy decision versus one’s own edification for 
personal enrichment), Bucchi identifies several levels of public communication for 
audiences with varying levels of scientific literacy. The “intraspecialist” level is the most 
esoteric, is provisional and tentative, and consists of texts like specialized journal papers 
(Bucchi, 2008, p. 61). Communications in the “interspecialist” level are aimed at 
researchers working in the same discipline but in different areas, such as interdisciplinary 
articles in “bridge journals” like Nature or Science (Bucchi, 2008, p. 61). The “pedagogic 
level” describes communications found in textbooks, which emphasize the historical 
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perspective of STE issues and attempt to transform theory into fact (Bucchi, 2008, p. 61). 
Lastly, the “popular level” consists of scientific articles found in popular media like 
television documentaries and daily newspapers (Bucchi, 2008, p. 61). These 
communications are full of metaphorical images and focus on issues with mass appeal 
and application, such as health, technology, and the economy (Bucchi, 2008, p. 61). In 
communications at the popular level, scientific information is presented as the most 
definite and certain (Bucchi, 2008, p. 62). 
 The results of traditional scientific literacy assessments have led to 
communication mechanisms based on what is often called “the deficit model” or the 
“diffusionist model,” wherein the public is seen as lacking knowledge and the solution is 
seen as transporting information from a specialist context to a popular one (Brossard & 
Lewenstein, 2010, p. 12; Bucchi, 2008, p. 58). Under this view, the public is passive and 
scientific communication is a one-way, linear process with a sharp distinction between 
scientific and popular discourse (Bucchi, 2008, p. 58).  
 Although there is disagreement over what the most effective public engagement 
mechanisms look like, there is general consensus that they should look different than the 
deficit model (Delgado, Kjølberg, and Wickson, 2011, p. 827). As explained above, 
Brossard and Lewenstein (2010) see the assessments that led to this model as deeply 
flawed (p. 13). They also point out that despite over 30 years of attempting to “fill the 
deficit,” assessments continue to reflect a largely stagnant level of scientific literacy 
(Brossard & Lewenstein 13). Others cite the artificial division this model perpetuates 
between knowledge creators and knowledge receivers, and the power dynamics inherent 
in it. Bucchi (2008), for example, argues that communication should be seen as “cross-
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talk,” rather than transfer (p. 67). Based on such shortcomings, scholars have posed a 
variety of alternative models by which to more effectively communicate with the public 
regarding STE issues. 
 The “contextual model” responds to calls—such as those by Wynne and 
Lewenstein—for an increased focus on the needs, interests, and backgrounds of members 
of the public (Wynne, 1991, p. 115; Lewenstein, 2003, p. 3; Brossard & Lewenstein, 
2010, pp. 13-14). It “acknowledges that individuals do not simply respond as empty 
containers to information, but rather process information according to social and 
psychological schemas that have been shaped by previous experiences, cultural contexts, 
and personal circumstances” such as stage in life, personality type, the social context in 
which information is received, and media influence (Brossard & Lewenstein, 2010, pp. 
13-14). This model has led to messages that are tailored to their recipients’ needs, but it is 
criticized as merely a more sophisticated version of the deficit model in which the focus 
on individuals’ needs and responses is used as a tool for manipulation and the goal 
remains acquiescence rather than communication (Brossard & Lewenstein, 2010, p. 14).  
 The “lay expertise model” takes the contextual model a step further. Its focus is 
expressly on actively engaging citizens with science and scientific issues, and it is 
premised on the idea that knowledge based on the lives and histories of those citizens 
(what is variously referred to as “local knowledge,” “experiential knowledge,” and “lay 
expertise,” among other terms) is valuable and important (Brossard & Lewenstein, 2010, 
p. 15). Further, rather than seeking to verify local knowledge with modern scientific 
methods, it is explicitly designed to value such knowledge in its own right and to 
incorporate such knowledge into policy decisions (Brossard & Lewenstein, 2010, p. 15). 
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Critics of this model argue that it swings the pendulum too far, privileging local 
knowledges over reliable knowledge about the natural world produced by modern 
science, and that it is driven too strongly by a political commitment to empowerment of 
local communities (Brossard & Lewenstein, 2010, p. 15).  
 In some ways proffered as the “just right” middle ground between the deficit and 
lay expertise models, the “public engagement model” aims to integrate local knowledge 
and citizens’ views with scientific ones in STE public policy debates (Brossard & 
Lewenstein, 2010, p. 16). It is often driven by a commitment to democratizing science, 
and thus focuses on activities that enhance public participation in science policy such as 
consensus conferences and citizen juries (Brossard & Lewenstein, 2010, p. 16). This 
model, like the lay expertise model, has faced criticism as motivated more by politics 
than public understandings, and as being too focused on the process, rather than the 
substance, of STE public communication (Brossard & Lewenstein, 2010, p. 16).  
 Covello and Sandman pose a similar spectrum of STE communication models for 
risk communication. They posit four models of risk communication: communicators can 
either ignore the public, learn to explain their data better, engage in community dialogue 
to better understand what people mean by risk (which, they demonstrate, is more 
complicated than what technical experts mean due to the wide array of factors involved 
when people process risk information), or treat the public as a “full partner” (Covello & 
Sandman, 2001, pp. 164-178). Their first two models are most closely related to the 
dissemination model described above, while their latter two bear a stronger resemblance 
to the lay expertise and public engagement models, respectively. 
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 Taking a somewhat different stance, Baruch Fischhoff (2013) distinguishes 
between “science communication” and “science education” (pp. 14033-14034). Fischhoff 
(2013) explains that science education starts by listening to scientists and “learning the 
facts they wish to convey,” while communication begins by listening to its audience to 
identify the decisions they face in order to determine what information they need (p. 
14034). He argues that science education is a necessary precursor to science 
communication (p. 14034). Fischhoff (2013) explains effective science communication as 
that which “reaches people with information they need in a form they can use” (p. 
14038). To accomplish this, Fischoff (2013) advocates that scientists with “subject matter 
knowledge” (like Collins and Evans’ contributory expertise) collaborate with scientists 
with expertise in communication processes (like Collins and Evans’ interactional 
expertise) as well as practitioners to manage the process (like Collins and Evans’ referred 
expertise) (p. 14038).  
 While there are thus a multitude of responses to the deficit model of STE 
communication with the public, the general tend is towards increasing the attention paid 
to recipients—to their needs, their interests, and the knowledge and input they have to 
offer.  
 III.b. Public Participation Mechanisms in STE Policy 
 Related but slightly distinct from public communication mechanisms are public 
participation mechanisms in STE policy. As noted above, as used here, participation 
mechanisms refer to those surrounding STE policy decisions, while communication 
mechanisms are those by which STE issues are discussed but that do not necessarily 
involve a decision on a particular issue. As with communication mechanisms, however, 
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participation mechanisms are likewise the subject of much research and resultant models. 
Also like communication mechanisms, the general trend in participation mechanisms has 
been away from a top-down, hierarchical approach towards a more inclusive, egalitarian 
one. 
  III.b.i. Descriptive Models of What Is 
 Parallel to deficit models of public communication are participation models in 
which the public is a mere passive recipient of information and that are often aimed at 
achieving acquiescence to a predetermined end. Such models include Craig Waddell’s 
“technocratic” and “one-way Jeffersonian” models, Crick and Gabriel’s “transmission 
model,” Stirling’s “instrumental” model, Habermas’s “strategic action” model, and Rowe 
and Frewer’s “public communication” model” (Waddell, 1995a, p. 205; Crick & Gabriel, 
2010, p. 204; Stirling, 2012, pp. 1, 3; Simmons, 2007, p. 90, citing Habermas; Katz & 
Miller, 1996, pp. 129-130). These models view public “participation” as one-way, linear, 
and with no role for recipients’ knowledges, concerns, or input.  
 Other public participation models involve the public slightly more, but in ways 
that are still limited in scope and impact. In these models, the public is afforded the 
opportunity to provide some information to decision-makers, but it is either non-technical 
or high-level information, or only ostensibly impacts policy outcomes. For example, in 
Waddell’s “Interactive Jeffersonian” model, the public communicates their “values, 
beliefs, and emotions” to the experts, while Stirling’s “substantive” model allows space 
for public communication to experts but only about non-technical matters (Waddell, 
1995a, p. 207; Stirling, 2012, p. 1). Importantly, although information is exchanged in 
both directions, technical information and non-technical information each only flow one 
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way, so there is no true two-way communication. Models in which the public’s 
involvement lacks actual impact on policy outcomes include Simmons’ (2007) partial and 
pseudo participation models (p. 96, borrowing language from Iacofano, Moore, and 
Goltsman, 1990). Under both of these models, “technical experts” determine a course of 
action for addressing an environmental issue, propose that plan to the public, and only 
then solicit feedback from the public by way of public meetings and comment periods 
prior to implementation (Simmons, 2007, 96). Similarly, Katz and Miller’s (1996) 
“engineering model” also provides the public some opportunity for input into the 
decision-making process, but in a limited and imbalanced way: the public can offer input 
only through forums and situations that the decision-maker controls (p. 128). Likewise, in 
Webler and Tuler’s “Science-Centered Stakeholder Consultation,” public involvement is 
primarily limited to “providing information to inform the process” (Webler & Tuler, 
2006, p. 711), while their Efficient Cooperation “de-emphasiz[es] […] empowerment”: 
there is “little support for participants’ ability to place topics on the agenda” or for 
consensus, and “features that would reduce the efficiency of the process” are discouraged 
(Webler & Tuler, 2006, pp. 713-14). Instead, agency-public interactions are hierarchical, 
with the public acting much like a hired consultant (Webler & Tuler, 2006, pp. 717). 
 While they vary, each of these models involves limited public participation and 
retains power imbalances between the public and the experts, positioning the experts as 
dominant in the decision-making process. 
  III.b.ii. Prescriptive Models of What Could Be 
Scholars have responded to what they see as shortcomings of these largely 
unidirectional approaches with a variety of suggested alternatives that provide a more 
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substantial role for the public and lessen the dichotomy between experts and the non-
expert public. These mechanisms are frequently process- rather than outcome-oriented, 
involve members of the public earlier in the process, and/or presume that the public has 
valuable knowledge to contribute to policy debates. 
Many scholars propose models that focus on the process itself and put the public 
on more equal footing with experts. Waddell (1995a), for example, advocates for what he 
terms the “Social Constructionist Model,” in which technical information, values, beliefs, 
and emotions flow in both directions between experts and the public (p. 207). Similarly, 
Stirling’s (2012) “normative” approach is focused not on a particular end but on the 
process itself, and values qualities like “independence, openness, accessibility, 
legitimacy, and accountability” (p. 1). Likewise, Rowe and Frewer (2005) call for a 
process that in which information flows two-directionally between a decision’ sponsors 
and the public (their “public participation” model). In this model, “the act of dialogue and 
negotiation serves to transform opinions in the members of both parties (sponsors and 
public participants)” (pp. 255-56). Similarly, Katz and Miller (1996) advocate for 
decision-making processes that are egalitarian, interactive, and truly dialogic, and a view 
of communication as historically situated, persuasive, and open-ended (135). 
Likewise, Karin Backstrand (2004) argues that “[a]ppraisals of technological risk 
should be conducted in a pluralistic and deliberative fashion applying discursive and 
participatory techniques” (p. 711). She advocates for a “civic expertise” model, in which 
citizens are viewed as having valuable knowledge to contribute to the science 
policymaking process, and decisions are made through “collaboration between, and 
participation by, scientists, citizens and civil society” (p. 706). This concept is grounded 
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in the same premise as Shen’s call for “civic scientific literacy,” discussed above, which 
seeks for citizens to feel knowledgeable enough about science to “participate more fully 
in democratic processes of an increasingly technological society” (Shen, 1975, p. 48).  In 
addition, Simmons (2007) advocates for a “participatory design” approach that 
“redistribute[s] the common imbalance of power in current risk communication 
practices” and in which the public’s “input [is] viewed as valuable knowledge capable of 
constructing risk through discourse with technical experts” (pp, 110, 100). Each of these 
scholars advocate for greater opportunities for input from persons not traditionally 
viewed as experts.  
One way to do more fully and equally involve “the public”, according to Sara 
Davies, Cynthia Selin, Gretchen Gano, and Angela Pereira (2012), is to move away from 
many public participation processes’ exclusive reliance on traditional modes of 
expression like speaking. These scholars explain that many public participation models 
value “rationality, reserve, selflessness, and powers of argumentation,” which is 
“‘scientists’ home turf’” (p. 353, quoting Elam & Bertilsson). To create a more equal 
playing field, they propose that deliberative and citizen engagement processes 
incorporate “non-traditional modes of deliberation interaction” such as music, 
storytelling, and emotion (Davies, Selin, Gano, & Pereira, 2012, p. 353). This suggestion 
calls to mind Flower, Heath, and Long’s techne of eliciting the story-behind-the-story, 
seeking rival hypotheses, and examining options and outcomes, which likewise serve as 
alternative means to elicit and connect with those not traditionally deemed experts. 
There have also been calls for public participation earlier in the decision-making 
process. These include Stirling’s suggestion to involve the public early in the process. He 
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explains that due to path dependence and the fact that “society cannot commit to any 
single trajectory without diminishing the potential for others,” it is particularly important 
for the public to have a voice early in the policymaking process, before such trajectories 
are set (Stirling, 2012, p. 4). Similarly, Simmons (2007) explains that “[i]n order for 
citizens to contribute significantly they must be brought into the decision making process 
early enough to contribute to the design of the policy” (p. 110). Jasanoff (2003) takes a 
similar position: she sees public engagement as necessary to “test and contest the framing 
of the issues the experts are then asked to resolve” (p. 397). Otherwise, experts may offer 
irrelevant advice on wrong or misguided questions (Jasanoff, 2003, p. 398). Echoing this 
call, Jack Stilgoe and James Wilsdon (2009) argue that we need upstream engagement 
before decisions have been made to explore questions such as, “Why this technology and 
not another,” “Who needs it,” “Who is controlling it,” and “Who benefits from it?” (p. 
22). Guston (2014) has demonstrated the viability of upstream engagement in his review 
of the National Citizens’ Technology Forum on Nanotechnology and Human 
Enhancement, in which he found that lay citizens could deliberate in thoughtful ways on 
emerging technologies prior to possessing significant factual knowledge or establishing 
opinions about it (pp. 54, 55).   
Another suggestion has been to move away from viewing consensus as the goal of 
participatory mechanisms. Stirling (2012) explains that seeking consensus can “thwart 
genuine substantive public participation” (p. 4). Under this view, a primary benefit of 
public participation is “not to force consensual prescriptive recommendations, but to map 
out alternative pathways” and to “catalyse and provoke—rather than substitute or 
suppress—wider public discourse” (Stirling, 2012, p. 4). Similarly, Hamilton and Wills-
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Toker (2006) advocate for “exploring and valuing diversity and consent,” rather than 
quashing them to achieve consensus (p. 768). To do so, they propose a “dialogic 
discourse,” based on Bakhtin’s work, that allows for shifts between problem-solving 
discourses—which have a goal of recognizing agreement—and sense-making 
discourses—which aim to recognize similarities and differences in developing 
understanding (Hamilton & Wills-Toker, 2006, p. 771). Hamilton and Wills-Toker 
(2006) believe that sense-making discourse, which they describe as “ongoing engagement 
and struggle among multiple perspectives,” is key to public participation models because 
it “recover[s] dissent and incompatibility as essential features of dialoguing” (p. 771). 
Likewise, Webler and Tuler’s (2006) Informed Collaboration model posits that consensus 
“endangers collaboration by giving participants the opportunity to dig in their heels and 
not compromise on their preferred outcomes” (p. 713). Under these views, a shift away 
from a focus on consensus will lead to more robust policies and more accountable 
policymaking processes. 
Rather than replace the transmission model, Crick and Gabriel (2010) propose 
that we need not dispense with it entirely if we add to it a “dramatist frame” (p. 219). 
Such an approach, they explain, uses Kenneth Burke’s language of theories of action 
rather than knowledge to view scientists and citizens as actors within a shared scene in 
which not only beliefs but also attitudes, conventions, relationships, emotions, 
aspirations, and sensations are acknowledged motivating factors (Crick & Gabriel, 2010, 
p. 218). In advocating for this approach, Crick and Gabriel (2010) state, “[t]he role that 
situational context plays in the resolution of public scientific controversies cannot be 
overstated” (p. 218). Such an approach is reminiscent of responses to the deficit model of 
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public communication, which similarly incorporate the contextual needs, interests, and 
knowledges of the public.  
Similarly, Fischer (2000) calls for “cultural rationality,” which is centered around 
“personal and familiar experiences rather than depersonalizing technical calculations,” 
and which treats citizen participation and scientific expertise equally in policymaking 
processes (p. 132). Like so many others, he stresses the importance of local contextual 
knowledge, and of viewing citizens as savvy and having value contributions to make (p. 
195). He further argues that the scientific method falsely universalizes and privileges the 
claims of experts, obscuring their socially constructed nature (p. 195). Consequently, lay 
citizens are rendered unable to contribute their nonexpert, though valuable, knowledge to 
decision-making processes that exclude perspectives grounded in local knowledge. 
Collins and Evans (2002) make a similar claim in their call for assessing expertise based 
on experiential knowledge rather than formal certification, and in their discussion of 
uncertified experts’ frequent lack of interactional expertise (p. 261).  
 Kinsella (2004) likewise explains that the current divide between experts and non-
experts often means public debates become battles between experts, and non-experts 
“become spectators whose choice becomes only a nonrational choice between actors on a 
stage” (p. 85, citing Walter Fisher, 1987, 72). Like Fischer, Collins, and Evans, Kinsella 
argues for a broader conception of expertise that recognizes the value of citizens’ input, 
local knowledge, and experiences. He terms this notion “public expertise,” and explains 
that reconceiving the expert/public relationship as a civic dialogue is “essential to 
overcoming the barrier” between the general public and technical experts (Kinsella, 2004, 
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p. 86). Doing so, Kinsella (2004) tells us, will improve the quality of STE decisions (p. 
86).  
 Not everyone agrees that increased public participation is always better. Collins 
and Evans (2002) argue that more public participation is only good when the public 
possesses expertise about the issue at hand (p. 283). They explain that, all other things 
being equal, “we ought to prefer the judgments of those who ‘know what they are talking 
about’” (even if they are sometimes wrong), and express concern over what they term the 
“problem of extension”—the issue of “when to limit participation in technical decision 
making so that the boundary between the knowledge of experts and of laypersons does 
not disappear” (Collins & Evans, 2007, p. 10). For Collins and Evans (2002), the 
distinction between experts and laypeople is useful, if experts are appropriately labeled as 
such based on a broader conception of expertise founded on experience rather than 
formal certification (p. 250). Thus, while Collins and Evans’ concern is finding the 
appropriate balance between expert and public roles in public policymaking processes, 
Kinsella’s and Fischer’s is equipping the public with the tools necessary to participate 
and be heard at all. Each of them agrees, however, that conceiving of expertise narrowly 
does both citizens and public policy itself a disservice.   
IV. The Place of My Study 
 There is thus a plethora of research regarding what “public” and “expert” are and 
ought to be, and regarding how STE public engagement mechanisms should allocate 
roles, power, and opportunities for input among them. Further, many scholars have called 
for designing public engagement mechanisms that allow for greater input from those 
traditionally viewed as non-experts, and have offered a variety of suggestions for how to 
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do this. These range from reconceptualizing whom we consider to be experts and what 
we consider valuable knowledge, to revising the structures of these mechanisms, to 
changing ideas of what presentation styles we consider acceptable in them. Viewing these 
factors as Mediational Means and exploring how they may work together to mediate 
information flow in such mechanisms takes this existing research a step further. In this 
study, I explore these issues in a real-world situation with real exigencies—policy 
decisions are currently being made as to how, when, and to what degree SSFL will be 
cleaned up, and the public engagement mechanisms through which these decisions are 
made are continuously occurring and evolving. Using this existing body of work as a 
base allows me to more thoughtfully and productively explore how two such public 
engagement mechanisms (the Water Board hearing and Work Group meeting) enact 
notions of “public” and “expertise,” and whether, and if so, how participants’ role 
designations, the structural features of each mechanism, and the stylistic features of 
participants’ contributions act as Mediational Means to mediate the flow of information 
in these mechanisms. Doing so has implications for both the SSFL controversy in 
particular as well as STE public engagement mechanisms more generally, and helps 
move existing research on these important issues in the field of Rhetoric and 
Composition forward. 
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CHAPTER 3 
EXAMINING “EXPERT” AND “PUBLIC” ROLE DESIGNATIONS  
AT THE SSFL WATER BOARD HEARING AND WORK GROUP MEETING  
AS MEDIATIONAL MEANS 
I. The Problem Driving This Chapter: Role Designations and Information Flow 
 As we saw in Chapter 2, notions of what it means to be an “expert” or a member 
of “the public” vary widely. Further, Rowe and Frewer’s taxonomy of public engagement 
mechanisms, among others, discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, offers a means by which to 
understand and categorize different ways that information flows in various mechanisms.  
In this chapter, I ask whether and, if so, how “expert” and “public” role designations 
serve as Mediational Means affecting the flow of information in the two public 
engagement mechanisms I take up in this project: the Water Board hearing and the Work 
Group meeting. To answer this question, I consider, first, whose information—that of the 
designated experts and/or that of “the public”—gets “to flow” in each mechanism, and, 
second, what kinds of information it is that these designated experts and members of “the 
public” are putting into circulation.  
 I begin this chapter with an explanation of my methodology, followed by 
summaries of the Water Board hearing and Work Group meeting. Next, for each 
mechanism, I examine the terms <expert> and <public> as ideographs, followed by a 
consideration of which information flowed in that mechanism—whose and what kinds—
and why this might be so. I close with a brief discussion of the implications of these 
findings regarding how role designations act as Mediational Means in these mechanisms. 
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II. Methodology 
 My goal in this chapter is to identify how “expert” and “public” role designations 
served as Mediational Means to impact information flow at the Water Board hearing and 
Work Group meeting. I conduct this analysis using a two-part inquiry. First, I ask what 
<expert> and <the public> meant at the Water Board hearing and Work Group meeting, 
respectively. To answer this question, I conduct an ideograph analysis of <expert> and 
<public> as used in each mechanism. Second, I ask which information—whose and what 
kinds—“flowed” in each mechanism and offer some ideas as to why. This two-part 
analysis allows me to understand “expert” and “public” designations as Mediational 
Means that mediate information flow by impacting whose information and what 
information gets to flow at an STE public engagement mechanism. 
 II.a. <Expert> and <Public> As Ideographs 
 To understand the contextual meanings of <expert> and <public> at the Water 
Board hearing and Work Group meeting, I turn to McGee’s ideograph analysis—
especially as implemented in Coogan’s “Service Learning and Social Change: The Case 
for Materialist Rhetoric.”8 Ideographs are essentially shorthand expressions of larger 
ideas. They are, in Coogan’s (2006) words, “ideological icebergs: the visible bump of 
what lies beneath,” and as such, analyzing them allows one to “take the ideological pulse 
of the community” (p. 670). Ideographs draw attention to the social functions of a term, 
                                                
8 To conduct his analysis, Coogan (2006) began with a historical account of how the 
ideographs <local control> and <accountability> were deployed in the decades before his 
case study (p. 672). He then documented a service-learning project about efforts to 
increase parental involvement in their children’s education. According to Coogan (2006), 
these ideographs were not used successfully in this project due in large part to their users’ 
failure to account for their historical meanings (p. 687). 
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insofar as they reveal the ideology behind the term as used in a particular community 
(McGee, 1980, p. 8). They are common expressive forms because, “‘while they appear to 
be drawn from ordinary language’ and may also appear to express the speaker’s 
intentions in an original way, they in fact ‘represent in condensed form the normative, 
collective commitments of the members of a public, and they typically appear in public 
argumentation as the necessary motivations or justifications for action performed in the 
name of the public’” (Coogan, 2006, p. 670, citing Condit & Lucaites xii-xiii). Moreover, 
ideographs are “one-term sums of orientation” that lead audiences to particular, 
collectively understood ends (McGee, 1980, pp. 7, 15-16). For these reasons, analyzing 
the ideographs used in a particular argument sheds light on deeper, systemic ideologies 
held by both their users and recipients, and allows us to understand the embedded 
meanings they carry for participants in that controversy.  
 Here, I use McGee and Coogan’s ideograph analysis as a framework within which 
to conduct a contextual analysis of <expert> and <public> at the Water Board hearing 
and Work Group meeting. I do this via a two-part inquiry. First, I identify who was 
designated as an expert in each mechanism, using Hartelius’s six “congruities” of experts 
as a guide. To do this, I review the Water Board hearing and Work Group meeting 
transcripts to see how the words “expert,” “expertise,” “public,” and their cognates 
(Coogan’s term for alternative words with similar meanings) were used, by whom, and in 
what contexts. I also look at how the presenters at each mechanism were addressed and 
treated discursively by others, which allows me to identify persons who may have been 
treated as designated experts even if not formally referred to as such. I also consider the 
significance of the use of first, second, and third person in speakers’ presentations and 
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comments insofar as this usage reflects how speakers understand their own and others’ 
roles as designated experts or members of “the public” in these mechanisms. In other 
words, the use of first, second, or third person sheds light on whether speakers see 
themselves and others as insiders or outsiders in the communities of designated experts 
and “the public,” respectively. Identifying the designated experts in each mechanism is 
particularly important in this study because some of the same people spoke at both the 
Work Group meeting and the Water Board hearing, and were designated experts in the 
former mechanism but not the latter. 
 Second, after I have identified who the designated experts and “public” in each 
engagement mechanism were, I look for specific features shared by the designated 
experts within each mechanism, as well as specific features shared by the “public” and 
other non-experts in each mechanism. To do so, I look to existing scholarship about what 
<expert> and <public> mean (just as Coogan looks to historical meanings of the 
ideographs he examines in his study). In particular, I apply Collins and Evans’ (2002) 
“certified” versus “uncertified” expert distinction as well their concepts of 
“contributory,” “interactional,” and “referred” expertise (p. 254). In focusing on the 
similarities among the designated experts and non-experts within each mechanism, I do 
not mean to gloss over the real and important differences that exist among the members 
of each of these heterogeneous groups. Instead, here I am explicitly looking for 
similarities among them—in both what they say and how they say it—for purposes of 
yielding potentially valuable insights about what <expert> and <public> mean in each of 
these engagement mechanisms One could conduct a rich and fruitful analysis focused on 
identifying the differences within each of these groups. But here my aim is to explore 
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whether there are any shared traits among the members of each from which we can better 
understand the embedded meanings of <expert> and <public> as used in these two public 
engagement mechanisms. 
 II.b. Accounting for Whose and What Kinds of Information Flowed in Each 
 Mechanism 
 For the final step of my analysis of role designations as Mediational Means, I 
consider how and why some information—that is, particular kinds of information offered 
by people holding particular roles—got to “flow” in each mechanism and other 
information did not. To conduct this analysis, I consider the Water Board hearing and 
Work Group mechanism in light of existing models of public engagement—specifically 
transmission models versus interactional models. 
 Before conducting this analysis, I first offer brief summaries of the Water Board 
hearing and Work Group meeting.  
III. Summary of Water Board Hearing and Work Group Meeting 
 III.a. Summary of Water Board Hearing 
 As the owner and operator of SSFL Area IV, Boeing is required to obtain and 
comply with the terms of a NPDES permit pursuant to the federal Clean Water Act (33 
USC §§ 1251-1387). The Water Board sets the terms for, issues, and grants renewals for 
Boeing’s NPDES permit. The NPDES permit controls pollutants by setting limits on the 
amounts of various pollutants in water discharged from the site, called “effluent limits.” 
These limits are set based on both the technologies available to control pollutant amounts 
as well as the pollutant concentrations in the water body into which the water discharged 
from the site is released. The NPDES permit also contains monitoring and reporting 
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requirements to assess compliance with the permit’s effluent limits. This permit is up for 
renewal every five years, at which time the Water Board staff drafts a tentative revised 
permit, which is open to public comment and presented to the Water Board for revision 
and approval. 
 Because of the technical challenges of regulating the water discharged from SSFL 
(because SSFL is located in two watersheds, the drainages are very steep, and the runoff 
carries soil and sediments contaminated from both past site activities and naturally 
occurring materials), the Water Board ordered Boeing in 2007 to assemble an 
“independent panel of experts” (which the Water Board refers to at hearings as “the 
Expert Panel”) to provide technical oversight and recommendations for stormwater 
treatment requirements throughout the site (Water Board Tr., p. 250; Boeing SSFL 
NPDES Compliance Program, 2008, p. 1). To select this panel, Boeing retained the 
consulting firm Geosyntec Consultants (Geosyntec). After soliciting statements of 
qualification from prospective panelists, Geosyntec, in consultation with Water Board 
staff, submitted a list of six names to the Water Board staff, which the Water Board staff 
approved (Boeing SSFL NPDES Compliance Program, 2008, p. 2). Collectively, the six 
panelists hold five PhDs, five current or former professorships, three  “Professional 
Engineer” certifications, and three private consultantships (Water Board Tr., p. 250; 
Boeing SSFL NPDES Compliance Program, 2008, pp. 2-3). Water Board staff set the 
terms of the proposed permit in consultation with the “Expert Panel.” Pursuant to Clean 
Water Act regulations, the Water Board accepts comments from Boeing and the public on 
the proposed permit, then holds a public hearing.  
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The most recent NPDES permit renewal hearing was held on February 12, 2015 
(Water Board Tr., p. 245). At this hearing, Water Board staff and the “Expert Panel” 
made presentations to Water Board members to explain the terms of the proposed permit 
and the reasoning behind them. In addition, Boeing made a presentation in which it 
explained its efforts over the previous permit term to comply with permit requirements, 
and took issue with several of the proposed changes in the tentative revised permit. Prior 
to the hearing, a number of public interest groups sent a joint comment letter to the Water 
Board in which they requested, among other things, that they be granted collective party 
status in this proceeding and be allowed to make a presentation at the hearing 
(Rocketdyne Cleanup Coalition, et al., 2015, p. 16). The Water Board granted this 
request, and as a result, the Organizations also presented at the hearing.9 These 
presentations were followed by the legally required opportunity for public comments. 
The Water Board referred to speakers during this period as “interested persons,” and 
defined “interested persons” as anyone they did not identify as formal parties to this 
proceeding (Water Board Tr., pp. 246, 247). We know that “interested persons” meant 
“the public” at this hearing because the Acting Chair of the Water Board started the 
hearing by mentioning the specified time limits “for the parties and for the public” (Water 
Board Tr., p. 246). At the start of the hearing, the Water Board stated that these 
comments would be limited to “three minutes maximum or less depending on the time 
and number of speakers” (Water Board Tr., pp. 246-247). By the time Water Board 
                                                
9 These organizations were Rocketdyne Cleanup Coalition; Physicians for Social 
Responsibility, Los Angeles; Southern California Federation of Scientists; Teens against 
Toxins; Committee to Bridge the Gap; Center for Race, Poverty, and the Environment; 
the People Senate; Aerospace Contamination Museum of Education; and Consumer 
Watchdog (collectively, “the Organizations”) (Water Board Tr., pp. 245-246). 
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reached this step in the proceeding, however, these comments were capped at “2 minutes 
each so that we have enough time” (Water Board Tr., p. 336). The Water Board then 
asked questions of the presenters, followed by deliberation and an affirmative vote on the 
tentative permit (Water Board Tr., pp. 341-385).  
 III.b. Summary of Work Group Meeting 
 Shortly before the Water Board Hearing, on February 4, 2015, the Work Group 
held one of its quarterly meetings (the “Work Group meeting”). The Work Group 
meeting consisted of five formal presentations followed by a question and answer session 
(the question and answer session was not recorded and is thus not part of this analysis). 
The first presenters were two high school students who spoke on behalf of Teens Against 
Toxins, a group whose goal is to raise awareness about SSFL among young adults. They 
gave a brief overview of the history of SSFL and its cleanup. This was followed by the 
presentation of interest for this project: a presentation regarding Boeing’s proposed 
NPDES permit given by Cindi Gortner, who also presented on behalf of the 
Organizations at the Water Board hearing. After Gortner, Denise Duffield—another 
Organizations presenter at the Water Board hearing—gave an update on building 
demolition and disposal at SSFL. Duffield was followed by a presentation about 
Department of Toxic Substances Control (DTSC, a California agency) reform. The final 
presenter at the Work Group meeting was Dan Hirsch—also a presenter on behalf of the 
Organizations at the Water Board hearing—who gave a presentation entitled “Cleanup 
Myths and Realities.” Hirsch’s presentation was followed by questions from the audience 
(unfortunately this segment of the meeting was not recorded). In this project I focus on 
the presentations by Hirsch, Gortner, and Duffield, for several reasons. First, the subject 
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of Gortner’s presentation is the renewal of Boeing’s NPDES permit—the precise subject 
of the Water Board hearing. Second, these three presenters spoke at both the Work Group 
meeting and the Water Board hearing, making their presentations a prime source for 
comparisons between these two participatory mechanisms. 
IV. The Water Board Hearing 
 IV.a. <Expert> and <Public> as Ideographs at the Water Board Hearing 
 As demonstrated in the sections that follow, viewing <expert> and <public> as 
ideographs at the Water Board hearing reveals a rather narrow, traditional ideology in this 
public engagement mechanism that views “expertise” as tied to formal training rather 
than experiential knowledge, and to “encyclopedic” rather than evaluative knowledge, 
and that makes a sharp distinction between experts and “the public.” These factors make 
the Mediational Means of role designations one that likely inhibits the flow of 
information in this mechanism. 
 Throughout the Water Board hearing, the terms “expert” and “expertise” were 
used exclusively in regards to the “Expert Panel,” and were used only by the Water Board 
(members and staff) and the Expert Panel itself. In addition to being explicitly labeled as 
experts, the Expert Panel members also satisfy many of Hartelius’s “congruities”: they 
identify themselves within larger networks—including this panel, as well as the research 
institutions and/or private research firms with which they are affiliated; they possess 
techne (a specialized skill or knowledge set)—discussed later in this chapter; several of 
them possess expert pedagogy as professors; and they take a stance on whether the public 
should defer or participate in discussions about a given issue—addressed in Chapter 6 
(Hartelius, 2010, pp. 164-166).The first reference to “experts” at the Water Board hearing 
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was when the Acting Water Board Chair stated: “The order of proceedings of this hearing 
will be as follows: Staff will present the tentative permit; next, the Boeing Company and 
the Expert Panel with [sic] make its presentation, which cannot exceed 40 minutes; after 
Boeing, the organizations I’ve previously mentioned will make its presentation, which 
also cannot exceed 40 minutes; the Board will then hear from interested persons, who 
will have three minutes maximum or less depending on the time and number of speakers” 
(Water Board Tr., pp. 246-247, emphasis added). As discussed more thoroughly in 
Chapter 6, it is noteworthy—and deeply troubling—that the Water Board gave Boeing 
and the Expert Panel one joint presentation slot and referred to both entities simply as 
“Boeing.” It is further worth noting that “interested persons”—i.e. members of “the 
public”—were given “three minutes maximum or less depending on the time and number 
of speakers,” as this structural aspect of the hearing has far-reaching implications for how 
being designated an “interested person” in this mechanism mediated (in this instance, by 
impeding) the flow of information from such persons. Again, this is explored in more 
detail in Chapter 6.  
 During the Water Board staff presentation, the term “expert” was used 57 times, 
all in reference to the “Expert Panel.” Cassandra Owens, Senior Environmental Scientist 
and Unit Chief of the Industrial Permitting Unit, explained: “The Expert Panel has 
provided the expertise and the experience required to implement a number of advanced 
Best Management Practices at the Santa Susana Field Laboratory” (Water Board Tr., p. 
259). She made no similar statements regarding any other participants. In singling out the 
contributions of the Expert Panel, Owens signals that she values the contributions of the 
Expert Panel, perhaps more so than that of other participants. This sentiment is reinforced 
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by the fact that the only input reflected in the final NPDES permit is that of the Expert 
Panel, addressed in more depth in Chapter 6. Because experts tend to enjoy a position of 
privilege in policy decisions (see, e.g., Kinsella, 2004, p. 8), and because the designated 
experts in this mechanism were the only ones that had a direct influence on its final 
outcome (as discussed in Chapter 6), it is useful to identify what characteristics 
distinguish those persons who were designated as experts in this mechanism from those 
who were not.  
  IV.a.i. Certified Experts Only 
 Many speakers at the Water Board hearing possessed knowledge about the issues 
on which they spoke, but the only persons designated as experts were those who were 
also certified via formal credentials (see Collins & Evans, 2002, 257). Every Expert Panel 
member had formal accreditations to point to in support of his expert status. In contrast, 
the Organizations’ representatives and the “interested persons” lacked advanced degrees 
or formal certifications regarding the issues on which they spoke. Instead, they acquired 
their knowledge through years of firsthand experience. 
 Of the six members of the panel, five hold PhDs (the sixth holds a Masters), five 
are current or past professors, three are registered “Professional Engineers,” and one is 
certified as a specialist in the field of water resources engineering (Water Board Tr., p. 
250; Boeing SSFL NPDES Compliance Program, 2008, pp. 2-3). As Michael Stenstrom, 
the first Expert Panel member to speak, explained: 
So this is our Expert Panel. It’s the same panel you’ve heard before. Bob 
Gearheart is Emeritus Professor at Humboldt State University and is a worldwide 
known expert on wetland systems. Jon Jones, to my left, is CEO of Wright Water 
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Engineers and is an experienced designer of BMP [Best Management Practices] 
and other hydraulic structures. Michael Josselyn is our plant expert; he is from 
WRA Consultants in San Francisco; and we have planted more than 10,000 plants 
at the site under his direction. Robert Pitt is Emeritis Professor of Civil 
Engineering at the University of Alabama, also an international expert on 
stormwater, most aspects of stormwater, particularly chemistry and corrosion. 
And I’m at UCLA, and I’ve done a variety of things in stormwater as well. (Water 
Board Tr., p. 287) 
Not only did the Expert Panel members possess experiential knowledge about the issues 
on which they were designated experts, gained from years of research and experience in 
their respective positions, but they possessed formal accreditations and institutional 
recognition as well. 
 In contrast, none of the other speakers at the Water Board hearing held advanced 
degrees or formal certifications regarding the issues on which they spoke. The first 
speaker on behalf of the Organizations was Daniel Hirsch, President of the nuclear policy 
organization Committee to Bridge the Gap. Mr. Hirsch holds a B.A. but no advanced 
degree, and is a university lecturer but does not hold a professorship. However, he has 
been involved in research and advocacy work regarding the cleanup of SSFL since the 
1970s, when his students discovered the 1959 partial meltdown while conducting work 
for one of his courses (Water Board Tr., pp. 306-307). Through this work, he has intimate 
knowledge of the SRE partial meltdown and broader history of SSFL, the continuing 
debates over its cleanup, and the technical aspects of nuclear reactors, nuclear reactions, 
and nuclear waste. Despite the expertise that Hirsch acquired through over 40 years of 
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experience regarding SSFL, he has never been designated as an expert at Water Board 
hearings. 
 Other speakers on behalf of the Organizations demonstrated the same trend: they 
possessed knowledge acquired through experience rather than certification, and were not 
designated as experts at the Water Board hearing. For example, Denise Duffield, 
Associate Director of Physicians for Social Responsibility, Los Angeles, spoke about the 
health impacts of radionuclides (Water Board Tr., pp. 308-309). Duffield has a BA in 
psychology and an MA in Theatre Arts but, like Hirsch, no science or technology-related 
advanced degree. However, she has over 15 years of experience working on SSFL and 
nuclear policy issues, presumably giving her a great deal of experiential knowledge about 
the content of her presentation (Physicians for Social Responsibility-Los Angeles 
website). Despite this experiential knowledge, however, she is denied expert status at this 
hearing. 
 Likewise, Cindi Gortner, another speaker representing the Organizations, is also 
denied expert status despite possessing knowledge gained through firsthand experience. 
Gortner, who holds an MBA but no STE-related advanced degree, introduced herself as a 
community member and began by stating: “I got involved five years ago when I realized 
I had been raising my three children near the site of a nuclear meltdown […] I have some 
wonderful pictures of my kids in the mud after a big rainstorm, and I wonder what was in 
that water” (Water Board Tr., p. 315). Gortner goes on to discuss Boeing’s exceedances 
of permit limits and the lack of transparency in the permit renewal mechanism (Water 
Board Tr., p. 315). Despite her firsthand knowledge as a resident directly impacted by 
SSFL runoff, she is not designated as an expert regarding the ways that nearby residents 
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use their water or regarding the ways that fear about SSFL runoff impacts their lives. Nor 
is she designated as an expert regarding the experience of community members seeking 
to partake in the permit renewal mechanism, despite her continuing and direct experience 
as such. Lastly, she is not designated as an expert regarding Boeing’s permit 
exceedances, despite her knowledge of them gained through five years of involvement 
with SSFL. 
 Like Hirsch, Duffield, and Gortner, the final speaker on behalf of the 
Organizations, Liza Tucker, possessed knowledge but no directly relevant credentials. 
Tucker works for Consumer Watchdog (a consumer advocacy organization), holds a BA 
and an MFA, and authored the report “Inside Job: How Boeing Fixers Captured 
Regulators and Derailed a Nuclear and Chemical Cleanup in LA’s Backyard.” She spoke 
about the “capture” of regulators by polluters—in this case, the “co-opt[ing]” of the 
Water Board by Boeing (Water Board Tr., p. 328). Yet, despite her thorough knowledge 
about these issues, gained through years of firsthand investigative experience, Tucker 
was not designated as an expert in this mechanism. 
 Persons who spoke during the “interested persons” comment period replicate this 
pattern. Christian Kiillkkaa, for example, is a member of the Board of Directors of the 
Los Angeles/Santa Monica Mountains Chapter of the California Native Plant Society, 
and a member of DTSC’s Santa Susana Field Lab Community Advisory Group 
(Community Advisory Group, n.d., p. 3). Kiillkkaa described himself as “specializ[ing] 
in landscape planning and garden design, [and a] native plants and habitat restoration 
specialist” (Community Advisory Group, n.d., p. 3). Kiillkkaa explained that he had been 
involved in issues concerning the relationship between “the Bell Creek Watershed, 
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relocation of treated groundwater release, and riparian habitat degradation” for the 
previous two and a half years. Like the presenters for the Organizations, Kiillkkaa 
possessed experiential knowledge on this issue but lacked formal certification. Similarly, 
interested person David Troy stated, “I live in the community. I have gardened at the 
community garden that’s within a couple of miles, and I know people who died of cancer 
who were gardeners there” (Water Board Tr., p. 339). Another interested person, Dory 
Raskin, began her comment by stating, “I’ve been involved with trying to get the site 
cleaned up for over 25 years” (Water Board Tr., p. 341). Both Troy and Raskin thus 
lacked formal certification, but possessed experiential local knowledge about their 
experiences as public participants in proceedings regarding SSFL and about community 
members’ concerns and priorities regarding the site. Despite their knowledge acquired 
through experience, these persons were relegated to “interested person” status and each 
given only two minutes maximum to offer their input.  
 What we see from this examination is that possessing knowledge on an issue is 
not enough to qualify one as an expert in this public engagement mechanism. Instead, 
that knowledge must be demonstrated through formal credentials, rather than experience. 
This reflects a traditional view of expertise, that views knowledge acquired through 
schooling, and formally recognized through degrees or certifications, as the only 
specialized knowledge worthy of expert recognition (Collins & Evans, 2002, p. 254). 
Increasingly, however, scholars are calling for the recognition of alternative sources of 
knowledge, such as that acquired through experience, as a valid means to achieving 
expert status (see, e.g., Collins & Evans, 2002, p. 260). For example, many people have 
gained relevant substantive knowledge on an issue through personal experience but lack 
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formal training or certification. These uncertified experts can offer equally valuable 
perspectives and input on that issue as degree-holders, if given the opportunity to do so 
(Collins & Evans, 2002, pp. 255-56, 270). Importantly, this is not to suggest that the 
Expert Panel members lacked expertise on the issues on which they spoke. Rather, the 
important takeaway is that many of the speakers who lacked formal credentials were also 
experts in their own right (see, e.g., Collins & Evans, 2002, pp. 255-256, 270). However, 
they were not recognized as such in this mechanism. As such, we see that the ideograph 
of <expert> at the Water Board hearing represents an ideology that values formal training 
and education. 
  IV.a.ii. Contributory and Interactional Expertise Necessary But Not 
 Sufficient for Expert Status 
 An examination of the Water Board hearing transcript reveals that in addition to 
“certification,” one must possess also possess “contributory” and “interactional” expertise 
to be designated as an expert. As discussed in Chapter 2, Collins and Evans distinguish 
between several types of expertise. Persons who possess “contributory expertise” are 
capable of making substantive contributions to the decision at issue, while those 
possessing “interactional expertise” have the ability to express those contributions in 
ways that formally trained experts will recognize and value (Collins & Evans, 2002, p. 
256). As demonstrated below, the possession of both of types of expertise was 
insufficient on its own to earn one expert status in this mechanism. 
 Although many speakers displayed both contributory and interactional expertise 
at the Water Board hearing, only those who also had formal credentials were designated 
as experts there. Not surprisingly, the Expert Panel presenters displayed interactional 
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expertise in addition to contributory expertise. That is, they used specialized language 
that demonstrated their belonging in the discourse community of hydrology experts. For 
example, in discussing some of the measures they have taken to improve the quality of 
water discharged from SSFL, they used technical terminology such as “end-of-pipe 
treatments,” “removing impervious surfaces as well as BMPs like catch basins,” “culvert 
modifications,” an “innovative statistically rigorous approach,” and “the change of dioxin 
compared as the influent verses [sic] the effluent conditions as the water passes through 
that system” (Water Board Tr., pp. 287-297). They used this precise and specialized 
language throughout their presentation, demonstrating interactional expertise as well as 
their belonging in a specialized discourse community. 
 Notably, many of the uncertified experts also demonstrated interactional expertise 
in addition to contributory expertise. That is, they spoke using the specialized language of 
the technical discourse communities in which they sought but were denied expert status. 
In doing so, they demonstrated a “working vocabulary of science terms and concepts, and 
an overall understanding of how technical reasoning operates”—a “basic technical 
literacy” (Kinsella, 2004, p. 85). This is important because “technical reasoning,” which 
is based on logic and grounded in scientific or technical knowledge, typically enjoys 
greater deference in STE decision-making than values-based reasoning grounded in 
practical or commonsense knowledge (O’Neill, 2006, p. 2; Kinsella, 2004, p. 4). 
Duffield, for example, demonstrated this “basic technical literacy” when she stated: “The 
National Academy of Sciences and all federal radiation protection agencies accept the 
principle that there is no safe level of radiation exposure; that there is no threshold of 
dose below which harm cannot occur” (Water Board Tr., p. 312). She continued, “Risk 
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increases, generally, in a linear fashion with radiation dose,” and “Dioxins are 
carcinogenic and can cause reproductive, developmental, immunological, and endocrine 
side effects” (Water Board Tr., pp. 312-313). Duffield’s use of specialized terminology 
and technical reasoning here is an example of her interactional expertise regarding the 
health risks and impacts of the standards the Water Board sets for Boeing’s NPDES 
permit. However, she gained this expertise through experience, rather than through a 
formal degree or certification program. Thus, while both Duffield and the Expert Panel 
demonstrated interactional expertise, only the Expert Panel members, who all possessed 
formal degrees and credentials, were designated as experts in this mechanism.  
 Similarly, Gortner took issue with proposed changes to sampling requirements 
and contamination limits using the technical language of a community of water sampling 
experts. She explains that the “old permit was weak” to begin with, in part because it 
used “non-enforceable benchmarks […] instead of enforceable numeric limits for several 
outfalls,” and because it eliminate[d] requirements that “both grab and composite samples 
be taken” (Water Board Tr., p. 318). She continues, “The [new] permit [further] 
eliminates all monitoring and compliance requirements for acute toxicity. […] It used to 
be that it was acute and chronic, and now it’s just chronic. We’d like to keep both 
measurements there” (Water Board Tr., p. 319). In arguing that an already weak permit is 
going to be made weaker and advocating for the use of more stringent and broad-ranging 
tests, she arguably exhibits a “working vocabulary” of specialized terminology as well an 
“understanding of how technical reasoning operates” (Kinsella, 2004, p. 85). But despite 
this display of interactional expertise, she was not designated an expert in this 
mechanism. 
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 Like the Organizations’ presenters, Kiillkkaa—a member of “the public” in this 
hearing—also exhibited at least some degree of interactional expertise in his brief 
comment. He asked the Water Board to “consider the future consequences to Bell Creek 
and the site ecology from those and more grim extraction wells scheduled to come online 
this year and divergence of treated water for irrigation, dust control, or hilltop aquifer 
recharge” (Water Board Tr., p. 340). Like Gortner, he used specialized language and 
technical reasoning to call attention to what he sees as problematic consequences of the 
proposed permit’s terms, but was not designated as an expert in this mechanism. Each of 
these speakers thus “talked the talk”—that is, they demonstrated a “working vocabulary” 
and understanding of technical reasoning regarding the issues about which they spoke—
but lacked formal credentials, and correspondingly was not given expert designation. 
 On the other hand, many public commenters failed to demonstrate interactional 
expertise. These speakers made statements including, “I understand that the previous 
standard wasn’t really quite strong enough. […] I believe that it is imperative to this 
community that this Board follow up on making the discharge of water not allowed into 
our community of pollutants” (Water Board Tr., pp. 339, 341), and “I feel that the water 
standard needs to be really strict and Boeing should not be discharging anything” (Water 
Board Tr., pp. 341-342). In contrast to the uncertified experts discussed above, these 
speakers used non-specialized, non-precise language, and did not frame their points as 
cause-and-effect arguments typical of technical reasoning. In doing so, they thus failed to 
demonstrate the “working vocabulary” and “overall understanding of how technical 
reasoning operates” that scholars such as Kinsella (2004) identify as the bare minimum of 
technical knowledge citizens need to give them “an adequate foundation for genuine 
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dialogue with […] specialists (p. 85). As such, here we see that speakers who lacked 
interactional expertise were not designated as experts in this mechanism. 
 What we see from this analysis is that persons lacking interactional expertise were 
not designated as experts in this public engagement, and that even persons who 
demonstrated interactional expertise were denied expert status unless they possessed 
formal training or credentials. Once again, we see an ideology behind <expert> in this 
mechanism that values formal certifications, in addition to contributory and interactional 
expertise 
  IV.a.iii. “Encyclopedic” Knowledge Preferred 
 Comparing the presentations of the Expert Panel to those of the Organizations’ 
representatives and “interested persons” reveals that only persons who based their 
arguments in quantitative, scientific, “encyclopedic” knowledge were designated as 
experts in this public engagement mechanism. This is consistent with many scholars’ 
findings that STE and risk assessment tend to value technical and quantitative knowledge 
over evaluative and qualitative knowledge (see, e.g., C. Miller, 2003, p. 200). Similarly, 
Crick and Gabriel (2010) have explained that although citizens may lack “encyclopedic 
knowledge,” they “possess intimate understandings of their lifeworlds (p. 220). Likewise, 
Bucchi (2008) has argued that “lay knowledge is not an impoverished or quantitatively 
inferior version of expert knowledge,” but rather it is qualitatively different (p. 60). A 
review of the Water Board transcript suggests that <expert> in this mechanism does not 
embody this ideology, as only those persons “encyclopedic” knowledge were granted 
expert status here. 
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 While the Expert Panel’s presentation was focused solely on technical, 
quantitative information, several presentations by persons lacking the “expert” label 
offered more subjective, values-based input. For example, “interested persons” Troy and 
Raskin both took a qualitative rather than quantitative approach to ask the Water Board to 
make Boeing’s NPDES permit requirements more stringent, and to express concern over 
the size of Boeing’s fines for permit violations. Troy stated: 
I understand that the previous standard wasn’t really quite strong enough. I agree 
with some of the previous speakers that fines of minimal amounts to such a 
wealthy company is not a deterrent to polluting. […] I believe that it is imperative 
to this community that this Board follow up on making the discharge of water not 
allowed into our community of pollutants. […] Do not permit chemicals like 
perchlorate and more nuclear radioactive waste to continue to run on, to move to 
the underground aquifer. (Water Board Tr., pp. 339, 341) 
Similarly, another public commenter stated:  
And the concern I’ve had, and still have, is public health. And I feel that the 
standards that we’re allowing for Boeing to dump all the contaminants is wrong. 
[…] I feel that this Board needs to enforce the cleanup, enforce that fine, make it 
really steep. Don’t make it a little dollar or whatever; make it billions of bucks, 
because that’s how much this corporation is making. And they don’t care about 
our health. I have just been very disappointed and frustrated with what’s going 
on. And I think about my friends who have cancer, friends who have died, and 
people who have been active in the community for a long time of wanting the 
site to be cleaned up completely. And I feel that the water standard needs to be 
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really strict and Boeing should not be discharging anything. And if they are, fine 
them, fine them so hard that it bites their tushes. (Water Board Tr., pp. 341-342) 
While these speakers may have lacked specialized knowledge regarding hydrology, the 
above comments demonstrate that they had knowledge to share regarding community 
members’ perception of and feelings about the Water Board’s setting and enforcement of 
permit requirements, as well as regarding the priorities and preferences of those persons 
most directly impacted by the runoff from SSFL. However, this qualitative knowledge 
was based on the commenters’ subjective values, perceptions, and common-sense 
experience. These speakers displayed no quantitative or technical knowledge about the 
relationship between the size of a fine and the impact it has on the entity required to pay 
it. Nor did they demonstrate specialized knowledge about or cite sources for the legality 
of increasing these fines. Instead, they relied on common sense and their own values and 
senses of fairness and justice, and used non-technical, imprecise language and spoke of 
qualitative issues like emotions, values, and desires, rather than technical, quantitative 
ones like measurements and statistics. These speakers, who grounded their arguments in 
qualitative knowledge, were not granted expert status in this mechanism. Further, as 
discussed in Chapter 6, they were asked no follow up questions by the Water Board and 
none of their feedback was incorporated into the final NPDES permit. Accordingly, the 
ideograph of <expert> at the Water Board hearing appears to represent an ideology that 
values quantitative, technical knowledge about technical issues over qualitative 
knowledge about values, fairness, and perceived risks  
 One might rightfully point out that the precise issues before the Water Board are 
which technologies the Water Board should require Boeing to use to control contaminant 
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levels in its discharges, and what limits the Water Board should set for those 
contaminants. Accordingly, it arguably follows that the only persons worthy of “expert” 
designation for these purposes are those with specialized knowledge of hydrology, 
stormwater, and related fields. From this perspective, the fact that the Water Board refers 
only to the Expert Panel as “experts” at this hearing appears unproblematic, because 
expertise regarding issues such as local residents’ water use, health impacts of 
radionuclides, and the trustworthiness of the Water Board is irrelevant. 
 However, this approach skips over a vitally important consideration in the 
NPDES permit renewal decision-making mechanism. In Carolyn Miller’s (2003) words, 
it “technicizes” the problem, changing the central question from “how safe is safe 
enough”—an evaluative, values-based question focused on “safe enough,” that people 
lacking specialized hydrology knowledge are quite competent to answer—into a technical 
one focused on “how safe” that requires specialized knowledge to answer (p. 197). 
Specifically, empaneling a group of credentialed hydrology-related designated experts to 
determine how to most efficiently achieve certain concentrations of pollutants—that is, a 
“how safe” focus—omits from this public engagement mechanism opportunities for 
public input into what those concentrations should be—the all-important “safe enough” 
aspect of this issue. 
 To refocus attention on the “safe enough” question, many researchers have called 
for early public involvement in the evaluative aspects of STE policy decisions. Stirling 
suggests that the public have a voice in such decisions early in the policymaking process, 
to allow for evaluative considerations of questions such as “‘which way?, ‘who says?,’ 
and ‘why?” instead of only technicized questions like “‘how much?, ‘how fast?,’ ‘how 
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costly?,’ or ‘who leads?” (Stirling,2012, p. 4). Stilgoe and Wilsdon (2009) echo Stirling 
in their call for upstream engagement before decisions have been made to explore 
questions such as, “Why this technology and not another,” “Who needs it,” “Who is 
controlling it,” and “Who benefits from it?” (p. 22). Similarly, Simmons (2007) explains 
that “[i]n order for citizens to contribute significantly they must be brought into the 
decision making mechanism early enough to contribute to the design of the policy” (p. 
110). Shen (1975) agrees, stating that, “how a technological project is implemented is 
mainly a job for experts, but the more basic decision of whether a project is to be 
undertaken must rest with citizens and their representatives” (p. 48). Likewise, Jasanoff 
(2003) sees public engagement as necessary to “test and contest the framing of the issues 
the experts are then asked to resolve” (p. 397). For these scholars, then, at least one 
purpose of public engagement mechanisms is to create opportunities for input into 
subsequent decision-making processes. From this perspective, the Expert Panel’s input 
should be downstream from the preliminary evaluative questions about what levels of 
risk are acceptable for water discharged from SSFL, and to whom; and how much time, 
money, and effort achieving those risk levels is worth. However, in the case of the Water 
Board hearing and the larger administrative system of which it is a part, there is currently 
no space for public input into such preliminary evaluations. Instead, each of these 
considerations about what risk levels are acceptable; how much time, money, and effort 
should be expended to achieve them; and who should bear the burdens of these risks and 
costs, are relegated to the designated experts, while “the public’s” only opportunity for 
input comes in the form of public comment periods that take place downstream from 
these important decisions.  
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 This is particularly unfortunate because research has shown that persons with no 
specialized knowledge about wetlands, hydrology, plants, stormwater, or civil 
engineering are capable of providing relevant and useful answers to these evaluative 
questions. Indeed, Dave Guston (2014) has demonstrated the viability of upstream 
engagement in his review of the National Citizens’ Technology Forum on 
Nanotechnology and Human Enhancement, in which he found that lay citizens could 
deliberate in thoughtful ways on emerging technologies prior to possessing significant 
factual knowledge or establishing opinions about it (pp. 54, 55). However, the Water 
Board hearing decision-making mechanism does not seem especially concerned with 
non-specialists’ positions on these issues, and does not involve them involve them in 
upstream decisions about them (and only involves them marginally in the downstream 
ones, via the brief public comment period). Indeed, the Expert Panel is composed of 
persons who specialize in figuring out how to achieve certain contaminant levels, but 
none who specialize in determining what those contaminant levels should be. As such, 
this mechanism misses opportunities for upstream engagement of non-specialists, as well 
as for considering important questions surrounding the reissuance of Boeing’s NPDES 
permit—questions whose answers have direct impacts on the very people being denied 
substantive input in this mechanism. As such, in this regard we once again see <expert> 
functioning as an ideograph that conveys a privileging of technical specialists over 
persons with evaluative knowledge. 
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 IV.b. Accounting for Information Flow at the Water Board Hearing: Experts and 
 Public as Distinct Entities in Transmission Model 
 Only persons with certification, contributory and interactional expertise, and 
encyclopedic knowledge qualified as experts in this mechanism. Further, the 
Organizational presenters were given only three days’ notice to prepare their 
presentation, and the “interested persons” were limited to two minutes each for their 
remarks. These two facts combined mean that only certified experts in possession of 
contributory and interactional expertise and encyclopedic knowledge had the opportunity 
to participate in this public engagement mechanism in a manner that was not rushed and 
from a position of authority. Perhaps not surprisingly then, as discussed further in 
Chapter 6, the only feedback that was incorporated into the final NPDES permit was that 
of the Expert Panel. These facts suggest that “expert” and non-expert role designations 
mediated the flow of information in this mechanism by privileging and promoting the 
experts’ information while impeding and minimizing the flow of non-experts’ 
information.   One important consideration for why this might have happened is the 
Water Board hearing’s strict adherence to a division between experts and non-experts. 
Researchers have increasingly called for “[d]econstructing the boundary between experts 
and laypeople” as “one necessary step toward improving the quality of public decisions 
on issues with technical dimensions” (Kinsella, 2002, p. 3). Experts often attempt to 
demarcate and preserve these boundaries in an effort to “maintain their cognitive and 
political autonomy” (Kinsella, 2002, p. 3, citing Taylor, 1996). However, such “boundary 
work” sustains a fiction that experts are the only ones who possess specialized 
knowledge. As Kinsella (2002) and others point out, “members of the public are experts 
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in their own practical and moral domains,” and can provide designated experts with local 
and evaluative contexts that “give meaning to expert discourse” (p. 3). Unfortunately, as 
demonstrated below, no such blurring of expert/public boundaries took place that the 
Water Board Hearing. Instead, the distinction between them was maintained in a 
transmission model of interaction. 
 The term “public” was used 47 times at the Water Board hearing (frequently in 
regards to “public health” (e.g., Water Board Tr., pp. 286, 327, 340, 368)). When 
members of the “Expert Panel” used the term, they did so in a way that reflects a 
transmission model view. For example, Expert Panel member Stenstrom explained, “So 
this is the scope of our work. We were created to be an independent Expert Panel to 
advice the Board, to advise you folks, as well as to advise Boeing. And it’s also become 
important to advise the public. […] And we’ve taken on the job of informing the public 
with risk assignment [sic] communication” (Water Board Tr., p. 288, emphasis added). 
Here, Stenstrom makes clear that he sees his role as expert as one-directionally educating 
the public, rather than eliciting input from them in a two-way conversation. Other aspects 
of the Water Board hearing support this view. Among proposed changes to Boeing’s 
NPDES permit was the addition of the following language: “The discharger [Boeing] 
shall also support the Surface Water Expert Panel and organize periodic public 
interaction events that encourage public communication involvement” (Water Board Tr., 
p. 378). The wording of this sentence does not envision public participation or public 
input, but rather “interaction events” and “communication involvement” (Water Board 
Tr., p. 378). This vague language provides no participatory role for “the public” other 
than as passive recipient of information and communications from Boeing and/or the 
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Expert Panel. Both of these examples reflect not only a transmission view of 
expert/public communications, but also a view of experts and non-experts as clearly 
distinct groups. 
 When persons designated as non-experts in this proceeding spoke of “the public,” 
they likewise treated it as a singular entity distinct from the designated experts. For 
example, in raising concerns over a perceived lack of transparency in the permit revision 
mechanism, Gortner told the Water Board, “It took the Board 14 months to write the new 
permit, and the pubic was only given 30 days, which also was over the holidays, and I 
don’t know about you, but my brain, shuts down over the holidays, to provide public 
feedback” (Water Board Tr., p. 317). She then explained that there was no list of changes 
comparing the old and proposed permit terms, and stated, “I didn’t feel that [was] very 
helpful for the public” (Water Board Tr., p. 318). Similarly, Tucker, who spoke about the 
Board Chair’s a potential conflict of interest by the Water Board Chair, explained that 
“[h]aving the Board Chair employed by a major polluter that the Board regulates taints 
public perception of the Board. […] And, indeed, the staff’s conduct regarding the 
Boeing permit reinforces public concerns in this regard” (Water Board Tr., pp. 328-329). 
She continued: 
The public had a right to know of this relationship. That in itself could affect the 
way the Board treated Boeing and the public. Yet the Board’s Chief Executive 
Officer asserted there was no obligation to disclose the conflict and that, if the 
public was concerned, they could ask Mr. Stringer [the Chair] and his firm about 
their Boeing work. This badly misunderstands disclosure principles. The person 
with the conflict is supposed to publicly disclose the conflict; it is not up to the 
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public to discover the secret conflict and ask the official to reveal what he has 
hidden. (Water Board Tr., p. 329) 
Tucker concluded her presentation by stating that “[i]t will take some very strong actions 
by this Board today to restore the public’s confidence” (Water Board Tr., p. 332). In both 
Gortner and Tucker’s presentations, they positioned “the public” as separate and distinct 
from their Water Board audience. In doing so, they preserved the boundaries between the 
“experts” and “the public,” reinforcing the notion that this mechanism operates on an 
ideology that “experts” and “the public” are entities that should play distinctly different 
roles. 
 IV.c. Conclusions Regarding the Water Board Hearing 
 As demonstrated above, numerous speakers at the Water Board hearing possessed 
both experiential contributory and interactional expertise, yet only those with formal 
credentials and scientific knowledge were treated as experts. Moreover, the only type of 
knowledge that warranted expert recognition in this mechanism was that of a scientific, 
technical nature. This suggests that the ideograph of <expert> as enacted at the Water 
Board hearing reflects a rather narrow conception of the term. As Collins and Evans 
explain, acknowledging expertise based on formal certification rather than on relevant 
knowledge acquired through experience potentially excludes valuable sources of input 
from this policymaking mechanism (Collins & Evans, 2007, p. 60). This is in part 
because experts, especially in the STE realm, typically hold a “position of privilege” in 
which their arguments enjoy greater deference than those of non-experts (Kinsella, 2002, 
p. 5). Although the Organizations were granted party status at this hearing, per their 
request, being called a “party” certainly does not carry the same weight as being called an 
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expert—the Water Board has no reason to give deference to a “party’s” input the way 
they do for an “expert’s.” Further, “interested persons” like Christian Kiillkaa were given 
less time in which to offer their input, and very likely even less deference, than those 
granted party status.  
 While there are clearly aspects of this controversy that require specialized 
technical knowledge of the sort the Expert Panel possesses, there are other important 
considerations involved in setting the terms of Boeing’s revised NPDES permit. Some of 
these are also technical in nature, such as the health impacts of the contaminants Boeing 
is discharging from SSFL. Speakers such as Denise Duffield offered expertise on this 
subject, but were not recognized as experts at this hearing. Other considerations are 
evaluative, and local community members who are most impacted by the outcome of this 
controversy, and who have been involved with these issues for years, possess the 
qualitative expertise required to take relevant, knowledgeable positions on them. 
However, the nature of this proceeding made an explicit distinction between those 
bestowed with expert status, and everyone else. Because of this, regardless of the 
expertise that non-Expert Panel members possess, they and all other participants and 
onlookers to this mechanism are sent an express message from the Water Board that their 
input is less valued and less important than that of the designated experts. The 
ramifications of this are potentially far reaching. Indeed, these role designations may be 
the reason that the Water Board disregarded or gave less consideration to the input of 
those deemed non-experts, as reflected in the Water Board’s failure to incorporate any 
non-experts’ feedback into the final NPDES permit. They may also have led those 
deemed non-experts to participate less. Moreover, the valuing of quantitative knowledge 
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and credentialed experts over local, qualitative knowledge and uncredentialed experts 
leaves no room for important evaluative questions about “what,” “whether,” and “who,” 
but only for questions about “how,” “how fast,” and “how much” (see Stirling, 2012, p. 
4; Stilgoe & Wilsdon, 2009, p. 22). This may lead us down a path that those most 
impacted by this controversy—local residents and others lacking technical, certified 
expertise—dislike but are powerless to stop. While this awareness in and of itself does 
not change the current landscape of STE public engagement mechanisms, it suggests the 
importance of considering role designations as Mediational Means that have significant 
impacts on how information flows. 
V. The Work Group Meeting 
 V.a. <Expert> and <Public> as Ideographs at the Work Group Meeting 
 As discussed in the following sections, the ideographs of <expert> and <public> 
at the Work Group meeting reflect an ideology that views expertise as tied to experience 
rather than credentials, and that sees distinctions between designated experts and “the 
public” as blurred. These factors make the Mediational Means of role designations at the 
Work Group meeting one that is likely to enhance, rather than impede, the flow of 
information in this mechanism. At the same time, this mechanism’s valuing of 
“encyclopedic” over evaluative information in regards to expertise echo the Water Board 
hearing’s more narrow and traditional <expert> ideograph. 
 Unlike at the Water Board hearing, none of the presenters at the Work Group 
meeting were given explicit “expert” role designations, and none of the presenters used 
the word “expert” in their presentations. However, it seems fair to infer that the 
presenters at the Work Group meeting were treated as the designated experts in this 
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participatory mechanism insofar as they were the persons given formal speaking 
platforms, and they were the persons that the audience asked questions of during the 
question and answer period. In other words, the audience looked to them for information 
and answers, in the same way that the Water Board looked to the Expert Panel. These are 
some of the “congruities” that Hartelius has identified as qualities that distinguish one as 
an expert (Hartelius, 2010, pp. 164-66). Further, unlike at the Water Board hearing, these 
presenters were not given a designated role of something distinctly non-expert. These 
factors suggest that the presenters at the Work Group meeting were the experts in that 
participatory mechanism. The question that follows, of course, is why these people were 
treated as experts at the Work Group meeting but not at the Water Board hearing. 
  V.a.i. Uncertified Experts Allowed  
 The same speakers given expressly non-expert roles at the Water Board hearing 
were the designated experts at the Work Group meeting. Each of these speakers lacked an 
advanced STE-related degree but possessed extensive experiential knowledge about the 
subject on which he or she presented. As explained above, Daniel Hirsch is a lecturer on 
nuclear policy, is the president of Committee to Bridge the Gap, and has spent over 40 
years researching and advocating for the cleanup of SSFL. Similarly, Duffield has over 
15 years of experience with SSFL and nuclear policy issues (Physicians for Social 
Responsibility-Los Angeles website), and Gortner has five (Water Board Tr., p. 315).  
 Further, Gortner not only has experience as part of the Work Group, but as a local 
resident as well, and her use of first and third in her presentation reflects this duality. In 
telling her audience about the upcoming Water Board hearing, Gortner stated:  
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So this new permit that is going to be voted on next week will be in effect until 
2020, so it is important that the community is aware of what is happening. Why 
do we care about the water? […] First, we want the community to be aware that 
we have some concerns about the transparency and the accessibility that the 
Water Board has given to the public. I will talk about that in a minute. And the 
old permit was weak to begin with and actually expired April 10th of last year. 
And this new permit, I will explain to you in detail, is even less protective of 
public health. (Gortner Tr., p. 1) 
Here, Gortner positioned herself as an expert in her own right when she told the audience, 
“I will explain to you in detail […]” and “one of the things I wanted to explain […]” 
(Gortner Tr., pp. 1, 2, emphasis added). Through these statements, she conveyed to 
audience members that she possessed expertise (or, in Hartelius’s (2010) terms, “techne” 
(p. 164) that she wanted to share with those who did not (Gortner Tr., p. 2). In doing so, 
she demonstrated that she “possess[ed] expert pedagogy” (Hartelius, 2010, p. 165). She 
also positioned herself as part of the community of SSFL experts (or “identif[ied herself” 
within [a] larger network” of experts (Hartelius, 2010, p. 164)) with statements such as, 
“we want the community to be aware that we have concerns” (Gortner Tr., p. 1, emphasis 
added). In this statement, she aligned herself as part of the expert community and 
distinguished that group from the local resident and audience community. She made a 
similar move when she stated, “it is important that the community is aware of what is 
happening […],” once again separating herself from “the community” (Gortner Tr., p. 1, 
emphasis added). Gortner closed her presentation by stating, “So we are letting you know 
that we would request people to attend the [Water Board] hearing next week and I 
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encourage you to speak up” (Gortner Tr., p. 4). In doing so, she not only positioned 
herself as part of the expert community, but she “t[ook] a stance on whether the public 
should defer or participate in discussions about a given issue, yet another expert trait 
(Hartelius, 2010, p. 166). At the same time, Gortner also positioned herself as part of “the 
public” through statements such as: “So if any public person wanted to really understand 
what the new permit was compared to the old one, they had to spend several days, hours, 
I don’t know, it was a long time going through it. […] So I called the Water Board 
saying, ‘Look, you really want me to read this 180 page document, line by line and 
compare it to the other one?’” (Gortner Tr., p. 2). Here, Gortner positioned herself as a 
member of the public, rather than as an expert. Notably, at the Work Group meeting, 
Gortner did not introduce herself as a local resident and mother, but instead only stated 
that she had “been doing this for five years” (Gortner Tr., p. 2). Perhaps this is because 
she was trying to establish herself as an expert on the scientific and technical aspects of 
this issue, rather than as a member of “the public.” Or, perhaps it is because she had been 
involved with the Work Group for five years and assumed the audience already knew this 
about her. In any event, while Gortner at times seemed to align herself with “the public,” 
she made multiple moves in her presentation that expressly positioned her as a designated 
expert.  
 Hirsch and Duffield also cast themselves as members of a community of experts 
in their presentations, despite lacking formal STE credentials, by embodying Hartelius’s 
(2010) “congruities” of “identifying themselves within larger networks” and 
demonstrating that they “possessed […] specialized knowledge” (pp. 164-66). For 
example, Hirsch explained that “the [Department of Energy] and NASA cleanups under 
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the Cleanup Agreement, what we call the AOC […]” (Hirsch Tr., p. 2, emphasis added). 
Like Gortner, here Hirsch conveyed that he and other members of an expert community 
possessed specialized knowledge and insider language that he was sharing with an 
audience who lacked it. Similarly, Duffield introduced herself by saying, “I am with 
Physicians for Social Responsibility-Los Angeles and our organization has long been 
concerned with attempts to send waste from Santa Susana that is radioactively 
contaminated to sites that are not licensed to receive it” (Duffield Tr., p. 1, emphasis 
added). She continued, “[i]n 2001, we discovered that waste that was contaminated with 
radionuclides from the burn put at SSFL was going to be sent to Buttonwillow. 
Buttonwillow is a primarily Latino farmworker community in the Central Valley that is 
not licensed to receive radioactive waste” (Duffield Tr., p. 1, emphasis added). She 
further stated that “we were able to prevent” waste from SSFL from being sent to 
Kettlemen City, another community that is not licensed to accept radioactive waste” 
(Duffield Tr., p. 1, emphasis added). She closed by telling the audience, “If you would 
like to read the ruling [regarding a lawsuit against DTSC] you can go to our website and 
you can read it there […]” (Duffield Tr., p. 3, emphasis added). Like Gortner, here Hirsch 
and Duffield used the first person to position themselves as designated experts with 
specialized knowledge to share with an audience that lacked it.  
 In addition to Gortner, Duffield, and Hirsch, two high school students spoke on 
behalf of Teens Against Toxins, a group whose goal is to increase awareness about SSFL 
among young adults. These speakers were ordained with expert status—at least insofar as 
they were responsible for sharing important information with an audience that lacked it, 
and were given a platform to speak from a position of authority—yet lacked any formal 
  104 
certification or credentials in any STE-related field. Instead, their expertise came solely 
from their experience learning about SSFL. 
 Overall, what we see in the Work Group meeting is that, in stark contrast to the 
Water Board hearing, here the persons treated as experts were people who lacked formal 
certification but possessed extensive experiential knowledge regarding the issues on 
which they spoke. As a result, unlike at the Water Board hearing, here <expert> 
represents an ideology that expertise can be based on experiential knowledge rather than 
credentials. As such, in this mechanism, role designations act as Mediational Means that 
provide a greater potential to maximize the flow of information because that flow is not 
impeded by technicalities like formal credentials, and certified experts’ arguments are not 
privileged over those from uncertified experts. 
  V.a.ii. Contributory and Interactional Expertise Necessary and Sufficient  
  for Expert Status 
 As at the Water Board hearing, the persons treated as experts at the Work Group 
meeting also demonstrated both contributory and interactional expertise. However, 
instead of demonstrating possession of only the specialized, technical language of STE  
experts, like the “Expert Panel” at the Water Board hearing, the presenters at the Work 
Group meeting demonstrated both the possession of specialized, technical language and 
the ability to translate that language into terms that were accessible to persons without 
specialized training. In other words, they demonstrate interactional expertise in both 
expert and non-expert discourse communities on these issues.  
 For example, at the Water Board hearing Gortner discussed “violations” without 
any explanation of what this term means (Water Board Tr., p. 317). At the Work Group, 
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in contrast, Gortner explained, “What is a violation? That means it has exceeded the 
amount that the permit has said is safe for the public” (Gortner Tr., p. 2). Similarly, at the 
Water Board hearing Gortner told the Board that “[t]he [proposed] permit eliminates all 
monitoring and compliance requirements for acute toxicity […] It used to be that it was 
acute and chronic, and now it’s just chronic. We’d like to keep both measurements there” 
(Water Board Tr., p. 319). At the Work Group meeting, on the other hand, Gortner 
explained, “The permit also eliminates monitoring and compliance requirements for acute 
toxicity. Acute toxicity means that it is something that kills you instantly versus chronic. 
So, that is something we want to keep in and the requirements for monitoring for 
radioactivity have been changed in a fashion that weakens them” (Gortner Tr., p. 2). This 
difference is likely due at least in part to the fact that Gortner knew her Water Board 
audience was already familiar with the specialized terminology she was using, while her 
audience of community members at the Work Group meeting might not have been. As 
explained further in Chapter 6, however, this difference was not only a display of 
interactional expertise. It was also a rhetorical choice by Gortner to position herself as an 
expert speaking from a place of authority at the Work Group meeting, and as someone 
with less authority and more deference at the Water Board hearing. This issue is explored 
further in Chapter Six. But regardless of Gortner’s motivations for these differences, her 
presentation at the Work Group meeting reflects a conception of <expert> that requires 
neither formal credentials nor the exclusive use of specialized language. Instead, the 
ideograph of <expert> at the Work Group meeting reveals an ideology that values the 
ability to make specialized knowledge accessible to persons unversed in specialized 
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terminology. In these ways, role designations act as Mediational Means that mediate 
information flow in real and significant ways. 
  V.a.iii. “Encyclopedic” Knowledge Preferred 
  Just like at the Water Board hearing, the experts at the Work Group meeting 
demonstrated “encyclopedic,” scientific knowledge rather than qualitative, evaluative 
knowledge. Rather than rely on personal narratives, descriptive information, or 
judgments based on values or emotions, these speakers grounded their presentations in 
technical, quantitative knowledge.  
 At both the Water Board hearing and Work Group meeting, Gortner told her 
audience that the new permit would increase mercury limits “from 0.2 to 0.7,” boron 
“from 148 to 537,” and nitrate “from almost 2,000 to around 5,000” (Water Board Tr., p. 
319; Gortner Tr., p. 3). Likewise, although the subject matter of Duffield’s presentations 
at the Water Board hearing and Work Group meeting differed, she relied on quantitative 
data in both. At the Water Board hearing, she set out the half-lives of several 
radionuclides and the numerical incidence of cancer for residents living within two miles 
of the site as compared to residents living within five miles of the site (Water Board Tr., 
pp. 312, 314). Duffield took a similar approach at the Work Group meeting, where she 
told her audience the number of tons of radioactively contaminated waste Boeing 
disposed of at facilities unlicensed to accept it (Duffield Tr., p. 1). In addition, Hirsch’s 
presentations at both the Water Board hearing and the Work Group meeting were heavy 
with quantitative data as support for his claims. He told the Water Board the precise 
number of Boeing’s exceedances at various outfalls (testing sites) and spoke of the 
proposed permit limits in terms of how many times higher they were than the 
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Environmental Protection Agency standards he argued should apply to the site (Water 
Board hearing Tr., p. 334). He shared these same numbers with his audience at the Work 
Group meeting, as well as quantitative knowledge about the acreage of SSFL that houses 
endangered species (Hirsch Tr., pp. 3-4). Lastly, the Teens Against Toxins presentation 
was rich with numeric data about the quantities of contaminants present at SSF and 
Boeing’s previous fines for permit violations. Each of these speakers heavily utilized 
quantitative knowledge in both their Work Group meeting and Water Board hearing 
presentations, replicating the pattern of experts’ reliance on quantitative knowledge that 
we saw at the Water Board hearing. 
 Hirsch, Duffield, and Gortner’s reliance on quantitative knowledge at the Work 
Group meeting reveals a finding similar to that of the Expert Panel’s quantitative 
presentations at the Water Board hearing. In both instances, expertise appears to correlate 
with the use of quantitative knowledge. That is not to say that experts may never express 
qualitative knowledge. Indeed, Hirsch, Duffield and Gortner include some evaluative 
claims in their presentations at both the Water Board hearing and the Work Group 
meeting. Rather, it is simply to say that persons who exhibit no quantitative knowledge in 
these proceedings were never granted expert status.  Like the Water Board hearing, here 
we see the ideograph of <expert> reflecting an ideology that values quantitative 
knowledge. And, once again, we can see how “expert” role designations and their 
emphasis on quantitative knowledge can act as Mediational Means to promote the flow of 
quantitative information and perhaps impede the flow of qualitative information. 
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 V.b. Accounting for Information Flow at the Work Group Meeting: Blurred Lines 
 Between Experts and Public in Interactional Model 
 At the Work Group meeting, persons who lacked certification and instead 
demonstrated only contributory and interactional expertise, along with the possession of 
“encyclopedic” knowledge, were treated as experts and spoke from positions of power. 
Moreover, members of the “public” were not limited in the amount of time they had to 
speak. These factors suggest that role designations in this mechanism promoted the flow 
of information among participants more so than those at the Water Board. A further 
reason for why this might be so is the blurring of boundaries between the designated 
experts and “the public” at the Work Group meeting.  
 In contrast to the Water Board hearing, the line between the designated experts 
and members of “the public” was less distinct at the Work Group meeting. This is 
evidenced in several ways. First, there were not explicit role designations for Work 
Group meeting participants. Second, the presenters spoke in ways that identified 
themselves as members of both a community of experts and “the public.” For example, as 
explained above, Gortner positioned herself as part of the community of SSFL experts 
with statements such as, “we want the community to be aware that we have concerns” 
(Gortner Tr., p. 1, emphasis added). In this statement, she aligned herself as part of the 
expert community and distinguished that group from the local resident and audience 
community. She made a similar move when she stated, “it is important that the 
community is aware of what is happening […],” once again separating herself from “the 
community” (Gortner Tr., p. 1, emphasis added). At the same time, Gortner also 
positioned herself as part of “the public” through statements such as: “So if any public 
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person wanted to really understand what the new permit was compared to the old one, 
they had to spend several days, hours, I don’t know, it was a long time going through it 
[…] So I called the Water Board saying, “Look, you really want me to read this 180 page 
document, line by line and compare it to the other one?” (Gortner Tr., p. 2). Here, 
Gortner positioned herself as a member of “the public,” rather than as an expert. 
 The presenters at the Work Group meeting also took a less one-directional 
approach to their audience. Instead of only informing their audience, they expressly 
sought audience participation. For example, Gortner closed her presentation by stating, 
“So we are letting you know that we would request people to attend the [Water Board] 
hearing next week and I encourage you to speak up” (Gortner Tr., p. 4). In 
“deconstructing” the boundary between “expert” and “public,” the Work Group 
meeting’s role designations acted as Mediational Means that promoted information flow 
by encouraging the blending of traditionally “expert” and “public” input to contextualize 
all participants’ contributions (Kinsella, 2002, p. 3). Doing so reveals an ideology behind 
the ideographs of <expert> and <public> in this mechanism that values a wider range of 
contributions than the Water Board hearing (Kinsella, 2002, p. 3). 
  IV.d.v. Conclusions Regarding the Work Group Meeting 
 At the Work Group meeting, no one was expressly called an expert, but by 
applying Hartelius’s “congruities,” we can infer that the presenters were the designated 
experts at this proceeding. These designated experts spoke from positions of authority, as 
evidenced by the fact that they were given a platform from which to share information 
with their audience, and the audience looked to them to answer their questions. Further, 
at the Work Group meeting no one else was explicitly designated an expert (in contrast to 
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the Water Board hearing’s “Expert Panel”) and these presenters were not explicitly 
designated something non-expert (in contrast to being granted “party status” and called 
“the Organizations” at the Water Board hearing).  
 These designated experts were uncertified, thus we can conclude that unlike the 
Water Board hearing, the ideograph of <expert> at the Work Group meeting represents 
an ideology that accepts as experts persons who have acquired their expertise through 
experience rather than formal training or credentials. However, just like at the Water 
Board hearing, the <expert> ideograph at the Work Group meeting reflects an ideology 
that values both interactional and contributory expertise, as well as the possession of 
quantitative, scientific knowledge rather than values-based or qualitative knowledge.  
VI. Conclusion 
 As demonstrated above, <expert> and <public> serve as an ideograph for distinct 
ideas about power and knowledge at the Water Board hearing and Work Group meeting, 
respectively. At the Water Board hearing, <expert> represented an ideology that 
credentials and formal training matter. We saw that without such certification, persons 
who had experiential knowledge and were conversant in the technical language about the 
NPDES permit were not granted expert status. At the Work Group meeting, in contrast, 
<expert> represents an ideology that experience-based knowledge is what matters. There, 
persons with extensive knowledge about SSFL, acquired through their own experience 
rather than through a formal degree or training program, were the designated experts.  
 This difference matters, and sheds light on how role designations function as 
Mediational Means in STE public engagement mechanisms. Recognizing uncertified 
experts opens the door for persons with decades of accumulated knowledge, such as 
  111 
Hirsch, to speak from a position of authority on an issue they are intimately familiar with, 
allowing information to flow in ways that it cannot in mechanisms that restrict expert 
designations to persons who possess credentials. In this way, it answers scholars’ calls to 
reconceptualize where expertise resides, and how and by whom knowledge is constructed 
(Flower & Heath, 2000, p. 53). It further opens the door for young people like those 
involved with Teens Against Toxins to share their knowledge. Lastly, because persons 
who hold advanced degrees tend to come from higher socioeconomic backgrounds 
(Cahalan & Perna, 2015, p. 39), public engagement mechanisms that recognize 
uncertified experts provide opportunities for persons of lower socioeconomic status to 
speak from positions of authority and share their experiential knowledge that mechanisms 
that recognize only certified experts do not. This reconceiving of the Mediational Means 
of role designations to maximize of information flow is one way to address the call by 
many scholars for greater inclusion of marginalized voices in public policymaking 
mechanisms (e.g., Benhabib, 1994, pp. 33-34; Long, 2008, p. 205). Further, as the 
designated experts at the Work Group demonstrate, one can possess relevant and 
technical, “encyclopedic” knowledge on a subject, and be highly conversant about it—
that is, one can possess contributory and interactional expertise on a subject—without 
possessing any formal certification about it. This is an important finding in the face of 
those who view credentials as a way to assess whether someone is qualified to contribute 
to a decision about a given controversy. It is also a variation of “flipping the script” of 
traditional expert/non-expert interactions, which usually entail persons of more power 
imparting knowledge on persons with less (Flower & Heath, 2000, p. 45). Instead of 
creating a collaboration between experts and non-experts—i.e. those with and those 
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without power—this broadened view of <expert> to include those who are uncertified 
goes a step further to give all persons with relevant knowledge in positions of power, 
regardless of if they possess formal credentials. This begs the question, of course, of what 
counts as “relevant” knowledge, and from the presentations at both the Water Board 
hearing and the Work Group meeting, it appears that quantitative knowledge is still the 
bar. 
 Conceptions of knowledge notwithstanding, however, the findings in this chapter 
suggest that whether one is designated as an expert or non-expert in a given public 
engagement mechanism mediates how information in that mechanism. That is, because 
those persons designated as experts speak from positions of authority, and, as we will see 
in Chapter 6, their opinions are sometimes taken into account when those of non-experts 
are not, role designations likely impact whose voices are heard in a given public 
engagement mechanism. Thus, what we see in this chapter is that viewing role 
designations as Mediational Means allows us to consider the impacts of those 
designations in a new and important way. Doing so allows us to explore and better 
understand how such “expert” and “public” role designations, and the ideologies behind 
them, mediate the flow of information in a given public engagement mechanism. From 
there, we can begin to craft public engagement mechanisms that maximize on the 
contributory potential of all participants in that mechanism.  
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CHAPTER 4 
EXAMINING STRUCTURAL FEATURES OF THE SSFL WATER BOARD 
HEARING  
AND WORK GROUP MEETING AS MEDIATIONAL MEANS 
I. The Problem Driving This Chapter: Structural Features and Information Flow 
 Not all public engagement mechanisms are created equal; instead, how such 
mechanisms are structured (such as the time and day they occur, who is invited to attend, 
and how participation is governed) matters. That is, different structural features can 
promote or impede the flow of both particular types of information as well as the 
information possessed by particular people. In fact, research has found that several 
structural features of public engagement mechanisms impact their effectiveness in 
cultivating fair and efficient information flow (Rowe & Frewer, 2005, pp. 262, 264). This 
is because the structural features of a public engagement mechanism impact who can be 
present there (e.g., via when it is scheduled), who can participate (e.g., via who is granted 
an opportunity to speak), and who can participate meaningfully (e.g., via how much time 
various participants are given to prepare and present). Therefore, assessing how an STE 
public engagement mechanism is structured allows one to better understand why 
particular information flows more or less in that mechanism.  
 In this chapter, I use Rowe and Frewer’s work as a guide to look for the presence 
or absence of several structural features of the February 12, 2015 Water Board hearing 
and February 4, 2015 Work Group meeting, in order to better understand whether, and if 
so, how the presence or absences of those features mediates the flow of information in 
each mechanism. To begin this chapter, I explain my methodology; next, I apply Rowe 
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and Frewer’s “effectiveness variables”—the structural features they have identified as 
impacting effectiveness—to the Water Board hearing and Work Group meeting. I 
conclude with a consideration of how these variables work together to mediate 
information flow in each mechanism. 
II. Methodology 
 To conduct my analysis, I use Rowe and Frewer’s research on structural 
mechanisms that impact public engagement mechanism effectiveness. Specifically, I 
consider the extent to which the Water Board hearing and Work Group meeting 
maximized the variables that Rowe and Frewer have theorized impact a public 
engagement mechanism’s effectiveness—or, in activity-systems theory terms, variables 
that mediate the flow of information in each mechanism.  
 Rowe and Frewer (2005) define effectiveness as both the “fairness” of a public 
engagement mechanism and the “competence/efficiency” of that mechanism in achieving 
its intended purpose, whether that purpose is educating the public, achieving consensus, 
eliciting views from the public, or something else (p. 262). They describe “fairness” as 
related to public acceptability, equity, democracy, representativeness, transparency, and 
influence, and explain that fairness “concerns the perceptions of those involved in the 
engagement exercise and/or the wider public, and whether they believe that the exercise 
has been honestly conducted with serious intent to collect the views of an appropriate 
sample of the affected population and to act on those views” (Rowe & Frewer, 2005, p. 
262). Rowe and Frewer (2005) describe the second component of effectiveness—
“competence/efficiency”—as “maximizing the relevant information (knowledge and/or 
opinions) from the maximum number of relevant sources and transferring this efficiently 
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to the appropriate receivers” (p. 263). They explain that efficiency may be compromised 
when a speaker’s information is incomplete, irrelevant, or incorrect, and that “structural 
features of [a public engagement mechanism] will limit or enhance the chances of 
effectiveness” (Rowe & Frewer, 2005, p. 263). In this chapter, I look at structural 
features of the Water Board hearing and the Work Group meeting that concern both the 
efficiency and fairness components of effectiveness. 
III. Effectiveness Variables at Water Board Hearing and Work Group Meeting 
 Rowe and Frewer identify five key variables that impact the efficiency of a public 
engagement mechanism: (1) the number of participants; (2) the relevant information 
elicited from those participants; (3) the relevant information provided by sponsors; (4) the 
transfer of information to, and processing by, recipients; and (5) the aggregation of all 
relevant information from participants. Rowe and Frewer theorize that the more each of 
these variables is maximized, the more effective a public engagement mechanism will be. 
In addition to these variables, here I also consider a sixth: (6) the degree to which 
ostensibly independent designated experts—the sponsor’s advisors here—are perceived 
as such. This variable speaks to the “fairness” aspect of effectiveness in Rowe and 
Frewer’s framework. Below, I explain my analysis of the transcripts of the Water Board 
hearing and Work Group meeting in light of each variable. To conduct this analysis, I 
reviewed one transcript at a time for the presence of a variable, and identified each 
instance where it appeared. Once I completed my review of the Water Board hearing 
transcript for this variable, I moved to the next variable, and continued until I had looked 
for each Rowe and Frewer variable. I then conducted this same analysis for the Work 
Group meeting transcripts. After completing this review, I noticed that multiple 
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commenters at the Water Board hearing raised the issue of the perceived independence 
(or lack thereof) of the Expert Panel, so I added this as a sixth variable to consider, and 
re-reviewed each transcript for it. In the discussion that follows, I ask whether and if so, 
how, each of these six variables mediated the flow of information in each mechanism.  
 III.a. Number of Participants 
 Maximizing the number of participants in a public engagement mechanism is 
important because doing so “maximizes the amount of potentially relevant information 
that might be distributed or attained” (Rowe & Frewer, 2005, p. 267). In considering this 
variable, Rowe and Frewer (2005) differentiate among the following: (1) the population 
of individuals affected or interested in the controversy at issue in a given public 
engagement mechanism; (2) the intended sample size of the mechanism; and (3) the 
proportion of that sample that is actually engaged (pp. 266-267). Participants are actively 
engaged if they process or respond to information (depending on the particular 
mechanism used (e.g. a presentation versus a survey)). Rowe and Frewer (2005) note that 
mechanisms in which the sponsor or organizer has some degree of control over 
participant selection—such as by targeting communications at, or attempting to elicit 
information from, a certain sample of the population—may be more likely to maximize 
the number of participants than mechanisms in which public participants self-select to be 
involved (p. 268). Instead of counting the number of participants (information not 
available to me), below I examine two other structural variables affecting participation: 
(1) Access: Timing of the Event and (2) Notice: News of the Event. 
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  III.a.i. Access: Timing of the Event 
 While there are no records regarding the number of people in attendance at the 
Water Board hearing or Work Group meeting, the timing of each mechanism likely 
impacted attendance and participation by “the public.” The Water Board hearing was 
held on a Thursday at 9am (Water Board Tr., p. 1). By the time the Water Board got to 
the issue of Boeing’s NPDES permit renewal (there were 18 other items on the agenda), 
it was 3:10pm (Water Board Tr., p. 245). This is an obvious structural impediment to 
public participation: for anyone who works during the week, attending the Water Board 
hearing would have required missing work. Further, at the start of this mechanism it was 
explicitly stated that “the agenda items are numbered for identification purposes and may 
not necessarily be considered in that order” (Water Board Tr., p. 6). This made it 
impossible for someone to take half a day off of work to attend the hearing, because they 
could not know in advance when during the day this agenda item would be considered. In 
contrast, the Work Group meeting was held on a Wednesday at 6:30pm. While this may 
not prove a convenient time for everyone who would like to attend, it seems far better 
than 9am, as it is after the end of the workday for most people.  
 In addition to actually being more convenient, setting the Work Group meeting at 
6:30pm has the added and important benefit of giving the impression that this meeting 
was scheduled with “the public’s” schedules and needs in mind, and with an interest in 
having “the public” attend. Setting the Water Board hearing at 9am on a workday, on the 
other hand, may lead members of “the public” to feel as though their presence does not 
matter to that mechanism’s sponsors (the Water Board). Along similar lines, the Water 
Board hearing’s legally required 30-day public comment period for written comments 
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took place in December, over Christmas, Hanukah, and New Years. Both Organizational 
speaker Tucker and member of “the public” Gortner expressed concern over this (Water 
Board Tr., pp. 318, 327). In the same way that holding a hearing at 9am on a weekday 
decreases the chances that members of the public can attend and increases the chances 
that they will perceive the mechanism’s sponsors as unconcerned with—or perhaps even 
discouraging of—their participation, having a public comment period over the holiday 
season likewise lowers the odds of participation and raises feelings of unimportance by 
members of the “public.” 
 In these ways, the time at which each of these mechanisms occurred mediated 
information flow by restricting whose information flowed in them. If members of “the 
public” could not submit written comments or attend the Water Board hearing due to 
scheduling conflicts, their information was de facto excluded from circulation. Further, if 
these timing issues led members of “the public” to feel like their input was not valued, 
they might have been less likely to go to the trouble of participating. Conversely, by 
setting the Work Group meeting at a time when members of “the public” were more 
likely to be able to attend, this mechanism set the stage to promote the circulation of “the 
public’s” information. 
  III.a.ii. Notice: News of the Event 
 Another important component of maximizing the number of participants in a 
public engagement mechanism is notifying potential participants of the event and of the 
opportunity for participation. The Water Board hearing fell short in this respect. One way 
that members of “the public” are notified of Water Board hearings is to place themselves 
on a listserv and receive emails informing them of upcoming hearings. As pointed out in 
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a written comment from the Rocketdyne Cleanup Coalition, the subject line of this 
hearing’s notification email read, “Tentative Waste Discharge Requirements for Boeing 
Santa Susana Field Lab” (Water Board Tr., p. 269). As such, it gave no indication that 
members of “the public” could comment on it. In response to this concern, Water Board 
staff said at the hearing, “Staff appreciates the constructive criticism and will be 
implementing a protocol that requires that the description included in the email 
specifically states that the attached documents are for public comment and provide the 
deadline for the comments as well […] So we will clarify that in future emails” (Water 
Board Tr., p. 269). If potential participants do not know about the opportunity to 
participate, they cannot participate, and their information is thereby prevented from 
flowing in that mechanism. Although here the proposed permit was circulated to potential 
participants, it was not done in a way that made clear that “the public” could participate.  
 Further, for persons not on this listserv, their options for viewing the proposed 
permit in a manner that allowed for meaningful participation in this mechanism were 
limited. The hearing was noticed twice in a local newspaper prior to the close of the 
public comment period, and the agenda for the hearing was posted on the Water Board’s 
website at least ten days before the hearing (which is all that is legally required). 
However, the tentative permit itself was not included in these announcements, and it was 
not posted on the Water Board’s website until after the written comment period closed 
(Water Board Tr., pp. 345-346). This means that persons who did not receive the Water 
Board’s email had no way to review the terms of the proposed permit prior to the close of 
the written comment period, making attending the Water Board hearing their only option 
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to participate. But because the hearing took place on a weekday, this may have proved an 
insurmountable impediment to participation for many would-be participants.  
 In these ways, the notification mechanisms here contributed to the Water Board 
hearing’s failure to maximize the number of participants—in particular, the number of 
“public” participants. By denying members of the “public” access to this STE public 
engagement mechanism itself, or to the materials at issue in this mechanism, this 
mechanism denied them the opportunity to meaningfully participate in it. As such, this 
failure restricted the flow of the “public’s” information, eliminating potentially rich 
sources of information and perspectives from this mechanism. Conversely, because the 
Expert Panel’s presence was assured at the hearing, this mechanism ensured that its 
information would circulate there.  
 III.b. Relevant Information Elicited from Participants 
 Maximizing the relevant information elicited from “public” participants is also 
tied to increasing a public engagement mechanism’s efficiency (Rowe & Frewer, 2005, p. 
268). Rowe and Frewer (2005) explain that all mechanism participants: 
possess a quantity of relevant information regarding the problem in hand (whether 
this is knowledge or simply an opinion) as well as other information of no 
relevance. An effective exercise needs to elicit all relevant information from each 
active participant while not eliciting irrelevant or spurious information. Should 
appropriate information remain unelicited or be confounded or confused by 
irrelevant information, effectiveness will be negatively impacted. (p. 268, 
emphasis in original) 
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Below, I consider the extent to which the Water Board hearing and Work Group 
meeting maximized the amount of relevant information elicited from participants 
by looking at three specific factors: (1) whether each mechanism elicited 
irrelevant and spurious information from participants; (2) whether each 
mechanism utilized facilitators, whether they had “open” versus “closed” 
response formats, and how much time participants were given to prepare and 
present; and (3) whether each mechanism maximized participants’ knowledge of 
the mechanism sponsors’ information.  
  III.b.i. Irrelevant and Spurious Information 
 While there is unfortunately no record of the question and answer period at the 
Work Group meeting, the Water Board hearing transcript reveals that the hearing elicited 
some “irrelevant or spurious information.” According to Rower and Frewer’s theory, this 
information “confounded or confused” the relevant information and negatively impacted 
this mechanism’s effectiveness (Rowe & Frewer, 2005, p. 268). For example, one 
“public” commenter stated, “I would just like you to not weaken any standard of 
cleanup” (Water Board Tr., p. 339). Similarly, another said, “I feel that the standards that 
we’re allowing for Boeing to dump all the contaminants is wrong. And they’re the 
polluter, and they need to clean up the site completely. […] I feel that this Board needs to 
enforce the cleanup […]” (Water Board Tr., p. 340, emphasis added). While the 
beginning of this comment is relevant, if imprecise, the rest is beyond the scope of the 
Water Board’s control and not at issue at the Water Board hearing. The Water Board 
makes this clear at the outset of the hearing when the Water Board’s Executive Officer 
states:  
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The California Department of Toxic Substances has oversight responsibilities for 
the cleanup, and the Water Board is not involved in the cleanup. […] However, 
stormwater runoff from the site is a Board issue and it is regulated through the 
permit that is before you today. […] So, once again, before I turn it over to 
Cassandra [a Water Board staff member], I just want to remind you that we are 
not here to consider the cleanup of the Santa Susana Field Lab, but actually the 
regulation of stormwater that drains from the site during wet-weather events. 
(Water Board Tr., pp. 249-250, 252, emphasis added) 
Despite these repeated statements, however, commenters offered information that, 
while important to other aspects of the SSFL controversy, was irrelevant to the 
Water Board hearing. According to Rowe and Frewer’s theory, this information 
distracted from the relevant information “the public” offered, likely inhibiting the 
flow of that information by decreasing the likelihood that listeners would take it 
seriously. 
 In addition, some “public” commenters at the Water Board hearing offered 
technically spurious information—or at least information that revealed a lack of 
interactional expertise. For example, one public commenter stated, “Boeing should not be 
discharging anything” (Water Board Tr., p. 341). While the sentiment of this comment is 
perhaps that Boeing should not be discharging contaminants at levels that are harmful to 
human health or the environment, as stated this comment requests a factual impossibility. 
A “discharge” simply means a release, and even if by “anything” this commenter meant 
pollutants, this is still inaccurate because there are natural levels of pollutants—called 
background levels—that would be discharged from the site no matter how stringently it 
  123 
was cleaned up. Comments like these reveal that this mechanism failed to elicit only 
relevant information from participants. Instead, it elicited erroneous and irrelevant 
information, primarily from members of the “public,” which made these speakers look as 
though they lacked both interactional and contributory expertise. This is problematic in 
two ways. First, it reinforced the idea that members of the “public” were properly denied 
expert status in this mechanism—that is, the idea that members of the “public” lacked 
both relevant or accurate information, as well as the ability to know which information 
was relevant to this particular controversy. Second, it furthered the all too common 
notion that the “public” is too ill-informed and unsophisticated to offer valuable 
contributions to STE deliberations and decisions. As a result, this mechanism’s failure to 
elicit only relevant information from members of the “public” made it less likely that the 
decision-maker (the Water Board) would seriously consider what the “public” had to say. 
Instead, it increased the likelihood that only information proffered by the designated 
experts in this mechanism would flow, effectively excluding important voices with 
valuable perspectives from this conversation. In this way, this failure to elicit only 
relevant information was as a Mediational Means that filtered whose information flowed 
in this mechanism.  
III.b.ii. Facilitators, “Open” Versus “Closed” Responses, and Time to 
Prepare and Present 
 Rowe and Frewer identify two structural aspects of public engagement 
mechanisms that affect whether the maximum amount of relevant information is elicited 
from “public” participants. First is the presence or absence of a facilitator, who aids 
“public” participants in ensuring that they share all of their relevant information before 
  124 
accepting a decision. Mechanisms with such facilitation have been shown to elicit more 
relevant information than identical mechanisms without it (Rowe & Frewer, 2005, p. 
269). Second is whether the response mode available to participants is “open”—meaning 
it allows free responses, like a focus group or conference—or “closed”—meaning it only 
allows participants to choose among two or more options, like a referendum or a survey 
with a ratings scale (Rowe & Frewer, 2005, p. 269). Mechanisms using “closed” 
mechanisms are likely to elicit less of participants’ relevant information than “open” ones 
(Rowe & Frewer, 2005, p. 269). This is because the sponsor of a closed mechanism will 
not know the reasons behind participants’ choices and therefore will not know whether 
some participants’ choices should be given more weight than others (Rowe & Frewer, 
2005, p. 269). 
 Neither the Water Board hearing nor the Work Group meeting utilized a 
facilitator, and both allowed for open choices insofar as they allowed participants to say 
anything they wished during the designated question and answer period. However, 
another variable, which is similar in flavor to “open” versus “closed” mechanisms, 
differentiated the Water Board hearing from the Work Group meeting and likely 
contributed to how well each mechanism elicited relevant information from participants. 
This variable is the amount of time participants were given to offer that information. At 
the beginning of the Water Board hearing, a spokesperson for the Water Board stated that 
“public” comments would be limited to “three minutes maximum or less depending on 
the time and number of speakers” (Water Board Tr., pp. 246-247). By the time Water 
Board reached this step in the proceeding, however, these comments were capped at “two 
minutes each so that we have enough time” (Water Board Tr., p. 336). Two minutes is an 
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insufficient amount of time for speakers to express either multiple 
questions/comments/concerns or to express even one in depth, leading to the same 
shortcomings that Rowe and Frewer identify for “closed” mechanisms. This is especially 
the case when there is no facilitator present to aid speakers in identifying what 
information is relevant and presenting it concisely. Conversely, the Work Group meeting 
did not cap the time participants were given to speak, theoretically allowing for elicitation 
of more information from “public” participants. 
 Moreover, other structural aspects of the Water Board hearing made it likely that 
even the Organizations that were granted party status could not offer maximal relevant 
information. As Gortner explained in her presentation, “while we’re grateful for party 
status, we were only given 3 days to prepare for this” (Water Board Tr., p. 318). Thus, 
even though the Organizations were given forty rather than two minutes to speak, the 
Water Board hearing failed to maximize the relevant information elicited from not only 
“the public” but the Organizations as well. As a result, we see once again structural 
features that promoted the flow of the designated experts’ information while impeding 
the flow of the non-experts’ information. Doing so stifled the robust and broad 
deliberation scholars have called for regarding STE issues, in several ways. First, these 
features essentially made the designated experts’ information the only information that 
decision-makers could consider. Second, they reinforced the widely criticized model of 
STE decision-making as a one-way process that privileges the voices of technical experts 
over those of persons with other perspectives and kinds of knowledge to contribute. As 
such, we see here that the absence of a facilitator, the use of a closed rather than open 
response format, and the tight limits on response times for non-experts acted as 
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Mediational Means that limited whose and how much relevant information was put into 
circulation in this mechanism. 
  III.b.iii. Knowledge of Sponsor’s Information 
 In order to maximize the relevant information elicited from participants in the 
Water Board hearing—which was information regarding the terms of the proposed 
permit—participants had to know what those terms were. This information was in the 
hands of the mechanism’s sponsor, the Water Board. This mechanism was problematic 
regarding the circulation of this information in several respects. First, as noted above, the 
email sent to potential Water Board hearing participants containing the proposed permit 
did not specify that it was open for public comment (Water Board Tr., p. 269). Second, 
also as noted above, the proposed permit was not posted to the Water Board’s website 
until after the 30-day written-public-comment-period closed (Water Board Tr., pp. 332, 
345). The Water Board staff’s response to this concern was, “Unfortunately, there was a 
mistake. The item should have been posted on the date that it was emailed to the 
interested parties. When staff became aware that it was not posted, it was—it was 
subsequently posted” (Water Board Tr., p. 369). Another Water Board staff member 
continued, “it’s a good idea to post things online; I would note, there is no legal 
requirement to do so. But it is a good idea to do so. I just want to let you know that it’s 
not a legal impediment for not doing that” (Water Board Tr., p. 345).  
 While Water Board staff’s failure to make the proposed permit available online to 
potential Water Board hearing participants may have prevented some people from 
participating at all, as explained in section III.a.ii above, it likely also prevented maximal 
elicitation of relevant information from those who could participate. This is because 
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people who wanted to submit written comments but were not emailed the tentative permit 
could not offer specific comments on the permit’s terms, and people who were able to 
attend the Water Board hearing were limited to two minutes each. Further, the Water 
Board staff’s failure to post the tentative permit online in a timely manner further 
contributed to participants’ feelings of unfairness and unimportance in this mechanism, as 
evidenced by Tucker’s statement that “the Board didn’t even post the tentative permit 
until after the public comment period—which ran over the Christmas holidays—closed. 
Boeing’s application for the permit has been kept secret for more than a year” (Water 
Board Tr., p. 332).  
 Furthering these feelings of unfairness and distrust was a perceived lack of candor 
by the Water Board regarding the proposed permit changes. When the Notice of Public 
Hearing was finally posted on the Water Board’s website, it was titled, “Proposed 
Reissuance of Waste Discharge Requirements—National Pollution Discharge 
Elimination System Permit” (Water Board Tr., p. 317; Rocketdyne Cleanup Coalition et 
al., p. 3). While a “reissuance” suggests a mere duplication of the existing permit, the 
proposed permit contained significant revisions. Yet these changes were at best not 
highlighted, and at worst intentionally obscured, from the public’s attention. As one 
commenter told the Water Board: 
I don’t know about you, but if you’ve gone through this, this is a beast. Okay? I 
tried to do this […] line by line, 195 pages [in the old permit] compared to 180 
pages [in the proposed permit]. I did call the Water Board. [….] I asked him is 
there, please, a list of changes. I really can’t go through this. And he said no. He 
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referred me to one specific page, but there was no list of changes. (Water Board 
Tr., p. 318) 
Because the proposed changes to the new permit were made neither easily identifiable 
nor easily accessible to members of “the public,” the likelihood that they could offer 
maximal relevant information about those changes significantly decreased.  
 These factors made it logistically difficult for potential “public” participants to 
obtain information about the proposed permit’s terms, which in turn impeded their ability 
to offer the relevant information they possessed regarding the proposed permit. In this 
way, this mechanism’s failure to maximize “public” participants’ knowledge of the Water 
Board’s information once again served as a Mediational Means that restricted the flow of 
the “public’s” information.  
 III.c. Relevant Information Provided by Sponsors 
 Maximizing the relevant information provided by sponsors is just as important as 
maximizing that elicited from “the public” (Rowe & Frewer, 2005, p. 270). Rowe and 
Frewer hypothesize that mechanisms that allow for “flexible, variable, and responsive 
information provision from sponsors”—what Asen explained as thin discursive norms—
are more likely to maximize relevant sponsor information than mechanisms that set the 
information provision prior to the interaction—Asen’s thick discursive norms (Rowe & 
Frewer, 2005, p. 270). This is because flexible information provision mechanisms allow 
“public” participants to identify holes in the information and clarify uncertainties, such as 
those resulting from the use of technical jargon (Rowe & Frewer, 2005, p. 270). Doing so 
would allow “the public” to offer better-informed input, meaning information flow would 
be enhanced by such flexibility. 
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 The Water Board hearing theoretically allowed “public” participants to “identify 
holes in the information and clarify uncertainties” during the public comment period. 
However, this period is expressly a period for “comments” rather than a question and 
answer period, unlike at the Work Group meeting. As such, “the public” may pose 
questions, identify holes, or express confusion or uncertainty during this time at the 
Water Board hearing, but the Water Board is under no obligation to respond, and in fact 
the procedure for the hearing expressly builds in no mechanism for such responses. 
Instead, “[a]fter completion of oral comments [from the public], the Board Members may 
ask questions of staff, parties, and interested persons” (Water Board Tr., p. 247). In this 
way, this mechanism is designed to ensure that the Water Board—the sponsor— rather 
than mechanism participants, gets to clarify uncertainties. Further, the Water Board’s 
failure to post the proposed permit on its website in a timely fashion, as well as its failure 
to create a list of proposed changes between the old and new permits, are other instances 
of this mechanism’s failure to maximize the relevant information provided by its 
sponsors. In these ways, these structural mechanisms impeded the flow of both the Water 
Board’s and “the public’s” information in this mechanism. 
 III.d. Transfer and Processing of Information 
 Maximizing the efficient transfer of information to, and processing by, recipients 
is another variable tied to a public engagement mechanism’s efficiency (Rowe & Frewer, 
2005, p. 271). Transfer of information is efficient when participants fully understand that 
information (Rowe & Frewer, 2005, p. 271). The most significant variable impacting 
efficient transfer is the medium through which the information is conveyed, and face-to-
face mediums are the least likely to lead to information loss or misunderstanding (Rowe 
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& Frewer, 2005, pp. 271-272). Another factor affecting information transfer and 
processing is the use of technical terminology and jargon, which decreases efficient 
transfer (Rowe & Frewer, 2005, p. 273). 
 Both the Water Board hearing and the Work Group meeting conveyed 
information through face-to-face interactions at the events themselves. However, 
speakers at the Water Board hearing were commenting on the written proposed permit (if 
they were able to access it, that is). Consistent with the notorious reputation of legal and 
scientific documents, the proposed permit was replete with highly technical terminology 
and jargon—both legal and scientific. For example, the proposed permit stated: 
The discharge shall not cause a violation of any applicable water quality standards 
for receiving waters adopted by the Regional Water Board or the State Water 
Resources Control Board as required by the federal CWA and regulations adopted 
thereunder. If more stringent applicable water quality standards are promulgated 
or approved pursuant to section 303 of the federal CWA, and amendments 
thereto, the Regional Water Board will revise and modify this Order in 
accordance with such more stringent standards. (California Regional Water 
Quality Control Board Los Angeles Region, 2015, p. 6) 
As discussed further in Chapter 6, the use of nominalizations such as “cause a violation” 
instead of verbs such as “violate” interferes with readability and comprehension, and 
“limits access to [this information] to those accustomed to reading and interpreting this 
form of discourse” (Killingsworth & Palmer, 1992, p. 174). Similarly, words such as 
“thereunder” and “thereto” are legal “jargon” that do “no more than reinforce the esoteric 
quality of legal discourse,” making the proposed permit needlessly difficult to understand 
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for persons not versed in such discourse (Ufot, 2013, p. 628). Similarly, a glance at the 
tentative permit’s Table of Contents (figure 5, below) reveals highly technical 
terminology that is likely inaccessible to persons without specialized knowledge:  
 
 
Figure 5: Tentative Boeing NDPES Permit Table of Contents  
Unless one is well-versed in hydrology and Clean Water Act terminology and concepts, 
phrases such as “Final Ambient WLAs for Pollutants in Sediment for Stormwater 
Dischargers,” “Single Constituent Effluent Limitation,” “Instantaneous Maximum 
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Effluent Limitation,” and “Mass Emission Rates”—none of which are explained or 
defined in the body of the permit—are likely meaningless. In contrast to the Water Board 
hearing, attendees at the Work Group meeting were not reliant on a written document to 
obtain relevant information, but instead were provided oral explanations of the proposed 
permit terms at the meeting. 
 Moreover, at the Water Board hearing itself, Water Board staff and the Expert 
Panel used technical terminology without defining or explaining it, such as 
“radionuclides,” “Tests for Significant Toxicity,” “whole effluent toxicity,” “primary 
constituents of concern,” “Best Management Practices,” and “proactively implementing 
compliance activities” (Water Board Tr., pp. 249, 250, 258, 259, 262). In contrast, 
speakers at the Work Group meeting usually clearly defined the technical terms they 
used. For example, Gortner told her audience at the Work Group meeting, “I am going to 
show you on this fancy slide that I did not make, the different outfalls are going to come 
up number by number and show you how many violations. What is a violation? That 
means it has exceeded the amount that the permit has said is safe for the public” (Gortner 
Tr., p. 2). In contrast, even when speakers at the Water Board hearing attempted to define 
or explain technical terms, those explanations themselves contained technical 
terminology and jargon. For example, a Water Board staff member stated: 
Now I would like to explain the difference between the exceedance of an effluent 
limit and the exceedance of a benchmark in the context of this permit. An 
effluent limitation is a numeric restriction on the amount of a pollutant that can 
be discharged from an authorized location. Effluent limitations can be derived 
from a variety of factors, including the Basin Plan, the California Toxics Rule, 
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the National Toxics Rule, the Board’s professional judgment or guidance. […] A 
benchmark is a limit that is used to evaluate the performance of Best 
Management Practices with regards to removal of pollutants present in the 
discharge. (Indiscernible) the benchmarks are established based on the numeric 
effluent limitations. (Water Board Tr., p. 263) 
The extensive use of technical terminology at the Water Board hearing, coupled with no 
express opportunity for people to seek clarification or explanation, inhibited the flow of 
information in this mechanism by decreasing the efficient transfer and processing of it. 
 In contrast, the presenters at the Work Group meeting used far fewer technical 
terms and jargon. This difference is apparent when looking at explanations of the same 
concepts at the Water Board hearing and Work Group meeting, respectively. For 
example, a Water Board staff member at the Water Board hearing explained: 
Regulating stormwater from the site presents a number of technical challenges. 
The site is located actually in two watersheds, the upper reaches of the Los 
Angeles River and the Arroyo Simi, which drains to Calleguas Creek and then to 
Mugu Lagoon. Further, the site is largely undeveloped and, in many areas, the 
drainages are very steep. Consequently, groundwater treatment BMPs need to be 
distributed throughout the site. (Water Board Tr., p. 250) 
Gortner explained this same concept at the Work Group meeting without technical 
terminology by saying: 
Well, Santa Susana is on the top of a hill. So logically when it rains, all the 
radioactive and chemical contamination that is getting into the soil near the water 
can run off down the hill in multiple locations. Here is a picture of the water 
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going off. Water is running where? Well, it is running into a number of areas, 
partially into Bell Creek which is the headwaters for the L.A. River. It is also 
running in our area over here in Simi towards Arroyo Simi, Runkle Canyon, and 
Dayton Canyon. (Gortner Tr., p. 1) 
Similarly, Water Board staff stated at the Water Board hearing that, “[…] the acute 
toxicity requirements have been replaced by the more stringent chronic toxicity 
requirements. And, in evaluating chronic toxicity using the Test for Significant Toxicity, 
the acute endpoint is also evaluated. The test evaluates mortality as well as reduced 
growth and reproduction” (Water Board Tr., p. 269). Gortner once again offered a 
simpler, if less thorough, explanation at the Work Group meeting: “The permit also 
eliminates monitoring and compliance requirements for acute toxicity. Acute toxicity 
means that it is something that kills you instantly versus chronic” (Gortner Tr., p. 2). 
 What accounts for these differences between the Water Board hearing and the 
Work Group meeting? While there are likely many factors, two primary sources are the 
differing audiences and purposes between these two mechanisms—and the structural 
variables that then follow. Presenters at the Water Board hearing are speaking to the 
Water Board, which is composed of persons knowledgeable about and well versed in the 
technical concepts at issue. Members of the community, though invited to comment (via 
a legally required comment period), are not the intended recipients of the information 
presented at the Water Board hearing. Presenters at the Work Group meeting, in contrast, 
are speaking to an audience of community members, many of whom are unfamiliar with 
the NPDES permitting process or subject matter. Relatedly, the purpose of the Water 
Board hearing is for the Water Board to gather information (from its staff, the Expert 
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Panel, the permittee (Boeing), the Organizations, and the public) and make a decision 
regarding the terms of Boeing’s new NPDES permit, not to educate, inform, or engage in 
a dialogue with the public. The Work Group meeting’s explicit purpose, on the other 
hand, is to do just that.  
 Thus, there may be logical reasons for the greater use of technical terminology 
and jargon at the Water Board hearing than at the Work Group meeting. However, 
regardless of why this is so, the end result remains that some of the recipients of 
information at the Water Board hearing—namely members of “the public”—were less 
likely to transfer and process information there than they were at the Work Group 
meeting. In this respect, these structural features of the Water Board hearing can be 
viewed as Mediational Means that inhibited the flow of information to and from the 
“public” to a greater extent than those of the Work Group meeting, contributing once 
again to the loss of important and valuable information and perspectives in this 
mechanism. 
 III.e. Aggregation of Relevant Information 
 Also important to achieving an effective public participation mechanism is 
efficiently and accurately combining all relevant information from participants (Rowe & 
Frewer, 2005, p. 273). Once again, the presence of a facilitator can help to maximize this 
aggregation (Rowe & Frewer, 2005, p. 273). Neither the Water Board hearing nor the 
Work Group meeting used a facilitator, but the Water Board explicitly requested 
aggregation. At the Water Board hearing, the Acting Chair of the Board told the “public”: 
“Persons with similar concerns or opinions are encouraged to choose one representative 
to speak” (Water Board Tr., p. 246). This statement seems difficult for members of the 
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“public” to act on unless they convened in advance of the hearing to coordinate their 
comments. Further, while avoiding duplicate comments is practical considering the time 
constraints of the hearing (which lasted 45 minutes longer than the hearing room was 
reserved for), one wonders if the repetition of particular concerns is important for the 
decision-making process. In the same way that constituents are encouraged to call their 
legislators en masse to sway him or her to vote a particular way on a bill, does the 
number of comments the Water Board receives that state the same concern impact how 
much weight Board members give to that concern? If so, one must pause to consider how 
consolidating the “public’s” comments might affect the impact of those comments. 
 III.f. Perceived Independence of Sponsor’s Advisors 
 In addition to Rowe and Frewer’s variables discussed above (which they note is a 
non-exhaustive list) (Rower & Frewer, 2005, p. 286), the extent to which a sponsor or 
decision-maker’s advisors were viewed as independent versus biased contributed to the 
fairness aspect of effectiveness at the Water Board hearing. 
 Prior to this hearing, when the Water Board first decided to create the Expert 
Panel, it put Boeing in charge of selecting its members (Boeing SSFL NPDES 
Compliance Program, 2008, p. 1). Further, rather than allocating separate, independent 
presentation timeslots at the Water Board hearing for Boeing, the “Expert Panel,” and the 
Organizations, the Water Board allotted 40 minutes to “the Boeing Company and the 
Expert Panel” and 40 minutes to “the organizations,” respectively. What is more, the 
Water Board did so without any explanation as to why it saw fit that the presumably 
neutral and independent “Expert Panel” should share a presentation slot with Boeing, the 
permittee. Even more egregious, the acting chair of the Water Board stated that “the 
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Boeing Company and the Expert Panel with [sic] make its presentation, which cannot 
exceed 40 minutes; after Boeing, the organizations I’ve previously mentioned will make 
its presentation. […]” (Water Board Tr., p. 246, emphasis added). In this statement, 
consciously or not, the acting chair expressly conflated Boeing and the supposedly 
“independent” Expert Panel by referring to them collectively as “it” and “Boeing.” 
These acts by the decision-maker sent a significant and troubling message to all 
participants and onlookers in this public engagement mechanism. Putting Boeing in 
charge of assembling the advisory panel that recommends Boeing’s course of action—
while perhaps due to the Water Board’s limited time and financial resources—feels an 
awful lot like the fox guarding the henhouse. Regardless of whether this act actually had 
any bearing on the neutrality, viewpoints, or recommendations of the Expert Panel’s 
members, it created the illusion of impartiality and caused this public engagement 
mechanism to lose legitimacy and credibility. Moreover, giving Boeing and the Expert 
Panel one shared timeslot while giving the Organizations a separate slot, and referring to 
Boeing and the Expert Panel collectively as “Boeing,” sent the message that Boeing and 
the Expert Panel are aligned in their positions and/or goals for the permit renewal hearing 
and permit terms, while the Organizations are at a minimum not part of this collaboration, 
or, perhaps, adverse to it. Further, it conveyed that Boeing is part of, or at least connected 
to, a group of ordained experts, but that the Organizations possess no such expert status 
or connections. This seemingly inconsequential act thus placed Boeing in a position of 
more power than the Organizations, and potentially impacted the credibility and 
deference that the Water Board bestowed each. In other words, this act potentially limited 
the circulation of the Organization’s information and promoted the flow of Boeing’s 
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information in this mechanism. In these ways, the Water Board’s treatment of the Expert 
Panel, and the impressions that treatment created, negatively impacted the flow of the 
Organizations’ information at the Water Board hearing. 
IV. Conclusion 
 The structural components of a public engagement mechanism impact how, what, 
and whose information flows in that mechanism. The Water Board hearing and the Work 
Group meeting shared some structural similarities, in that they both included formal 
presentations followed by a period allocated for members of “the public” to speak. 
Further, as Rowe and Frewer explain, both the Water Board hearing—a “public 
hearing”—and the Work Group meeting—a “public meeting”—“rely on the public to 
come to the information rather than vice versa. As such, the involved “public” is largely 
self-selected and biased in terms of those most proactive and interested. Information is 
communicated face-to-face by sponsors to those individuals and is variable, depending to 
some degree (often small) on what participants ask” (Rowe & Frewer, 2005, p. 278). 
Because of this “self-selection of participants and also flexible information,” Rowe and 
Frewer (2005) conclude that these types of public engagement mechanisms “seem less 
optimal from the perspective of maximizing information distribution (unless one 
considers that the sponsors may themselves be unclear as to who are the appropriate 
participants and what is the most important information to impart)” (p. 283, emphasis in 
original). At both the Water Board hearing and the Work Group meeting, the sponsors 
seem clear on both the appropriate participants (at the hearing, the appropriate 
participants appear to be anyone who can spare a Thursday to offer two minutes of 
commentary, while at the Work Group meeting the appropriate participants are concerned 
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community members) and the most important information (the proposed permit terms 
and their significance and impacts). Despite these similarities, however, applying Rowe 
and Frewer’s effectiveness variables reveals several stark and important differences 
between these two mechanisms. 
 The Water Board hearing failed to maximize the number of participants, due to a 
combination of factors. First is the timing of the hearing—9am on a Thursday—and of 
the preceding written comment period, which was over Christmas, Hanukah, and New 
Years holidays. Second is the notification process, wherein the transmittal email 
circulating the proposed permit to members of “the public” did not indicate that it was 
open for public comment, and wherein the proposed permit was not posted to the Water 
Board’s website until after the written public comment period had closed.  
 The Water Board hearing also failed to maximize the relevant information elicited 
from participants, and instead elicited some relevant information as well as some 
spurious and irrelevant information. This is likely attributable in part to the two-minute 
time limit for public comments. In addition, the failure to timely provide participants with 
the permit on which they were to comment, the lack of a list of changes between the old 
and proposed permits, and the perceived lack of candor by the Water Board in titling the 
permit a “reissuance” rather than a revision, also contributed to this mechanism’s less 
than maximal elicitation of relevant information from participants. 
 In addition, the Water Board hearing did not maximize relevant information 
provided by the sponsor, because it did not provide an opportunity for participants to 
receive clarification or explanations of issues on which they were uncertain or confused. 
Neither did it maximize participants’ transfer or processing of information, due to its 
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extensive use of technical terminology and jargon. It further failed to maximize the 
aggregation of relevant information, due to its lack of facilitation. Lastly, the Water 
Board’s decision to allocate one joint timeslot to Boeing—the permitee—and the Expert 
Panel, its reference to both as “Boeing,” and the fact that the Water Board put Boeing in 
charge of selecting the Expert Panel members all contributed to a perceived lack of 
fairness in this mechanism, further inhibiting the flow of information there and 
decreasing its effectiveness. 
 While the Work Group meeting was not executed perfectly either, it maximized 
participants, relevant information from both participants and sponsors, and information 
transfer more so than the Water Board hearing. This is because it was held at 6:30pm 
(after the workday ended), there was no time limit for public questions, it utilized a two-
directional question and answer period rather than a one-directional comment period, and 
it had limited technical terminology and jargon. In these ways, the structural features of 
the Work Group meeting enhanced rather than impeded the flow of information in this 
mechanism.  
 We have seen from this analysis that the structural features of a public 
engagement mechanism act as Mediational Means that impact how, what, and whose 
information flows there. In the case of the Water Board hearing, its structural features 
tended to reinforce the notion that the designated experts were better qualified to offer 
information than the Organizations or the “public,” such as by allotting the designated 
experts more time to speak or prepare than the “public” or Organizations, and by failing 
to elicit only relevant information from the “public.” They also tended to promote the 
flow of the designated experts’ information while restricting that of the “public’s” 
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information, excluding potentially valuable and important knowledge and perspectives 
from circulation there. In contrast, the Work Group hearing utilized structural features 
that made the “public’s” information more likely to flow. As a result, the information that 
flowed in each of these mechanisms was in many ways very different: the designated 
experts’ technical, “encyclopedic,” specialized knowledge was a central component of 
the Water Board hearing, while the “public’s” non-technical information about values 
and fairness was a larger part of the Work Group meeting. In Chapter 6, I will consider 
the implications of these impacts insofar as they are reflected in the terms of the permit 
that the Water Board issued at the close of the Water Board hearing. But first, in the next 
chapter, I ask how and whether the stylistic features utilized by the speakers at the Water 
Board hearing and Work Group meeting mediated information flow in each mechanism. 
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CHAPTER 5 
EXAMINING STYLISTIC FEATURES OF THE SSFL WATER BOARD HEARING 
AND WORK GROUP MEETING AS MEDIATIONAL MEANS 
I. The Problem Driving This Chapter: Role Designations and Information Flow  
 STE scholars have found that particular stylistic features of a message can restrict 
who can access, process, and respond to it (see, e.g., Dahlstrom, 2014, p. 13614; 
Killingsworth & Palmer, 1992, p. 173; Rowe & Frewer, 2005, p. 273). Stylistic features 
are elements that structure language use—often at the sentence level, such as passive 
voice, the use of nominalizations, and deferential language, for instance. Because of the 
exclusionary power associated with certain stylistic features, identifying which messages 
utilized those features in a given STE mechanism sheds light on whose information 
circulated, and to whom, in that mechanism. Recognizing how stylistic features mediate 
information in an STE public engagement mechanism allows us to better understand how 
the discourse that takes place in that mechanism impacts its outcome. To accomplish this 
task, in this chapter, I ask which stylistic features persons designated as experts and non-
experts used at the Water Board hearing and Work Group meeting, and whether, and is 
so, how these features mediated the flow of information in each mechanism. As I 
elaborate next, this chapter is based on prior scholarship that attributes certain stylistic 
features to discourse that restricts access to a message (Dahlstrom, 2014, p. 13614; 
Killingsworth & Palmer, 1992, p. 173; Rowe & Frewer, 2005, p. 273). In this chapter, I 
examine stylistic features that characterize presentations made at both the Water Board 
hearing and Work Group meeting. This chapter also analyzes the stylistic features of 
speakers who spoke at both events. This two-part analysis sheds light on how stylistic 
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features mediate what, whose, and how information flows in these STE public 
engagement mechanisms. 
II. Methodology 
 I base my methodology for this chapter on M. Jimmie Killingsworth and 
Jacqueline S. Palmer’s analysis of Environmental Impact Statements in EcoSpeak. 
Environmental Impact Statements are reports that federal agencies must prepare in which 
they consider the environmental impacts of their proposed actions. Just like in the 
NPDES permit process, federal agencies must accept written and oral public comments 
about a tentative Environmental Impact Statement prior to finalizing it. Killingsworth and 
Palmer explain that:  
[T]he primary readers of the [Environmental Impact Statement] are people who 
make decisions about land use and air and water quality—executive 
administrators and sometimes judges and legislators. The intended audience also 
consists of invited commentators, related government agencies, and concerned 
citizens—all of whom may in principle influence the final decision of the primary 
audience through testimony, advice, lobbying, and voting. (Killingsworth & 
Palmer, 1992, p. 170) 
The same is true for the Water Board hearing presentations, which have as their primary 
audience the Water Board—the decision-maker—and as their secondary audience 
concerned citizens.  
 Below, I examine the Water Board hearing and Work Group meeting 
presentations first for: (1) passive voice; (2) nominalizations; (3) strings of noun 
modifiers; and (4) acronyms. These are the features that Killingsworth and Palmer (1992) 
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looked for in Environmental Impact Statements to see how well those documents 
communicated information to their audiences (p. 173). Next, I look for (5) technical 
language, which, as noted in Chapter 3, Rowe and Frewer (2005) have identified as 
negatively impacting the effectiveness of public engagement mechanisms (p. 273). I then 
look for (6) narrative, which research suggests is easier to comprehend and more 
engaging than traditional “logical-scientific communication” (Dahlstrom, 2014, p. 
13614). Lastly, I examine (7) how precise and (8) how deferential the language that 
speakers used in their presentations was. In conducting these analyses, I consider in 
particular differences between the presentations made by the same persons at the Water 
Board hearing and Work Group meeting, respectively, as well as between the 
presentations made by the designated experts and non-experts at the Water Board 
hearing. 
III. Stylistic Features 
 The style one uses to communicate a message has implications for both who can 
understand that message (Killingsworth & Palmer, 1992, p. 170)—and thus participate in 
decisions about it—and for how an audience perceives its speaker (e.g. C. Miller 2003, p. 
200). Indeed, “[t]he very language” of agency documents like [Environmental Impact 
Statement] reports ensures that “the interested public” is “systematically excluded from 
participation in the [decision-making] process, even while their rights to be heard are 
ostensibly maintained” (Killingsworth & Palmer, 1992, p. 170). Research has shown that, 
perhaps because of this exclusion, “the likelihood of an outsider influencing an agency 
action is slight” (Killingsworth & Palmer, 1992, p. 170). 
  145 
 Certain stylistic features decrease the accessibility of a message, thereby 
impeding information flow. These include passive voice, nominalizations, strings of noun 
modifiers, acronyms, and technical terminology (Killingsworth & Palmer, 1992, pp. 173-
174; Rowe & Frewer, 2005, p. 273). Killingsworth and Palmer (1992) refer to this 
combination of features as “the expert’s style,” and explain that this style “limits access 
to the information of the [message] to those accustomed to reading and interpreting this 
form of discourse” (p. 170). This style is typical of bureaucratic and technical prose, and 
it decreases “general readability and comprehension” (Killingsworth & Palmer, 1992, p. 
170). Below, I examine the use of each of these features, in addition to narrative, precise 
language, and deferential language, at the Water Board hearing and Work Group meeting 
and ask whether, and if so, how they impacted the flow of information in each 
mechanism. 
 III.a. Passive Voice 
 Passive voice “obliterates agents of actions and thereby obscures responsibility 
and/or authority” (Killingsworth & Palmer, 1992, p. 173). At the Water Board hearing, 
the Water Board and Water Board staff used passive voice often. For example, Acting 
Water Board Chair Diamond stated, “Today you will hear from members of the Expert 
Panel about some of the systems that were implemented” (Water Board Tr., p. 246, 
emphasis added). Similarly, Water Board staff explained that “[d]ischarges from the 
Groundwater Extraction and Treatment system have been terminated until Boeing can 
work with the California Department of Fish and Wildlife to determine the requirements 
and the amount of treated wastewater that can be discharged” (Water Board Tr., p. 257, 
emphasis added). In these statements, the actor(s) who implemented the systems and who 
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discharges wastewater is absent. Water Board staff also used passive voice to eliminate 
the actor responsible for drafting the new permit’s terms, which is Water Board staff. For 
example, Water Board staff explained that “[t]he first item considered [when developing 
the revised permit terms] was the Reasonable Potential Analysis” (Water Board Tr., pp. 
257, 258, emphasis added), instead of an active voice statement such as “the first item we 
considered […]” or “the first item Water Board staff considered […]” Water Board 
staff’s explanation of certain testing requirements also omitted the human actors who set 
the permit’s terms and who will conduct the tests: “The acute toxicity requirements have 
been replaced by the more stringent chronic toxicity requirements. And, in evaluating 
chronic toxicity using the Test for Significant Toxicity, the acute endpoint is also 
evaluated” (Water Board Tr., pp. 258, 269, emphasis added). Similarly, in addressing 
concerns that the tentative permit was not posted on the Water Board website, Water 
Board staff explained, “When staff became aware that [the tentative permit] was not 
posted, it was—it was subsequently posted” (Water Board Tr., p. 269, emphasis added). 
Once again, the actor responsible for posting the permit—Water Board staff—is absent 
from this statement.  
 Each of these statements removed the human actor responsible for the action at 
issue, which helped these speakers “achieve distance from their subject matter and 
audiences” and “obscures responsibility” (Killingsworth & Palmer, 1992, p. 173). As 
such, passive voice mediated the flow of information here by restricting the flow of 
information about the actors responsible for deciding on the proposed terms of the 
revised permit, and for making those terms accessible on the Water Board’s website. It 
also made these speakers’ messages less accessible to listeners, especially listeners not 
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well versed in this speaking style. Because the Water Board, Water Board staff, the 
Expert Panel, and the Organizations routinely read documents and hear testimony that 
utilize passive voice, the listeners most likely to be unaccustomed to it were members of 
the “public.” In this way, passive voice inhibited the flow to the “public” of the 
information contained in these messages, which in turn impeded the “public’s” ability to 
circulate their information in response. Once again, we see a Mediational Means that 
restricted the circulation of the “public’s” viewpoints in this mechanism, creating a less 
robust information landscape for the Water Board to make a decision in. 
 Both the Expert Panel and one of Boeing’s presenters, Steve Shestag, used some 
passive voice, but spoke largely in active voice, through statements such as this one by 
Shestag: 
Since the last hearing in 2010, we’ve ceased all industrial operations at the site; 
we’ve substantially completed demolition of Boeing’s building infrastructure; 
we’ve cleaned up numerous source areas; we’ve constructed several advanced 
stormwater treatment systems; and we’ve completed extensive erosion control 
and re-vegetation actions all in the interest of improving water quality. As a 
result, we made considerable progress in achieving compliance at the majority 
of the outfalls. (Water Board Tr., p. 277, emphasis added) 
In statements such as this one, where Shestag discussed Boeing’s accomplishments, he 
tended to use active voice. However, during the few instances in this presentation where 
he discussed Boeing’s shortcomings, he tended to use passive voice. For example, 
Outfalls 008 and 009 were areas of weakness for Boeing: exceedances dropped by only 
one per year for Outfall 008, and increased for Outfall 009, over the previous permit 
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period (Water Board Tr., p. 333). When Shestag explained this to the Water Board, he 
said, “At Outfalls 008 and 009, where conventional contain-and-treat or flow-through 
systems are not practical, Best Management Practices have been implemented […]” 
(Water Board Tr., p. 278). Shestag similarly explained that Boeing worked with the 
Expert Panel “to improve surface water quality in the watersheds where it was not 
feasible to construct stormwater treatment systems […]” (Water Board Tr., p. 281). In 
these instances, Shestag omitted the actor responsible for implementing Best 
Management Practices (that is, Boeing) and for constructing stormwater treatment 
systems, but included the actor who proactively worked with the Expert Panel to find 
alternatives (once again, Boeing). Shestag thus used passive voice to obscure 
responsibility for the negative aspects of Boeing’s permit compliance while emphasizing 
Boeing’s responsibility for the positive ones. In this way, he used passive voice 
selectively (whether intentionally or not) to promote the flow of positive information. 
Like the Water Board and Water Board staff, he also used passive voice to make negative 
information about Boeing more difficult for members of the “public” to process and 
respond to. Doing so eliminated from this mechanism—and from the universe of data 
considered by the decision-maker—the information that those members of the “public” 
could have brought to bear on these issues. 
 The Organizations also used passive voice at times. For example, Duffield stated 
that “Perchlorate and Strontium-90 were found at Runkle Ranch” (Water Board Tr., p. 
314). In this instance, removing the actor who found the perchlorate and strontium-90 
helped to sustain the image of science and scientific tests as objective and not subject to 
human error or interpretation. Further, rather than telling the Water Board, “You must 
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strictly enforce the NPDES permit,” she said, “The NPDES permit must be strictly 
enforced to ensure the protection of all” (Water Board Tr., p. 315, emphasis added). As 
discussed further below in section III.h, this is perhaps connected to the fact that at the 
Water Board hearing, Duffield was not an ordained expert who was granted authority, but 
was instead speaking from a place of less authority to persons with more authority (the 
decision-maker).10 
 Organizational speaker Gortner also used passive voice at the Water Board 
hearing, which allowed her to avoid directly accusing the Water Board. For example, she 
told the Water Board, “We were only given three days to prepare for this” (Water Board 
Tr., p. 318, emphasis added). Likewise, she explained, “It took the Board 14 months to 
write the new permit, and the public was only given 30 days […] to provide public 
feedback” (Water Board Tr., p. 317, emphasis added). In contrast, at the Work Group 
meeting she told her audience: “Well they [the Water Board] took 14 months to write the 
new permit and gave the public only 30 days over the holidays no less to provide public 
feedback […]” (Gortner Tr., p. 1, emphasis added). Gortner thus used active voice to 
discuss the Water Board’s actions at the Work Group meeting, where she was in a 
position of authority as a designated expert, but used passive voice to describe these same 
actions at the Water Board hearing, where she was not. Because passive voice decreases 
the accessibility of a message, she thus promoted the flow of her information at the Work 
Group meeting, but inhibited its flow at the Water Board hearing. As we will see in 
Chapter 6, the Water Board did not take her comments into account in the final permit it 
                                                10	Duffield’s Work Group meeting presentation is about the status of building demolition 
at SSFL, rather than the proposed NPDES permit, so she made no comparable statements 
in that mechanism.	
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issued at the end of the Water Board hearing. While it seems highly improbable that her 
use of passive voice at the hearing was the cause of that omission, it is plausible that it 
was a contributing factor, especially when viewed in conjunction with her non-expert role 
designation and the other structural and stylistic features of that mechanism discussed in 
this project. 
 By using passive voice, each of these speakers avoided placing or accepting 
blame throughout their presentations at the Water Board hearing, and also made the 
content of some of their messages more difficult for “public” recipients to understand. At 
the Water Board hearing, the use of passive voice thus mediated information flow in 
ways that kept the “public” from processing other speakers’ information and, in turn, 
from offering their own information in response. In contrast, at the Work Group meeting 
speakers used passive voice far less often, thus promoting the flow of speakers’ 
information there.  As noted above, whether the “public” understands and is thus able to 
respond to speakers’ information with their own directly impacts what information is on 
the table for decision-makers and other mechanism participants to consider. The 
“public’s” information tends to be values-based and evaluative rather than technical, like 
that typical of designated STE experts, so when the circulation of that information is 
hampered, those decision-makers and participants do not get to consider the full range of 
perspectives about the issue at hand. In these ways, restricting the flow of information to 
and from the “public” shapes the deliberations that take place during, and the outcome of, 
a public engagement mechanism in ways that lead to less thorough deliberations and 
decisions. 
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 III.b. Nominalizations 
 Nominalizations “favor stasis over action by using words in their noun forms 
when they might just as well be written as verbs or adjectives” (Killingsworth & Palmer, 
1992, p. 173). Just as with passive voice, the Water Board and Water Board staff used 
nominalizations frequently in their presentations at the Water Board hearing, and often 
did so in conjunction with passive voice. Below, I list several of these nominalizations 
from the Water Board hearing transcript and include non-nominalized, active voice 
alternatives in brackets to highlight how nominalizations unnecessarily clutter and 
complicate messages:  
• “After completion of oral comments” [After we complete oral comments] (p. 247) 
• “After the conclusion of Board questions” [After the Board concludes their 
questions] (p. 247) 
• “These operations resulted in contamination of soil and groundwater” [These 
operations contaminated soil and groundwater] (p. 249) 
•  “The Board required that an Expert Panel be convened to provide 
recommendations for stormwater treatment” [The Board convened an Expert 
Panel to recommend stormwater treatment plans] (p. 250) 
• “Implementation of traditional Best Management Practices was not a viable 
option” [We could not implement traditional Best Management Practices] (p. 258) 
• “The actual excavation and restabilization efforts were completed in November 
2013. Some of the restabilization efforts included the installation of native plants 
to hold the disturbed soils in place, installation of filters with specialized media to 
remove specific contaminants, and installation of retention basins […]” [We 
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completed our efforts to excavate and restabilize the area in November 2013. 
Some of our efforts to restabilize included installing native plants to hold 
disturbed soils in place, installing filters with specialize media to remove specific 
contaminants, and installing retention basins] (p. 258) 
• “Exceedance of a benchmark triggers additional actions, such as, evaluation and 
implementation of new or upgraded Best Management Practices” [Exceeding a 
benchmark triggers additional actions, such as evaluating and implementing new 
or upgraded Best Management Practices] (p. 264) 
 In each of these statements, the Water Board or Water Board staff made their 
messages needlessly wordy and complex by using passive voice combined with a 
nominalization, rather than active voice combined with a verb. Doing so made their 
messages less accessible, stymying the flow of the information contained in them, 
particularly to members of the “public,” who, as noted above, are less likely to be 
accustomed to this speaking style.  
 Shestag, a Boeing presenter, used nominalizations as well, in statements such as, 
“[…] using treated groundwater for onsite dust suppression and temporary irrigation 
purposes presents a wealth of opportunity to reduce consumption of potable water 
supplies” (Water Board Tr., p. 285, emphasis added). Instead, he might have said, “If we 
use treated groundwater to suppress onsite dust and temporarily irrigate the site, we will 
use less potable water.” Shestag also tells the Water Board that Boeing is working “to 
achieve full compliance with the permit,” where he could have said Boeing is working 
“to fully comply” with the permit (Water Board Tr., p. 286). Like the Water Board and 
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Water Board staff, here Shestag’s use of nominalizations makes his messages less 
accessible and makes it more difficult for his message to circulate. 
 Likewise, the Expert Panel made statements such as, “So we know that [the 
devices] are working from this performance monitoring that we’re doing at these 
locations in addition to observations, you know, at the area of accumulation of sediment” 
(Water Board Tr., p. 297, emphasis added). The Expert Panel could have made this 
statement easier to follow by instead saying, “We know these devices are working from 
monitoring their performance at these locations and observing how much sediment is 
accumulating.” Especially when used in conjunction with passive voice and technical 
terminology, nominalizations made these speakers’ messages less accessible to persons 
unfamiliar with this style of speaking. As such, the “public’s” understanding of, and 
ability to respond to, this information was disproportionately excluded by these 
nominalizations. 
 Although the non-experts at the Water Board hearing (that is, the Organizations 
and the “interested persons,” i.e. the “public”) used some nominalizations, they did so 
only a few times, and most often in conjunction with non-technical language. For 
example, one public commenter at the Water Board hearing told the Water Board, “I 
agree with some of the previous speakers that fines of minimal amounts to such a wealthy 
company is not a deterrent to polluting” (Water Board Tr., p. 339, emphasis added). 
Although this speaker could have said, “do not deter polluting,” this statement is not so 
complex that the nominalization makes it particularly difficult to understand. 
Accordingly, the non-experts’ messages were likely more accessible, at least in this 
respect, than those of the Water Board, Water Board staff, Boeing, and the Expert Panel. 
  154 
 The presenters on behalf of the Organizations used virtually no nominalizations at 
the Water Board hearing, but did use some at the Work Group meeting. For example, 
Duffield stated at the Work Group meeting, “Failure to dispose radioactive waste 
appropriately can result in contamination of groundwater and through it, exposure to the 
public in drinking water […]” (Duffield Tr., p. 2, emphasis added). Here, Duffield might 
have said, “Failing to dispose radioactive waste properly can contaminate groundwater 
and through it, expose the public through drinking water […].” Because Duffield’s 
presentation at the Work Group meeting—where she spoke as a designated expert—was 
about a different issue than her presentation at the Water Board hearing, we cannot make 
an apples-to-apples comparison between her two presentations, but it is worth noting that 
her Water Board hearing presentation—where she held an expressly non-expert role—
included no similar nominalizations.  
 III.c. Strings of Noun Modifiers 
 Strings of noun modifiers “obscure relationships among people and things by 
increasing the number of nouns and extending their function to replace that of adjectives, 
adverbs, prepositional phrases, and dependent clauses” (Killingsworth & Palmer, 1992, p. 
174). As with passive voice and nominalizations, many speakers at the Water Board 
hearing used strings of noun modifiers, but the most frequent users were the Water Board 
and Expert Panel at the Water Board hearing. Examples include (cited as speaker 
followed by Water Board Tr. page number):  
• “Groundwater remediation investigation program” (Water Board staff, p. 256) 
• “National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit” (throughout) 
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• “Effluent-limit benchmark and receiving-water exceedances” (Water Board staff, 
p. 263) 
• “Erosion control measures and treatment systems” (Boeing, p. 280) 
• “Innovative statistically rigorous approach” (Expert Panel, p. 290)  
• “Pollutant concentration reductions” (Expert Panel, p. 296)  
• “Wastewater treatment plant” (Expert Panel, p. 302) 
• “Plutonium and uranium carbide fuel fabrication facilities” (Organizations, p. 
310) 
• “Pollution discharge limits” (Organizations, p. 325) 
Of course, some of these phrases are from the Clean Water Act itself, such as “National 
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit,” and thus unavoidable. Similarly, one of 
the only strings of noun modifiers at the Work Group meeting was Hirsch’s discussion of 
a “suburban residential cleanup level,” a term taken directly from the EPA (Hirsch Tr., 
pp. 3-4, U.S. Department of Energy, “Environmental Assessment”). The extensive strings 
of noun modifiers in phrases such as these, taken directly from laws and regulations, go 
to issues of accessibility of the laws and regulations themselves, rather than of the public 
engagement mechanisms by which they are implemented. Such terms notwithstanding, 
the frequent use of other strings of noun modifiers at the Water Board hearing—
especially when combined with technical language, passive voice, and nominalizations—
unnecessarily complicated already complex messages, further impeding information 
flow. Just as with the use of passive voice and nominalizations, this likely impacted 
members of the “public” more than anyone else at the Water Board hearing, making it 
harder for them to process and respond to this information. As a result, the circulation of 
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the “public’s” information in this mechanism was restricted, meaning that the decision-
maker (the Water Board) and other mechanism participants were denied the opportunity 
to hear and consider it. 
 III.d. Acronyms 
 In written documents, acronyms “cause the reader unused to government jargon 
the inconvenience of constant page turning to locate original references or lists of 
abbreviations” (Killingsworth & Palmer, 1992, p. 173). They also increase the density of 
information that must be absorbed in a short space,” which “intimidate[s] the average 
reader” (Killingsworth & Palmer, 1992, p. 174). In the case of oral presentations like at 
the Water Board hearing and Work Group meeting, audience members lack the ability to 
turn a page to find out what acronyms stand for, further increasing the potential for 
audience members’ confusion, exclusion, and intimidation.  
 Overall, the presenters at the Water Board hearing and Work Group meeting used 
relatively few acronyms and usually defined the ones they did use (e.g. Water Board Tr., 
pp. 279 (Boeing: “BMPs, or Best Management Practices”), 295 (Expert Panel: “We’re 
now at NASA facility called the ‘LOX site,’ Liquid Oxygen site […]”); Hirsch Tr., p. 2 
(Hirsch: “the Cleanup Agreement, what we call the AOC”)). However, several times, 
Water Board hearing speakers used acronyms that neither they nor anyone else at the 
hearing defined. For example, Water Board staff stated, “These limits, which include 
limits for TSS, oil and grease, BOD, settleable solids, and sulfides, are for the protection 
of the receiving water’s beneficial uses […]” (Water Board Tr., p. 267). No one at the 
hearing defined “TSS” or “BOD,” leaving those unfamiliar with these acronyms to 
wonder what they meant.  
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 Even when a speaker or author defines the acronyms they use, if they use many 
acronyms for technical terms in close proximity to one another, this can lead to 
information overload for the audience (Killingsworth & Palmer, 1992, p. 174). This may 
have happened at the Water Board hearing and Work Group meeting, particularly when 
speakers used acronyms in conjunction with technical language. For example, the Expert 
Panel stated at the Water Board hearing, “NASA has already invested in an ELV media 
filter. Through extensive testing at over 70 locations, we identified that this ELV, or 
Expendable Launch Vehicle, was a particularly potent source of dioxins, thus, that 16-
acre area is treated by the BMP that you see here; sedimentation infiltration” (Water 
Board Tr., p. 295). Although the Expert Panel defines “ELV,” this term combined with 
“NASA,” “BMP,” and specialized terminology like “dioxins,” “media filter,” and 
“sedimentation infiltration,” make this message difficult to absorb. Similarly, Duffield 
explained at the Work Group meeting:  
So in July of 2013, just as Boeing was about to begin the demolition and disposal 
of more nuclear structures including a plutonium fuel fabrication facility, several 
public interest groups, Physicians for Social Responsibility-Los Angeles and 
Consumer Watchdog and Southern California Federation of Scientists and 
Committee to Bridge the Gap, filed suit against DTSC and DPH for not 
complying with CEQA prior to the demolition and disposal activities. In 
December of 2013, the court ruled that there was a reasonable likelihood that 
DTSC had violated CEQA in permitting the Area 4 building demolition before 
conducting environmental review. (Duffield Tr., p. 2) 
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Here, the combination of acronyms, strings of noun modifiers, technical language, 
nominalizations, and a very long first sentence potentially makes this passage particularly 
overwhelming for listeners.  
 Overall, presenters at both the Water Board hearing and Work Group meeting did 
not use acronyms extensively, but when they did, it likely further impeded the flow of the 
information contained in their messages, particularly to members of the “public.” Thus 
we see a continuation of the trend whereby the stylistic features speakers used hampered 
the “public’s” processing of and ability to respond to the information presented. This, in 
turn, leads to a skewed universe of information before the decision-maker: when the 
“public’s” information cannot circulate, or its circulation is restricted, the information of 
other presenters such as the Expert Panel and Boeing comprises a disproportionately 
large amount of the information upon which the Water Board will make its decision, 
likely impacting not only the procedural exercise of the mechanism but its substantive 
outcome as well. 
 III.e. Technical Language 
 Using technical language that is unfamiliar to one’s audience makes a message 
more difficult for that audience to understand (Rowe & Frewer, 2005, p. 273) and 
increases audience confusion (Killingsworth & Palmer, 1992, p. 172). By “technical 
language,” here I mean “true jargon,” “pseudo (popular) jargon,” and “specialized 
vocabularies” (Ike, 2002, pp. 8, 12). “True jargon” is “technical words or vocabulary 
freely used and generally well understood among members of a particular profession” 
(Ufot, 2013, p. 624, citing Ike, 2002, p. 8). “Popular jargon” is “verbose, pompous, and 
overdosed with clichés and hackneyed expressions that mostly add little or nothing to the 
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general meaning of what is written but rather tend to obscure the real meaning to a point 
of incomprehensibility (Ufot, 2013, p. 624, citing Ike, 2002, p. 8). Much of this kind of 
jargon is captured in the previous sections on passive voice and nominalizations. Lastly, 
“specialized vocabulary” consists of “words that have different meanings in general 
English from the meaning in the technical sense” (Ike, 2002, p. 12). Such language, 
“however unintelligible to the layman, is never obscure as long as it is used in its proper 
context. But when it is employed by experts to laymen who do not understand it, it is 
both a form of bad manners and, like pseudo-jargon, a barrier to communication” (Ufot, 
2013, p. 624). Further, “[i]n social terms, jargon helps to create and maintain connections 
among those who see themselves as ‘insiders’ in some way and to exclude ‘outsiders’” 
(Ufot, 2013, p. 624). As we will see below, this language likely did just that at the Water 
Board hearing. 
 Just as we saw with passive voice, nominalizations, and strings of noun modifiers, 
speakers for the Water Board, Boeing, and the Expert Panel used technical language 
frequently in their Water Board hearing presentations. For example, Water Board staff 
explained that, “The chronic test evaluated using the Test of Significant Toxicity 
methodology is more stringent, and the chronic test evaluates the acute endpoint of 
mortality along with growth and reproduction” (Water Board Tr., p. 267). Here, 
“chronic,” “significant toxicity,” and “acute endpoint” are specialized vocabulary, which 
have specialized meanings in this context that only persons familiar with such testing 
understand. This jargon-filled sentence is likely inaccessible to persons unversed in this 
specialized vocabulary, meaning the information contained in it will not flow to them. 
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 Similarly, Boeing explained, “Prior to 2009, we installed flow-through 
multimedia infiltration systems at outfalls and subsequently upgraded them using a media 
blend developed by the Expert Panel” (Water Board Tr., p. 281). This sentence includes 
more technical than non-technical terms, and excludes as outsiders anyone not familiar 
with terms such “flow-through multimedia infiltration systems,” “outfalls,” and “media 
blend.” Likewise, the Expert Panel stated, “Permit limit exceedances at Outfall 009 
persist for lead and dioxins at low concentrations and they’re undoubtedly partially 
affected by atmospheric and natural soil contributions” (Water Board Tr., p. 300). This 
sentence is rife with jargon and could easily be restated as follows to be more accessible: 
“At Outfall 009, lead and dioxin are still exceeding permit limits at low concentrations. 
Contributions of these substances from the atmosphere and soil are no doubt partially 
affecting these levels.” The extensive use of technical language excludes those who are 
not well-versed in it—namely, the “public”—from understanding these statements, 
thereby preventing this information from flowing to them. Once again, it also further 
prevents any potential responses to it, since one cannot substantively respond to a 
message that he or she cannot access. 
 One might think there is no way to avoid technical language when speaking about 
technical issues, and that exclusion is therefore a necessary if unintended consequence of 
such communications. But the Organizations’ speakers demonstrated that this is not the 
case. For example, Hirsch explained at the Water Board hearing, “Remember that we’re 
in a drought […] there simply hasn’t been much rain.” (Water Board Tr., p. 334). Water 
Board staff explained this same concept with more technical language: “the discharge 
that is regulated by this permit only occurs during wet weather, except for a small amount 
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of groundwater that is treated before it is discharged, and, as we all know, we haven’t had 
many wet-weather events over the past three years” (Water Board Tr., pp. 251-252). 
Instead of discussing “wet-weather events,” Hirsch simply discussed “rain,” making his 
message accessible to all listeners.  
 Along similar lines, Water Board staff explained, “The site is located actually in 
two watersheds, the upper reaches of the Los Angeles River and the Arroyo Simi, which 
drains to Calleguas Creek and the Mugu Lagoon” (Water Board Tr., p. 250). Gortner also 
conveyed this same information at the Water Board hearing, but with less technical 
language. She said, “And, as you’ve heard, the water is running off in different 
directions, including into the L.A. River—the headwaters for the L.A. River—and the 
Arroyo Simi, which flows all the way to the ocean and recharges groundwater in Simi 
used in part for drinking water and elsewhere for agriculture” (Water Board Tr., p. 316). 
Her message dispenses with technical language, making it easier for everyone to access. 
Similarly, at the Work Group meeting, she said:  
Why do we care about the water?  Well, Santa Susana is on the top of a hill.  So 
logically when it rains, all the radioactive and chemical contamination that is 
getting into the soil near the water can run off down the hill into multiple 
locations.  Here is a picture of the water going off.  Water is running where?  
Well, it is running into a number of areas, partially into Bell Creek which is the 
headwaters for the L.A. River.  It is also running in our area over here in Simi 
towards Arroyo Simi, Runkle Canyon and Dayton Canyon. (Gortner Tr., p. 1) 
Instead of a dry, technical explanation of the site’s location in relation to “watersheds,” 
Gortner’s explanations at both the Water Board hearing and Work Group meeting used 
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primarily non-jargon language, telling listeners that the site is “on top of a hill” and that 
“water is running off in different directions.” Further, unlike Water Board staff, Gortner 
adds context to make this information meaningful to her audience by explaining that this 
water ends up in our drinking and agricultural supplies. From examples like these we see 
that the Organizations’ presenters—at both the Water Board hearing and Work Group 
meeting—generally used less technical language than the Water Board staff and Expert 
Panel. In doing so, they proved that one can demonstrate command of complex concepts 
without using complex terminology, which increases the circulation of information to all 
participants. However, unless one views their target audience as persons unfamiliar with 
such terminology, they have no motivation to do so. 
 III.f. Narrative 
 Narrative communication is associated with increased recall, easier 
comprehension, and higher engagement than traditional logical-scientific communication 
(Dahlstrom, 2014, p. 13615). In addition, once out of school, narrative is one of the most 
common formats through which scientific information is delivered to members of “the 
public,” via the mass media (Dahlstrom, 2014, p. 13614). Key features of narrative 
communication are: (1) the depiction of cause-and-effect relationships (causality); (2) 
that take place over a particular period of time (temporality); and (3) that impact 
particular characters (character) (Dahsltrom, 2014, p. 13615). 
 Water Board staff did not utilize narrative in their presentations at the Water 
Board hearing. Instead, they spoke only of the proposed permit terms, the written 
comments they received about those terms (e.g., “the first comment […],” “the next 
comment was […]”  (Water Board Tr., p. 267), and their responses (e.g., “The staff’s 
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response is […]) (Water Board Tr., p. 267). Further, not only did Water Board staff not 
use narrative, but, as explained above, they also frequently omitted actors from their 
statements through the use of passive voice.  
 In contrast, Boeing’s presenters framed their presentations in part as a narrative. 
Shestag explained:  
Since the last hearing in 2010, we’ve ceased all industrial operations at the site; 
we’ve substantially completed demolition of Boeing’s building infrastructure; 
we’ve cleaned up numerous source areas; we’ve constructed several advanced 
stormwater treatment systems; and we’ve completed extensive erosion control 
and re-vegetation actions all in the interest of improving water quality. As a 
result, we made considerable progress in achieving compliance at the majority of 
the outfalls. […] And these have greatly improved water quality in those areas 
[…].” (Water Board Tr., p. 277) 
Here, Shestag presented a cause-and-effect relationship between Boeing’s actions and 
improving water quality at SSFL, over a period of time. Similarly, another Boeing 
presenter, Debbie Taege, explained, “Over the past six years, Boeing has implemented a 
variety of Best Management Practices to improve surface water quality through an 
iterative and adaptive process. […] [T]hese BMPs, or Best Management Practices, have 
been effective in treating stormwater compounds, such as, metals and dioxins” (Water 
Board Tr., p. 279). Shestag concluded Boeing’s presentation by stating: 
[W]e hold true to our commitment that we expressed six years ago, and that is to 
take actions to protect public health and improve water quality and strive for 100 
percent compliance, to work with the Board and the stormwater Expert Panel to 
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implement the best technical solutions to achieve full compliance with the permit, 
to keep the community informed of our progress and efforts, and to engage with 
others on the best practices to help advance effective stormwater solutions at the 
Santa Susana site. (Water Board Tr., p. 286) 
By framing the issue of permit compliance as a narrative about a permittee on a journey 
to improve water quality and protect public health, Shestag effectively communicated a 
memorable and easy-to-comprehend message about his company.  
 In contrast, when Shestag asked the Water Board to lax the terms of the proposed 
permit, he obscured the meaning of his requests by framing them in technical terms 
without the use of narrative. For example, he stated:  
Our first request is that the aquatic toxicity requirements be based on the duration 
of the discharge. As noted in our written comments, the discharges from the site’s 
outfalls are intermittent, they’re infrequent, and they’re short duration. The permit 
should establish (indiscernible) toxicity limits for discharges of only seven days 
or longer and acute toxicity limits for discharges of less than seven days. This is 
more appropriate based on the actual exposure. (Water Board Tr., p. 285) 
By expressing requests such as this one in dry, technical terms with no narrative arc, 
Shestag made his message less accessible and memorable to persons unaccustomed to 
this communication style. Similar to his strategic use of passive voice, Shestag used 
narrative to enhance the flow of positive information about Boeing while hindering the 
flow of negative information about it. 
 The Expert Panel used narrative in much the same way as Shestag did when he 
discussed Boeing’s progress—it told a narrative story about its efforts at the site and the 
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impacts of those efforts over time. For example, Expert Panelist John Jones explained 
that “our panel has been together—it’s hard to believe—for seven years, and it’s been a 
great pleasure. […] We have received input from the public via e-mail and at [many] 
meetings, and that has made a big impact on the way that we’ve approached this. We’ve 
also had an excellent working relationship with your staff […] Of course, we’ve worked 
regularly with NASA and Boing […] As a result of this big, collaborative effort, BMPS 
have been implemented […]” (Water Board Tr., p. 300). Although neither Boeing nor the 
Expert Panel told lengthy or extensive narratives, they framed their presentations in part 
as narratives about the cause-and-effect of their actions at the site over time. This familiar 
causality/temporality/character structure aided listeners in understanding their messages 
(see Dahsltrom, 2014, p. 13615), thereby promoting the circulation of the information 
they contained. 
 The Organizations utilized narrative more so than any other presenters at the 
Water Board hearing. After introducing himself, Daniel Hirsch began his presentation by 
telling his audience: 
Thirty-five years ago, I was teaching at UCLA and some of my students began 
a research project that uncovered a partial nuclear meltdown at the Santa 
Susana Field Laboratory that had been kept secret for 20 years. With additional 
research, they found that, not only was it kept secret, but many other accidents 
had occurred at the facility producing widespread radioactive and chemical 
contamination. (Water Board Tr., p. 307) 
He continued:  
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 The government and the company that ran the site were neither candid nor open 
and, on top of that, they had a very cozy relationship between the regulator and 
the company. These problems have continued now for the 70 years since that site 
was established, and we are here today to talk about a—we’re going to petition 
that pattern that places people at risk, a longstanding disregard of environmental 
rules, and a spending of money primarily through lobbyists to relax regulatory 
requirements. […] The site continues to leak badly; Boeing is cutting corners 
terribly to avoid its obligations to stop the releases. The ISRA hasn’t worked. 
(Water Board Tr., p. 307-308) 
These passages reflect the storytelling nature of Hirsch’s presentation. Unlike Boeing and 
the Expert Panel, Hirsch framed not only his own actions but those of everyone he spoke 
of in narrative form; he cast each person as a character in a gripping narrative about the 
site. Doing so made it easier for his audience to follow and remember his message, and in 
this way enhanced its circulation, especially to members of the “public.” 
 Organizational presenter Duffield took a similar approach. She explained: “As 
you’ve heard, the Santa Susana Field Lab was established in the late ‘40s for rocket 
testing. In 1949, it was chosen for nuclear testing that was considered too dangerous to do 
in a populated area; population has since dramatically increased […]. There were many 
nuclear accidents at the site” (Water Board Tr., p. 309). As she told this chronological 
story, she showed corresponding photographs, further cementing the narrative in viewers’ 
minds (Water Board Tr., pp. 309-310). She then stated, “The health impacts of 
radionuclides: This is why our organization is involved, this is why a physician’s 
organization has been involved in efforts to clean up the fuel lab for over 30 years; this is 
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why we’re all here; this is why we should be here: Because the materials that we’re 
talking about impact people’s health, they impact their lives and their well-being” (Water 
Board Tr., p. 312). Duffield likewise used narrative in her presentation at the Work 
Group meeting, explaining to her audience that “Boeing dumped a total of 1,963 tons of 
waste into sites not designated for radioactive waste and it recycled 2,925 tons of 
contaminated debris […]. Where did it go? These are some sites throughout Southern 
California that it went to […]. None were licensed to receive radioactive waste. There are 
a couple matters that are at issue here, first the potential impacts on public health […].” 
(Duffield Tr., p. 2). In each of these presentations, Duffield, like Hirsch, conveyed her 
message as a narrative replete with characters that caused effects over time, helping her 
audience to absorb and remember it. 
 The use or absence of narrative in each of these presentations thus mediated the 
flow of information at these mechanisms by enhancing the circulation of the information 
conveyed in narrative form while hampering the flow of information conveyed without it.  
 III.g. Precise Language 
 In reviewing the public comments at the Water Board hearing, one immediately 
sees that many of them had a different feel than the statements made by other speakers at 
both the Water Board hearing and Work Group meeting. Upon closer examination, one 
sees that one reason for this difference, in addition to the stylistic features discussed 
above, is a lack of precise language. This lack of precision demonstrated a potentially 
costly lack of interactional expertise, and at times resulted in statements that were, on 
their face, inaccurate. For example, one commenter stated:   
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I live in the community. I have gardened at the community garden that’s within a 
couple of miles, and I know people who died of cancer who were gardeners 
there. There were many former Boeing workers who have worked there and 
many of them have gotten cancer. I believe that it is really imperative to this 
community that this Board follow up on making the discharge of water not 
allowed into our community of pollutants. (Water Board Tr., p. 339) 
In contrast to this comment, other presenters at the Water Board hearing and Work Group 
meeting used precise measurements and quantities. For example, Duffield stated that 
“[t]he incidence of cancer was more than 60 percent greater among residents living 
within two miles of the site than of those living within five miles for types of cancer 
including thyroid, upper aero/digestive track, bladder, blood, and lymph tissue” (Water 
Board Tr., p. 314). The “public” comment above, in contrast, discussed a garden that is 
“a couple of miles” from SSFL, and “many” people who have gotten cancer. Further, the 
“public” commenter asked the Water Board to “mak[e] the discharge of water not 
allowed into our community of pollutants” (Water Board Tr., p. 339). Although the 
sentiment of this statement may be that the Water Board should not allow Boeing to 
discharge pollutants at levels that endanger people and the environment, as stated this 
comment asks that no discharge of pollutants be allowed at all. This is not only 
unrealistic for this site but likely impossible, as there are naturally occurring levels of 
certain pollutants in the environment, even for sites without contamination as extensive 
as that at SSFL (see, e.g., the Expert Panel’s statements that “atmospheric and natural soil 
contributions” contribute to contaminant discharge levels and that “no stormwater site 
ever has zero violations if they have a permit that’s stringent” (Water Board Tr., pp. 300, 
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304)). The imprecision of this “public” comment conveys a lack of both interactional and 
contributory expertise, and lies in stark contrast to the precise nature of other speakers’ 
remarks. 
 Another “public” commenter reflected this trend by stating:  
[…] I’ve been involved with trying to get the site cleaned up for over 25 years. 
[…] And I feel the standards that we’re allowing for Boeing to dump all the 
contaminants is wrong. And they’re the polluter, and they need to clean up the 
site completely. […] And I feel that the water standard needs to be really strict 
and Boeing should not be discharging anything. And if they are, fine them, fine 
them so hard that it bites their tushes. (Water Board Tr., pp. 340-341) 
While the idea of “clean[ing] up the site completely” may sound appealing at surface 
level, those familiar with the laws and the science surrounding the cleanup know this is 
neither financially nor practically feasible. Further, although the statement “Boeing 
should not be discharging anything” may express a popular sentiment, it is, as stated, a 
factual impossibility. A “discharge” simple means a release, and discharges of water 
happen regardless of whether that water contains pollutants. Moreover, informal and 
imprecise statements like, “fine them so hard it bites their tushes” likely detracted from 
the degree of seriousness with which the Water Board viewed this speaker’s comment, as 
they convey a lack of interactional expertise.  
 Likewise, this “public” commenter stated regarding the fines the Water Board has 
assessed against Boeing for its permit violations, “I feel that this Board needs to enforce 
the cleanup, enforce that fine, make it really steep. Don’t make it like a little dollar or 
whatever; make it billions of bucks, because that’s how much this corporation is making. 
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And they don’t care about our health” (Water Board Tr., p. 341). Once again, this speaker 
is well intentioned but exhibits a fundamental lack of understanding, or utter disregard 
for, the legal limitations and realities of the situation, as well as a lack of interactional 
expertise. Assessing Boeing fines of “billions of bucks” is not only entirely unrealistic, 
but also illegal. While this commenter may be expressing a sentiment with which many 
people agree, her lack of demonstrated interactional expertise in these inaccurate and 
imprecise overstatements may have prevented her from achieving credibility with her 
certified expert audience. 
 Statements such as these conveyed to these speakers’ audience a lack of 
interactional expertise. These “public” commenters are arguably uncertified experts 
regarding community experiences and desires about SSFL’s cleanup. However, the 
imprecision and inaccuracy of their words may have caused the certified experts and 
decision-makers to whom they were speaking to see them as unknowledgeable and 
lacking understanding. This in turn could have lead those certified experts and decision-
makers to disregard the input of those “public” commenters’ because it did not look or 
sound like the type of input that they believed qualified as valuable. In this way, the use 
of precise versus imprecise language acted as a Mediational Means that impeded the flow 
of information presented with imprecise language and promoted the flow of information 
presented with precise language. In addition, the “public’s” use of imprecise language, 
like the presentation of irrelevant or erroneous information discussed in Chapter 4, 
reinforced the notion that the failure to designate any of the “public” commenters as 
experts at the Water Board hearing was warranted, and that the “public” lacked the 
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contributory and/or interactional expertise required to be valuable participants in STE 
deliberations and decisions. 
 III.h. Deferential Language 
 Another stylistic feature that differed among participants at the Water Board 
hearing and Work Group meeting is whether they used deferential or authoritative 
language. By “deferential” language or style, I adopt Jo Liska, Elizaebeth Mechling, and 
Susan Stathas’s concept of “deferential language” as a language category comprised of 
the following “set of language characteristics”: “speaking more frequently, being 
interrupted more frequently, using more tag questions [questions formed by adding an 
interrogative fragment to the end of a declarative statement, e.g., “You’re John, aren’t 
you?”], using more ‘wh’ imperative constructions, avoiding coarse language and 
expletives, more frequently posting questions rather than making statements, using more 
qualifiers, using more apologies, more polite commands, and using more modal 
construction (can, may, would, should, and ought) (1981, p. 41). Of particular relevance 
here are qualifiers and polite commands. In this section I juxtapose “deferential” 
language with “authoritative” language. By “authoritative” language or style, I mean the 
corollaries to the deferential language characteristics, particularly the use of fewer 
qualifiers and polite commands. By “authoritative” style, I also mean assuming a teacher-
like role, wherein one positions him or herself as an explainer of specialized knowledge, 
rather than a subordinate requester. Whether one uses deferential or authoritative 
language is significant because persons who use deferential language are perceived as 
having less power and slightly less believability (1981, p. 47). 
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 In examining the Water Board hearing and Work Group meeting transcripts of 
Gortner, the only presenter who spoke about the same issue at both proceedings, an 
interesting trend emerged: she used a more deferential style at the Water Board hearing, 
where she was in an expressly non-expert role, and a more authoritative style at the Work 
Group meeting, where she was cast as a resident expert. For example, Gortner defined 
terms for her audience at the Work Group meeting but not at the Water Board hearing. At 
the Water Board hearing, she discussed “violations” without any explanation of what this 
term meant, but at the Work Group meeting, she explained, “What is a violation? That 
means it has exceeded the amount that the permit has said is safe for the public” (Gortner 
Tr., p. 2; Water Board Tr., p. 317). One likely reason for Gortner’s added explanations at 
the Work Group meeting is that she knew that her Water Board audience was already 
familiar with the specialized terminology she used, while her audience of community 
members at the Work Group meeting may not have been. But there is another factor 
worth considering.  
 By explaining these terms to her audience at the Work Group meeting, Gortner 
cast herself as an expert and teacher who possessed specialized knowledge that her 
audience lacked. At the Water Board hearing, in contrast, Gortner was not granted expert 
status and therefore was not speaking from a place of authority. When speaking in this 
non-authoritative role, Gortner no longer addressed her audience as a teacher addresses a 
class of students: she omitted phrases such as “I will explain to you,” “I think it is 
important,” “we want the community to be aware,” and “I am going to show you” 
(Gortner Tr., p. 1). She also omitted statements to her audience that told them how to 
interpret the information she gave them. For example, at the Work Group meeting she 
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told her audience that the new permit was less protective of the public, and that 
“[m]ercury, for example, we all know mercury is not good for people. That has changed 
from 0.02 pounds to 0.07 pounds per day which is three times more. This is amazing” 
(Gortner Tr., p. 2). At the Water Board hearing, she merely sated that “[m]ercury 
changed from .2 to .7” (Water Board Tr., p. 319). In this way, she transitioned from an 
authoritative, explanatory speaker at the Work Group meeting to a mere relayer of 
information at the Water Board hearing. It is impossible to determine from the bounds of 
this project what the impacts or significance of this difference is, but it seems worthy of 
further exploration. 
 Along similar lines, Gortner made non-qualified statements at the Work Group 
meeting, but qualified them at the Water Board hearing. For example, at the Work Group 
meeting she told her audience in unqualified language that the proposed NPDES permit 
“eliminated monthly average pollution limits and they are not sampling frequently 
enough” (Gortner Tr., p. 3, emphasis added). At the Water Board hearing, on the other 
hand, she deferentially stated, “They’ve also eliminated monthly average pollution limits 
for the outfalls, and we don’t feel that sampling is occurring frequently enough” (Water 
Board Tr., p. 320, emphasis added). The addition of “we don’t feel,” combined with 
passive voice that avoids pointing a finger at the Water Board, made this statement less 
authoritative than the one Gortner made at the Work Group meeting.  
 Likewise, in explaining her efforts to identify the differences between the old and 
proposed NPDES permits, Gortner used unqualified language to authoritatively tell her 
Work Group meeting audience:  
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They called the new permit a reissuance. Well a reissuance sounds pretty, you, 
know, harmless. But if you read the fine prints, you would find many things 
changed and not in the public’s favor. So I called the Water Board saying, ‘look, 
you really want me to read this 180 page document, line by line, and compare it 
to the other one? Are you kidding me?’ (Gortner Tr., p. 1-2) 
 In contrast, she deferentially explained this to her Water Board audience using qualifiers 
and polite language as follows: 
They called it a re-issuance, but we disagree. We think there are quite a few 
changes. […] So I did call the Water Board. Mazur Ali is a very nice person. I 
asked him, ‘Is there, please, a list of changes? I really can’t go through this. And 
he said no. He referred me to one specific page, but there was no list of changes. 
So I didn’t feel that [was] very helpful for the public. (Water Board Tr., p. 318) 
In her explanation of this issue at the Work Group meeting, where she was a designated 
expert, Gortner was commanding and assertive, but when she explained this same issue 
to the Water Board in an expressly non-expert capacity, she was deferential and polite 
bordering on timid. Gortner repeated this pattern when discussing the changes between 
the old and new permits. She assumed her teacher role and stated authoritatively at the 
Work Group meeting, “And the old permit was weak to begin with and was actually 
expired April 10th of last year. And this new permit, I will explain to you in detail, is 
even less protective of public health” (Gortner Tr., p. 1). But at the Water Boar hearing, 
she deferentially told the Water Board, “We also felt the old permit was weak and 
expired and the new permit we believe is even less protective” (Water Board Tr., p. 316). 
By adding qualifiers such as “we also felt” and “we believe,” she positioned herself as 
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less authoritative and more deferential when speaking at the Water Board hearing versus 
the Work Group meeting.  
 In these ways, Gortner made moves to cast herself as an authority figure at the 
Work Group meeting made that she did not make at the Water Board hearing. Exactly 
how these moves impacted the flow of information at these mechanisms is difficult to 
know, but because the use of deferential language is associated with less power and less 
believability, it stands to reason that her authoritative statements may have circulated 
more than her deferential, qualified statements, since the former conveyed a sense of 
confidence and expertise that the latter seemed to lack.  
IV. Conclusion 
 Speakers at the Water Board hearing and Work Group meeting were addressing 
different audiences in public engagement mechanisms that had different aims. The 
primary audience for the Water Board hearing presenters was the Water Board—the 
decision-makers—and the purpose of that mechanism was to reach a decision on the 
terms of the revised NPDES permit. In contrast, the primary audience at the Work Group 
meeting was members of “the public,” and that mechanism’s aims were to inform “the 
public” of the presenters’ views on the problems with the proposed permit’s terms, and to 
persuade them to comment on the permit at the upcoming hearing. 
 In examining the stylistic features of the presenters in each of these mechanisms, 
several trends emerged. Regarding passive voice, speakers in positions of authority 
tended to use active voice to explain their accomplishments (e.g. Shestag regarding 
Boeing), or when they sought to place blame (e.g. Gortner at the Work Group meeting), 
and used passive voice to obscure responsibility for their actions (e.g. Shestag and Water 
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Board staff at the Water Board hearing). When some of those same speakers were placed 
in non-authoritative positions, they tended to use more passive voice (e.g. the 
Organizations at the Water Board hearing). Regarding nominalizations and acronyms, 
speakers in authoritative designated expert roles tended to use them more than speakers 
in non-authoritative, non-expert roles. This was particularly evident in the Expert Panel’s 
use of nominalizations and acronyms, as well as the Organizations’ speakers’ use of these 
features at the Work Group meeting but not at the Water Board hearing. We also saw 
extensive use of noun modifiers and technical language at the Water Board hearing but 
hardly any at the Work Group meeting. Another noteworthy trend is the use of imprecise 
language by members of “the public,” compared to much more precise language by other 
speakers, which likely hampered the flow of “public” commenters’ information. Finally, 
by comparing one speaker’s presentations on the same issue at both the Water Board 
hearing and Work Group meeting, we saw that she tended to use a more authoritative 
speaking style when holding an designated expert role, and a more deferential one when 
in a non-expert role. While the exact relationship between deferential versus authoritative 
speaking style and information flow is difficult to ascertain here, the use of deferential 
language likely negatively impacted speakers by causing audiences to view them as less 
powerful and less believable  
 Overall, just as we saw with structural features, the stylistic features of speakers’ 
messages at the Water Board hearing tended to reinforce the unfortunate notion that 
members of the “public” lack the sophistication or understanding necessary to participate 
meaningfully or productively in STE deliberations or decisions, and thus that those 
persons were properly denied expert status there. They also tended to promote the 
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circulation of the designated experts’ information while hampering the circulation of the 
“public’s” information. As such, these stylistic features served as Mediational Means that 
by and large restricted the flow of the “public’s,” and to some extent the Organization’s, 
information at the Water Board hearing. This left the decision-maker a skewed universe 
of data—consisting primarily of the Expert Panel’s and Boeing’s information—to 
consider in setting the new NPDES permit’s terms. In this way, the stylistic features of 
participants’ messages at the Water Board hearing acted as Mediational Means that 
omitted from deliberation the diversity of perspectives that robust circulation of the 
“public’s” information would have made possible. I address this omission’s impacts on 
substantive outcomes in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 6 
IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 This project examined the transcripts of two STE public engagement 
mechanisms—the February 12, 2015 Water Board hearing and the February 4, 2015 
Work Group meeting—to explore whether, and if so, how (1) being designated as an 
expert or non-expert; (2) the structural features; and (3) the stylistic features of 
participants’ contributions, operated as Mediational Means to mediate the flow of 
information in each mechanism. Below, I provide a brief summary of my findings, then 
consider how these Mediational Means work together in each mechanism to mediate 
information flow. I follow that with an analysis of the impacts these Mediational Means 
had on the measurable outcomes of the Water Board hearing, and close with a discussion 
of how future work might build on this study. 
I. Summary of Findings 
 I.a. Role Designations 
 Examining <expert> and <public> as ideographs (McGee 1980) at the Water 
Board hearing and Work Group meeting unearthed important, otherwise unspoken 
connotations and associations that these role designations carried with them at each 
mechanism. Specifically, this examination revealed that: (1) <expert> signified the 
possession of formal credentials at the Water Board hearing but not the Work Group 
meeting, which has implications for whose, what, and how information flowed at each 
mechanism; (2) <expert> signified the possession of “encyclopedic” knowledge at both 
mechanisms, which restricted whose, what, and how information flowed; and (3) the 
relationships between the recognized experts and assumed non-experts in each 
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mechanism further mediated the flow of information. Below, I address each of these 
findings in turn. 
  I.a.i. Certified Versus Uncertified Designated Experts 
 First, the ideograph of <expert> at the Water Board hearing and Work Group 
meeting signified two very different ideologies about whether expertise is tied to the 
possession of formal credentials. At the Water Board hearing, only persons with formal 
credentials were designated experts. Indeed, of the six members of the Water Board 
hearing’s Expert Panel, five held PhDs (the sixth holds a Masters), five were current or 
past professors, three were registered “Professional Engineers,” and one was certified as a 
specialist in the field of water resources engineering. In contrast, the non-experts at the 
Water Board hearing lacked advanced degrees or formal certifications regarding the 
issues on which they spoke. Instead, they possessed contributory knowledge acquired 
through years of firsthand experience, but this was insufficient to qualify them as 
designated experts in this public engagement mechanism. In contrast, the designated 
experts at the Work Group meeting were treated as such despite lacking formal 
certification. Indeed, some of the same persons designated as experts at the Work Group 
meeting were explicitly designated as non-experts at the Water Board hearing. As such, 
we can conclude that at the Water Board hearing, <expert> represented an ideology that 
formal training and certification matter, while the Work Group meeting overlooked this 
formality and, instead, the ideograph of <expert> there represented an ideology that 
experience-based knowledge is what matters. 
 Relatedly, <expert> at both mechanisms reflected an ideology that being an 
expert requires both contributory and interactional expertise, but at the Water Board 
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hearing this expertise was not sufficient—the designated experts there needed formal 
credentials as well. At both the Water Board hearing and the Work Group meeting, the 
persons recognized as experts displayed both contributory and interactional expertise. 
That is, they had both substantive contributions to make and the ability to communicate 
them in ways that resonated with their audiences. However, at the Water Board hearing, 
several persons deemed non-experts also demonstrated both contributory and 
interactional expertise, but lacked formal credentials, and were not granted expert status. 
Specifically, while the Expert Panel members used specialized language that 
demonstrated their belonging in the discourse community of hydrology experts, so too 
did several Organizations speakers and public commenters. Yet, despite using the 
specialized language of the technical discourse community in which they sought 
membership, the Organizations speakers and public commenters were not recognized as 
experts at the Water Board hearing. In contrast, these same speakers were the designated 
experts at the Work Group meeting. As such, it appears that contributory and 
interactional kinds of expertise were necessary to obtain expert status in both 
mechanisms, but that these kinds of expertise were sufficient only at the Work Group 
meeting. At the Water Board hearing, the designated experts had to possess not only 
contributory and interactional expertise, but had to be certified via formal credentials, as 
well.  
 Because role designations at the Water Board hearing and Work Group meeting 
were tied to the possession of formal credentials, they served as Mediational Means that 
mediated whose, what, and how information flowed in each mechanism. At the Water 
Board hearing, only persons certified with credentials were designated as experts. This 
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meant that (aside from the decision-makers—members of the Water Board) only persons 
with formal credentials spoke from a place of authority, and only their information 
flowed down to “the public,” or laterally to the Water Board. On the other hand, the non-
credentialed non-experts in this mechanism—the Organizational speakers and public 
commenters—spoke from a place of no such authority or deference, and their information 
flowed up from their non-authoritative positions. Indeed, as we will see below, no input 
from these non-experts was incorporated into the final NPDES permit.  
 In contrast, role designations at the Work Group meeting mediated the flow of 
information differently: persons without formal credentials were the designated experts 
who spoke from a place of authority and deference, allowing their information to flow 
more freely and persuasively. Recognizing these uncertified experts as contributory 
designated experts would be one answer to scholars’ calls to reconceptualize where 
expertise resides, and how and by whom knowledge is constructed (Flower & Heath, 
2000, p. 53). Moreover, persons who hold advanced degrees tend to come from higher 
socioeconomic backgrounds (Cahalan & Perna, 2015, p. 39). Therefore, public 
engagement mechanisms that recognize the potential value of uncertified experts’ 
contributions provide opportunities for persons of lower socioeconomic status to speak 
from positions of authority and to share their experiential knowledge in ways that 
mechanisms recognizing only certified experts do not. In these ways, recognizing persons 
without credentials as experts begins to address scholars’ (e.g., Benhabib, 1994, pp. 33-
34; Long, 2008, p. 205) pleas for greater inclusion of marginalized voices in public 
engagement mechanisms. 
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  I.a.ii. The Possession of “Encyclopedic” Knowledge 
 A notable similarity between the Water Board hearing and Work Group meeting 
was that the designated experts in both mechanisms demonstrated scientific, 
“encyclopedic” knowledge. While at the Work Group, the designated experts also 
demonstrated evaluative, values-based knowledge, all of the designated experts in both 
mechanisms utilized “encyclopedic” knowledge. This reliance on “encyclopedic” 
knowledge is significant. It “technicizes” the issues considered in these mechanisms, 
shifting the central question away from the “safe enough” aspect of “how safe is safe 
enough”—an evaluative, values-based question that persons lacking technical knowledge 
about hydrology could answer. Instead, the central question becomes one focused on 
“how safe,” which requires specialized knowledge to answer. The controversies at issue 
at the Water Board hearing and Work Group meeting are no doubt technical, thus 
requiring some participants to possess technical knowledge. However, granting expert 
status only to those persons with such knowledge excludes important voices and 
considerations from the conversation, and sends the message that qualitative concerns 
and input are less important than quantitative ones. In this way, the designation as experts 
of only those persons possessing technical knowledge is a Mediational Means that 
mediates—in this case by restricting—the flow of information in these mechanisms. 
  I.a.iii. Relationships Between Designated Experts and Non-Experts  
 The final trend we saw regarding the ideographs <expert> and <public> at the 
Water Board hearing and Work Group meeting concerned how the relationships between 
these groups mediated information flow. At the Water Board hearing, the designated 
experts and non-experts were explicitly treated as distinct entities in a one-directional 
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hierarchy, whereby the designated experts’ job was to educate and enlighten “the public.” 
At the Work Group meeting, on the other hand, the line between the designated experts 
and “the public” was less distinct. This was evidenced in several ways. First, the 
designated experts at the Water Board hearing were explicitly labeled as such, while the 
Work Group meeting dispensed with such titles. Second, the designated experts at the 
Water Board hearing spoke in ways that clearly delineated themselves from “the public,” 
while the designated experts at the Work Group meeting spoke in ways that identified 
themselves as both members of a community of experts and of “the public.” For example, 
the Expert Panel at the Water Board hearing explained that they “advise the public” and 
that they “have taken on the job of informing the public” (Water Board Tr., p. 288). In 
contrast, one of the designated experts at the Work Group meeting positioned herself as a 
member of “the public” when she explained: “if any public person wanted to really 
understand what the new permit was compared to the old one, they had to spend several 
days, hours, I don’t know, it was a long time going through it. […] So I called the Water 
Board saying, “Look, you really want me to read this 180 page document, line by line 
and compare it to the other one?” Lastly, the Water Board hearing took a transmission 
model view of the designated expert-“public” relationship, as evidenced by the Expert 
Panel’s explanation of their role as to “advise the public” and “informing the public” 
(Water Board Tr., p. 288). The Work Group meeting took a more interactive view, 
expressly seeking participation by “the public” rather than seeking only to inform them. 
We see this in statements such as Gortner’s closing remark at the Work Group meeting 
that, “we are letting you know that we would request people to attend the [Water Board] 
hearing next week and I encourage you to speak up” (Gortner Tr., p. 4). These 
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differences further demonstrate how role designations mediate the flow of information in 
these mechanisms. 
  I.a.iv. Implications of “Expert” and “Public” Role Designations as   
  Mediational Means 
 Taken together, we see that <expert> and <public> at the Water Board hearing 
and Work Group meeting reflect distinct ideologies about power and knowledge. While 
the designated experts in both mechanisms demonstrated contributory expertise, 
interactional expertise, and “encyclopedic” knowledge, only those persons possessing 
formal credentials were designated experts at the Water Board hearing, while persons 
with experienced-based knowledge but lacking formal credentials were designated 
experts at the Work Group meeting. As such, we see that at the Water Board hearing, 
<expert> represented an ideology that credentials and formal training matter, while at the 
Water Board hearing, this term represented an ideology that experience-based knowledge 
is what matters.  
 This difference matters. It allowed persons who possessed valuable, experience-
based knowledge but lacked formal credentials to speak from a position of authority at 
the Work Group meeting but not at the Water Board hearing. Further, because formal 
credentials require time and money to acquire, and because the majority of people who 
hold advanced degrees come from higher socioeconomic backgrounds (Cahalan and 
Perna 39), this difference has important implications for the relationship between power 
and socioeconomic standing as well. In these ways, the Work Group meeting offers an 
example of one way to answer scholars’ calls for greater inclusion of marginalized voices 
in public engagement mechanisms. Lastly, the uncertified designated experts at the Work 
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Group meeting demonstrated that one can possess relevant technical, quantitative 
knowledge about a subject and be able to communicate that knowledge without 
possessing formal credentials about it, calling into question the use of credentials as a 
means of assessing expertise. In each of these ways, role designations operated as 
Mediational Means in these mechanisms, impacting how information flowed among 
participants. 
 I.b. Structural Features 
 Prior research has shown that the structural features of a public engagement 
mechanism directly impact the effectiveness of that mechanism (Rowe & Frewer 2005, 
pp. 262, 264), and the Water Board hearing and Work Group meeting were no exception. 
Analyzing the Water Board hearing and Work Group meeting transcripts revealed several 
key differences between the structural features of these mechanisms—differences that 
highlight how these structural features mediated information flow in each mechanism.  
 First, the timing and notification procedures of the Work Group meeting increased 
access to it more so than those of the Water Board hearing, making Work Group meeting 
more likely to maximize participants than the Water Board hearing. While the Work 
Group meeting was held at 6pm on a weeknight, the Water Board hearing was held at 
9am on a weekday, making it difficult for people who work on weekdays to attend. Not 
only did this difference make it practically easier for people to attend the Work Group 
meeting than the Water Board meeting, but it also sent a message to potential participants 
that their attendance was valued and was taken into consideration in scheduling the Work 
Group meeting but not the Water Board hearing. Further, the Water Board hearing’s 
notice procedure decreased the likelihood that members of “the public” would participate 
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in that mechanism The subject line of the email in which the Water Board circulated the 
proposed NPDES to persons signed up for their listserv read, “Tentative Waste Discharge 
Requirements for Boeing Santa Susana Field Lab,” giving no indication to recipients that 
“the public” could comment on the proposed permit. The subject line could have easily 
indicated that there was a role for the public here, by stating, for example, “Opportunity 
for Public Comment on Tentative Waste Discharge Requirements for Boeing Santa 
Susana Field Lab,” or “Tentative Waste Discharge Requirements for Boeing Santa 
Susana Field Lab Open for Public Comment.” Moreover, persons not on the listserv 
could not view the tentative permit via the Water Board website, because the Water 
Board failed to post it prior to the deadline for public comments (Water Board Tr., pp. 
345-346). If people cannot attend a public engagement mechanism due to scheduling 
conflicts, if they do not know they can participate in that mechanism, or if they do not 
have access to the materials that are the subject of that mechanism, they are effectively 
barred from participating, which is likely what happened to many potential participants at 
the Water Board hearing. As such, these structural features mediated the flow of 
information at the Water Board hearing and Work Group meeting by effectively 
excluding information flow to and from some would-be participants at the Water Board 
hearing, while coming closer to maximizing information flow at the Work Group 
meeting. 
 In addition to failing to maximize the number of participants, the Water Board 
hearing failed to maximize the relevant information elicited from both participants and 
the mechanism’s sponsor (the Water Board), instead eliciting some spurious and 
irrelevant information from members of “the public.” This mechanism did not utilize a 
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facilitator to aid “the public” in ensuring that they shared all relevant information before a 
decision was made. Further, it gave members of “the public” only two minutes each to 
speak, and gave the Organizations only three days’ notice of their opportunity to present. 
Lastly, the 30-day period for written public comments was in December, during the 
holiday season, further decreasing the likelihood that potential participants would 
contribute relevant information. This mechanism similarly failed to maximize the 
relevant information elicited from the Water Board in that it did not provide members of 
“the public” an opportunity to ask questions and receive answers on issues which were 
unclear or confusing. Instead, it allowed “the public” the chance to comment, but the 
Water Board was under no obligation to respond to those comments. In contrast, the 
Work Group meeting had a dedicated question and answer period in which members of 
“the public” could ask questions, with no limits on how long they could speak. Once 
again, these structural features operated as Mediational Means to mediate the flow of 
information in each of these mechanisms. 
 The Water Board hearing also fell short in maximizing the transfer and processing 
of information by participants by using technical terms and jargon without explaining it 
in both the tentative permit and at the hearing. This problem was confounded by the 
Water Board hearing’s lack of opportunity for members of “the public” to seek 
clarifications or explanations. In contrast, speakers at the Work Group meeting used far 
fewer technical terms and jargon, even when explaining the same concepts as Water 
Board staff at the Water Board hearing. Two reasons for this difference are the differing 
audiences and purposes of the Water Board hearing and Work Group meeting. The 
speakers’ audience at the Water Board hearing was the Water Board, which is composed 
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of persons knowledgeable about the technical terms and concepts surrounding water 
quality and monitoring, while the speakers’ audience at the Work Group meeting was 
community members, many of whom were likely unfamiliar with the NPDES permitting 
process and accompanying terminology. Relatedly, the purpose of the Water Board 
hearing was for the Water Board to gather information (from its staff, the Expert Panel, 
the permittee (Boeing), the Organizations, and “the public”) and make a decision 
regarding the terms of Boeing’s new NPDES permit, not to educate, inform, or engage in 
a dialogue with “the public.” The Work Group meeting’s explicit purpose, in contrast, 
was to do just that. Regardless of the reasons for the prevalence of unexplained technical 
terminology at the Water Board hearing, the end result was that some recipients of 
information at the Water Board hearing—namely, members of “the public”—were less 
likely to transfer and process information there than they were at the Work Group 
meeting. In this way, these structural features impeded the flow of information at the 
Water Board hearing but not the Work Group meeting. 
 In addition, the Water Board hearing did not take steps to maximize the efficient 
and accurate aggregation of all relevant information elicited from participants. Despite 
the acting Water Board chair’s request to members of “the public” that “[p]ersons with 
similar concerns or opinions are encouraged to choose one representative to speak” 
(Water Board Tr., p. 246), this mechanism did not utilize a facilitator or provide other 
means by which to combine participants’ input. Further, one wonders whether choosing 
one participant to voice similar concerns would have the same impact that the repetition 
of particular concerns by multiple members of “the public” has—similar to how 
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constituents are encouraged to call their legislators en masse to persuade them to vote a 
particular way. 
 Finally, certain structural features of the Water Board hearing contributed to a 
perceived lack of fairness. Specifically, Boeing—the entity subject to regulation at the 
Water Board hearing—was responsible for selecting the members of the Expert Panel—
the entity tasked with recommending what regulations Boeing should be subject to. In 
addition, rather than allocating separate, independent presentation timeslots for Boeing, 
the “Expert Panel,” and the Organizations at the hearing, the Water Board allotted 40 
minutes to “the Boeing Company and the Expert Panel” and 40 minutes to “the 
organizations,” respectively. Further, the acting Water Board chair stated that “the Boeing 
Company and the Expert Panel with [sic] make its presentation, which cannot exceed 40 
minutes; after Boeing, the organizations I’ve previously mentioned will make its 
presentation. […]” (Water Board Tr., p. 246, emphasis added). Perhaps unintentionally, 
here the acting Water Board chair expressly conflates Boeing and the ostensibly 
“independent” Expert Panel by referring to them collectively as “Boeing” (Water Board 
Tr., p. 246). Regardless of whether these structural features actually impacted the 
impartiality of the hearing, they potentially created the perception of unfairness and sent 
the message that Boeing and the Expert Panel are aligned in some way, while the 
Organizations are at a minimum not part of this collaboration, or, perhaps, adverse to it. 
Further, treating Boeing as affiliated with ordained experts placed Boeing in a position of 
more power than the Organizations.  
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 Although the Work Group meeting was not conducted perfectly either, it 
generally utilized more of the structural features associated with mechanism effectiveness 
than the Water Board hearing did. 
 In each of these ways, the structural features of the Water Board hearing and 
Work Group meeting can be seen as Mediational Means that enhanced or impeded the 
flow of information among participants in each mechanism. 
 I.c. Stylistic Features 
 The style one uses to communicate a message has implications for both who can 
understand that message (Killingsworth & Palmer , 1992, p.170)—and thus participate in 
decisions about it—and for how an audience perceives its speaker (e.g., C. Miller, 2003, 
p. 200). Certain stylistic features decrease the accessibility of a message, thus impacting 
the flow of the information contained in that message. These include passive voice, 
nominalizations, strings of noun modifiers, acronyms, and technical terminology 
(Killingsworth & Palmer, 1992, p. 173-174; Rowe & Frewer, 2005, p. 273). The presence 
or absence of each of these features mediated information flow at the Water Board 
hearing and Work Group meeting. 
 Passive voice “obliterates agents of actions and thereby obscures responsibility 
and/or authority” (Killingsworth & Palmer, 1992, p. 173). At the Water Board hearing, 
Water Board staff and Boeing used active voice when talking about their 
accomplishments and the progress they had made in complying with the terms of the 
previous NDPES permit. In contrast, they tended to use passive voice when discussing 
the areas in which they fell short in meeting their obligations. Because passive voice 
allows speakers to “achieve distance from their subject matter and audiences” and 
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“obscures responsibility” (Killingsworth & Palmer, 1992, p. 173), passive voice mediated 
the flow of information in this mechanism by allowing speakers to avoid blame for 
particular actions. In addition, the use of passive voice restricted the flow of information 
by making messages that utilized it less accessible to listeners, especially listeners not 
well versed in this speaking style. Because the Water Board, Water Board staff, the 
Expert Panel, and the Organizations routinely read documents and hear testimony that 
utilize passive voice, the listeners most likely to be unaccustomed to it were members of 
“the public.” In this way, passive voice inhibited the flow to “the public” of the 
information contained in these messages, which in turn impeded the “public’s” ability to 
circulate their information in response. Because the “public’s” information tends to be 
values-based and evaluative rather than technical, like that typical of the “experts,” when 
the circulation of that information is hampered, decision-makers and participants do not 
get to consider the full range of perspectives about the issue at hand. In contrast, at the 
Work Group meeting speakers used passive voice far less often, thus promoting the flow 
of speakers’ information and participants’ responses there.  In these ways, passive voice 
mediated information flow in different ways at the Water Board hearing and Work Group 
meeting. 
 Nominalizations “favor stasis over action by using words in their noun forms 
when they might just as well be written as verbs or adjectives” (Killingsworth & Palmer, 
1992, p. 173). At the Water Board hearing, the Expert Panel, Water Board, and Water 
Board staff used nominalizations liberally, often in conjunction with passive voice and 
technical terminology. Doing so made their messages needlessly wordy and complex, 
which stymied the flow of the information contained in them, particularly to members of 
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the “public,” who, as noted above, are less likely to be accustomed to this speaking style. 
Accordingly, the “public’s” understanding of, and ability to respond to, these messages 
was disproportionately excluded by these nominalizations. In contrast, the Organizations’ 
speakers used very few nominalizations at the Water Board hearing. As such, the non-
experts’ messages at the Water Board hearing were likely more accessible, at least in this 
respect, than those of the Water Board, Water Board staff, Boeing, and the Expert Panel. 
 Strings of noun modifiers “obscure relationships among people and things by 
increasing the number of nouns and extending their function to replace that of adjectives, 
adverbs, prepositional phrases, and dependent clauses” (Killingsworth & Palmer, 1992, p. 
174). Speakers at the Water Board hearing—particularly the Water Board and Expert 
Panel—used them frequently, while speakers at the Work Group meeting used almost 
none. The frequent use of other strings of noun modifiers at the Water Board hearing—
especially when combined with technical language, passive voice, and nominalizations—
unnecessarily complicated already complex messages, further impeding information 
flow. Just as with the use of passive voice and nominalizations, this likely impacted 
members of “the public” more than anyone else at the Water Board hearing, making it 
harder for them to process and respond to this information. As a result, the circulation of 
the “public’s” information in this mechanism was restricted, meaning that the decision-
maker (the Water Board) and other mechanism participants were denied the opportunity 
to hear and consider it. 
 In written documents, acronyms “cause the reader unused to government jargon 
the inconvenience of constant page turning to locate original references or lists of 
abbreviations (Killingsworth & Palmer, 1992, p. 173). They also increase the density of 
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information that must be absorbed in a short space,” which “intimidate[s] the average 
reader” (Killingsworth & Palmer, 1992, p. 174). In the case of oral presentations like the 
Water Board hearing and Work Group meeting, audience members lack the ability to turn 
a page to find out what acronyms stand for, increasing the potential for audience 
members to be confused, intimidated, and excluded. Overall, the speakers at the Water 
Board hearing and Work Group meeting used relatively few acronyms and usually 
defined the ones they did use, but they still may have benefitted from using even fewer. 
And, once again, the use of this stylistic feature likely hampered the “public’s” 
processing of and ability to respond to the information presented, which in turn skewed 
the universe of information before the decision-maker: if the circulation of the “public’s” 
information was restricted, the information of other presenters such as the Expert Panel 
and Boeing comprised a disproportionately large amount of the information upon which 
the Water Board made its decision, likely impacting not only the procedural exercise of 
the mechanism but its substantive outcome as well. 
 Using technical language that is unfamiliar to one’s audience makes a message 
more difficult for that audience to understand (Rowe & Frewer, 2005, p. 273) and 
increases audience confusion (Killingsworth & Palmer, 1992, p. 172). At the Water 
Board hearing, speakers for the Water Board, Boeing, and the Expert Panel used 
technical language frequently in their presentations, excluding those unfamiliar with such 
language from understanding their messages. One might think there is no way to avoid 
technical language when speaking about technical issues, and that exclusion is therefore a 
necessary if unintended consequence of such communications. However, the 
Organizations’ speakers at both the Water Board hearing and Work Group demonstrated 
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that this is not the case, using terms like “rain” instead of “wet-weather events” (Water 
Board Tr., pp. 334, 251-252), and putting technical concepts in context to make them 
meaningful for listeners instead of expressing them as dry, abstract and a-contextual. In 
short, the Organizations’ presenters at both the Water Board hearing and Work Group 
meeting proved that one can demonstrate command of complex concepts without using 
complex terminology. However, unless one views their target audience as persons 
unfamiliar with such terminology, they have no motivation to do so. 
 The use or non-use of narrative also mediated information at the Water Board 
hearing and Work Group meeting. Narrative communication is associated with increased 
recall, easier comprehension, and higher engagement than traditional logical-scientific 
communication (Dahlstrom, 2014, p. 13615). In addition, once out of school, narrative is 
one of the most common formats through which scientific information is delivered to 
members of “the public,” via the mass media (Dahlstrom, 2014, p. 13614). Key features 
of narrative communication are: (1) the depiction of cause-and-effect relationships 
(causality); (2) that take place over a particular period of time (temporality); and (3) that 
impact particular characters (character) (Dahlstrom, 2014, p. 13615). Water Board staff 
did not utilize narrative in their presentations at the Water Board hearing, but instead 
spoke only of the proposed permit terms, the written comments they received about those 
terms (e.g., “the first comment […],” “the next comment was […]”  (Water Board Tr., p. 
267), and their responses (e.g., “The staff’s response is […]) (Water Board Tr., p. 267). 
Further, not only did Water Board staff not use narrative, but, as explained above, they 
also frequently omitted actors from their statements through the use of passive voice. In 
contrast, Boeing, the Expert Panel, and, to an even greater extent, the Organizations at the 
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Water Board hearing and the speakers at the Work Group meeting, all utilized narrative 
to present their information as stories about causal relationships about characters over 
time. Doing so helped these speakers effectively communicate memorable and easy-to-
comprehend messages to their audiences. In these ways, the use of narrative mediated the 
flow of information at the Water Board hearing and Work Group meeting by enhancing 
the circulation of the information conveyed in narrative form while hampering the flow 
of information conveyed without it. 
 Another difference that emerged in reviewing the Water Board hearing and Work 
Group meeting transcripts was that many of the comments by members of “the public” at 
the Water Board hearing used imprecise language. At worst, this lack of precise language 
sometimes caused these comments to be inaccurate, and at best convey a lack of 
interactional expertise on the part of these commenters. These public commenters are 
arguably uncertified experts regarding community experiences and desires about SSFL’s 
cleanup. However, the imprecision and inaccuracy of their words may have caused the 
certified designated experts and decision-makers to whom they were speaking at the 
Water Board hearing to see them as unknowledgeable and lacking understanding, and 
thus to disregard their input because it did not look or sound like the type of input that 
those certified designated experts and decision-makers believed qualified as valuable. In 
this way, the use of precise versus imprecise language acted as a Mediational Means that 
impeded the flow of information presented with imprecise language and promoted the 
flow of information presented with precise language. In addition, “the public’s” use of 
imprecise language reinforced the notion that the failure to designate any of “the public” 
commenters as experts at the Water Board hearing was warranted, and that “the public” 
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lacked the contributory and/or interactional expertise required to be valuable participants 
in STE deliberations and decisions. 
 Finally, in analyzing the Water Board hearing and Work Group meeting 
transcripts, we saw an interesting difference in whether speakers at each mechanism 
spoke deferentially or authoritatively. Specifically, we saw that Gortner, the only 
presenter who spoke on the same issue at both the Water Board hearing and Work Group 
meeting, used a more deferential style at the Water Board hearing, where she was in an 
expressly non-expert role, and a more authoritative style at the Work Group meeting, 
where she was cast as a resident expert. In particular, she defined terms for her audience 
at the Work Group meeting but not at the Water Board hearing, and addressed her 
audience as a teacher would a class of students, saying things such as, “I will explain to 
you” and “I am going to show you” (Gortner Tr., p. 1). Although one likely reason for 
these differences is that Gortner knew her Water Board audience was already familiar 
with the specialized terminology she used, while her audience of community members at 
the Work Group meeting may not have been, there is another factor worth considering.  
 By providing explanations to her audience at the Work Group meeting, Gortner 
cast herself as an expert who possessed specialized knowledge that her audience lacked. 
At the Water Board hearing, in contrast, Gortner was not granted expert status and 
therefore was not speaking from a place of authority. Indeed, when speaking as a 
designated expert at the Work Group meeting, Gortner made direct statements, but 
qualified them at the Water Board hearing. For example, at the Work Group meeting she 
told her audience that the proposed NPDES permit “eliminated monthly average 
pollution limits and they are not sampling frequently enough” (Gortner Tr., p. 3, 
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emphasis added). At the Water Board hearing, on the other hand, where she was not 
designated as an expert, she deferentially stated, “They’ve also eliminated monthly 
average pollution limits for the outfalls, and we don’t feel that sampling is occurring 
frequently enough” (Water Board Tr., p. 320, emphasis added). Similarly, when speaking 
as a designated expert at Work Group meeting, Gortner was often commanding and 
assertive, but when she explained the same issues to the Water Board in an expressly 
non-expert capacity, she was deferential and polite, bordering on timid. She stated at the 
Work Group meeting, “And the old permit was weak to begin with and was actually 
expired April 10th of last year. And this new permit, I will explain to you in detail, is 
even less protective of public health” (Gortner Tr., p. 1). But she told the Water Board, 
“We also felt the old permit was weak and expired and the new permit we believe is even 
less protective” (Water Board Tr., p. 316). In short, Gortner made multiple rhetorical 
moves at the Work Group meeting through which she cast herself as an authority figure, 
which she distinctly did not make at the Water Board hearing. Exactly how these moves 
impacted the flow of information at these mechanisms is difficult to know, but it stands to 
reason that her authoritative, more direct statements may have circulated more than her 
more deferential, qualified statements, since the former conveyed a sense of confidence 
and expertise that the latter seemed to lack. 
II. Putting It All Together: Role Designations, Structural Features, and Stylistic Features 
as Concurrent Mediational Means 
 In addition to understanding role designations, structural features, and stylistic 
features as independent Mediational Means at the Water Board hearing and Work Group 
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meeting, this project also yielded important insights into how these features work 
together as concurrent Mediational Means. 
 At the Water Board hearing, we saw several particular Mediational Means 
combine to mediate the flow information in ways that did not maximize participants’ 
contributory potential. First, this mechanism made a sharp distinction between the 
designated experts and non-experts in a hierarchical transmission model of engagement. 
Second, all of the designated experts here possessed formal credentials. Third, the 
structural features of this mechanism did not maximize efficiency. Finally, structural and 
stylistic aspects of this mechanism sent the message to potential and actual participants 
that non-experts’ understandings and input were not important. These aspects included: 
• The hearing’s notice procedures and timing (which made it difficult for non-
experts to participate); 
• The use of nominalizations, strings of noun modifiers and technical language 
without explanations (which conveyed that non-experts’ understandings did not 
matter); 
• The lack of a question-and-answer period in which non-experts could seek 
clarifications and have their concerns addressed (which likewise sent a message 
that non-experts’ understandings and concerns did not matter) 
• The sponsor’s treatment of Boeing and the Expert Panel as one entity (which 
suggested a lack of impartiality); and 
• The limiting of public comments to two minutes or less (which conveyed that 
input by “the public” did not matter).  
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In short, this mechanism assessed expertise based on formal credentials, utilized a 
transmission model of engagement, and had structural and stylistic features that both 
excluded and devalued members of “the public” and persons unfamiliar with technical 
concepts and specialized language. Because each of these Mediational Means occurred 
together, they compounded the hindrance on maximizing participants’ contributory 
potential in this mechanism. 
 At the Work Group meeting, in contrast, we saw a different set of Mediational 
Means combine to mediate information flow in a way that was more likely to maximize 
participants’ contributory potential. First, this mechanism blurred the lines between the 
designated experts and “the public” (via a lack of express labels for each, and by the 
designated experts’ explicit references to themselves as members of “the public”) in an 
interactional model of engagement. Second, in this mechanism, experience-based 
knowledge was enough to establish expertise. Third, this mechanism did a better job than 
the Water Board hearing of utilizing the structural variables that lead to effective public 
engagement mechanisms. Lastly, structural and stylistic features of the Work Group 
meeting conveyed to potential and actual participants that non-expert understandings and 
input mattered. Specifically, in this mechanism:  
• The meeting was scheduled at a time that took into consideration “the public’s” 
work schedules (indicating that their attendance and participation mattered); 
• Speakers used less technical terminology than those at the Water Board hearing, 
and usually provided explanations when they did (conveying that “the public’s” 
understanding mattered); 
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• There was an explicit question and answer session (further suggesting that non-
experts’ understanding and concerns mattered); and 
• There were no caps on question length during the question and answer session 
(once again conveying that non-expert input and understanding was important in 
this mechanism).  
In sum, the Work Group meeting combined several Mediational Means—assessing 
expertise based on experience, an interactional model of engagement, and structural and 
stylistic features that included and valued members of “the public” and persons 
unfamiliar with technical concepts and specialized language—to mediate information 
flow in a way that came closer to maximizing participants’ contributory potential. 
 In examining the transcripts of the Water Board hearing and Work Group 
meeting, we also saw another interesting and significant combination of Mediational 
Means. Specifically, in the presentations by the Organizational speakers, we saw that 
persons who held positions of authority as designated experts used more authoritative, 
less deferential speaking styles. When these Organizational speakers presented as non-
experts at the Water Board hearing, they used more deferential language and passive 
voice. In contrast, when they held designated expert roles at the Work Group meeting, 
they used more authoritative, assertive language and more active voice. This finding is 
significant for several reasons. First, it extends Cheryl Geisler’s work on the differences 
between how experts and non-experts interact with texts. As discussed more thoroughly 
in Chapter 2, Geisler found that experts challenge and engage with texts, while non-
experts assimilate and regurgitate them. Along similar lines, here we see another 
characterizable difference between experts and non-experts: experts explain 
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authoritatively, while non-experts ask deferentially. Second, this difference in speaking 
style reflects a power differential between those who hold expert status and those who do 
not. Participants’ awareness of this power inequity is reflected in Tucker’s presentation 
on behalf of the Organizations, in which she refers to local residents as “the ‘little people’ 
that live near the Santa Susana site” (Water Board Tr., p. 328). Further, as explained 
below, neither the Organizations’ nor “the public’s” input was incorporated into the final 
NPDES permit. These findings reinforce the significance of role designations and 
stylistic choices in public engagement mechanisms, and highlight the importance of 
examining both in conjunction as concurrent Mediational Means that work together to 
mediate the flow of information. 
 Finally, we saw that the Mediational Means of role designation—that is, of 
holding a position of authority as a designated expert—co-occurred with the use of both 
“encyclopedic” knowledge and precise language. All of the designated experts at both the 
Water Board hearing and Work Group meeting used “encyclopedic” knowledge and 
precise language, while most members of “the public” at the Water Board hearing did 
not. This suggests that, at a minimum, to be viewed as an expert in STE public 
engagement mechanisms, one should incorporate these features into his or her arguments.  
 Perhaps none of this is surprising. The audience at the Water Board hearing was 
the Water Board, which was well versed in the technical concepts and terminology 
surrounding water pollutant regulation and monitoring. In contrast, the audience at the 
Work Group meeting was community members, many of whom were unfamiliar with the 
language and science regarding Boeing’s NPDES permit. Further, the purpose of the 
Water Board hearing was for the Water Board to make a decision regarding the terms of 
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Boeing’s new NPDES permit, and the goal of speakers in that mechanism was to request 
or persuade the Water Board to set the terms in accordance with their preferences. The 
purpose of the Work Group meeting, on the other hand, was to give community members 
a better understanding of the issues surrounding Boeing’s new NPDES permit, and the 
goal of speakers in that mechanism was to inform those community members about these 
issues and persuade them to participate in the Water Board hearing. But regardless of the 
likely reasons for the co-occurrence of certain sets of Mediational Means, the fact that 
they did co-occur matters. Instead of examining these Mediational Means in isolation, 
researchers would be wise to try to understand the activity systems of STE public 
engagement mechanisms more holistically by considering these Mediational Means in 
conjunction with one another to better understand their real-world impacts. In doing so, it 
is also important to recognize that all Mediational Means are not equal. While some are 
static and unchangeable, such as one’s credentials, others are dynamic and can be altered, 
such as the stylistic features one uses in conveying her message. Further, Mediational 
Means often overlap and impact one another. For example, we saw here that role 
designations and stylistic features are interdependent: the stylistic choices one makes 
appear to be related to one’s expert or non-expert role designation. It is important to 
account for this relational nature of Mediational Means when trying to understand their 
impacts through an activity systems lens. 
III. Impacts on Measurable Outcomes 
 While it impossible to know for certain what impacts speakers’ comments had on 
Water Board members’ thoughts about the terms of Boeing’s new NPDES permit, the 
follow-up questions that Water Board members asked after speakers’ presentations, as 
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well as the revisions that Water Board members made to the final NPDES permit in 
response to speakers’ comments, are revealing.  
 Following the public comment period, Water Board members had an opportunity 
to ask questions before deliberating and voting on the terms of the final NPDES permit. 
This question period started with Board member Mehranian stating: 
Well, you know, we hear you and we understand the contamination, the 
scale of this project, it has been an environmental disaster. I don’t think 
anybody on the Board or on the staff questions—ever questions that. So 
having said that, because of the past incidences, the scale of 
contamination, of course, the cleanup is very complicated. And, as a result 
of that, we’re trying to listen to all the points that were brought up. (Water 
Board Tr., p. 343) 
Board member Mehranian then proceeded to ask five questions of Water Board staff. She 
asked about “benchmarks versus the numeric values of the cleanup,” Water Board staff’s 
failure to post the tentative permit online, how fines for permit violations were 
determined, why “we think we’re not weakening the standards,” and whether there was a 
discrepancy between how many permit exceedances Water Board staff and the 
Organizations said Boeing had (staff explained that there was no discrepancy, and that 
staff had cited the number of violations, while the Organizations had stated the number of 
exceedances, which is larger because not all exceedances constitute violations) (Water 
Board Tr., pp. 343, 345, 345, 347, 348). Here, although this Board member only asked 
questions of Water Board staff and not of Boeing, the Expert Panel, the Organizations, or 
“the public,” each of these questions sought to address a concern raised by either the 
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Organizations or “the public.” This conveys that this Board member was taking the 
Organizations’ and “public’s” concerns seriously and valued their input.  
 The second Board member to speak, Board Member Camacho, repeated this 
pattern. He began: 
It’s like knowing the history of the site, knowing the amount of time the site was 
used for the various uses, knowing where it’s located in terms of its proximity to 
various communities, knowing it’s the headwaters of the river and of multiple 
waterways, and knowing the work that Boeing has done to try to implement new 
BMPs and really try to move forward in creative and innovative ways, which is 
exciting, but then hearing the concerns and the statements made by various 
stakeholders and by various groups, it’s just really confusing. (Water Board Tr. 
353) 
He continued: 
 And I think, you know, I understand that—I think it was Boeing team had 
explained that, you know, 97 percent compliance with the permit, but obviously 
the goal is 100 percent. […] What is it going to take to get that 3 percent? And 
even with the 97 percent of compliance now, there’s still—it seems there’s still a 
lot of concern, there’s children playing in creeks, they’re people with health, you 
know, issues. (Water Board Tr. 353-354) 
A Water Board staff member responded to this Water Board member’s comment by 
stating, “I think we’ve heard from—from members of the community and the coalition 
who spoke today and, they kind of drew a nexus between the cleanup and the stormwater 
quality, and we agree, there is that nexus.” (Water Board Tr., p. 357). This statement 
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suggests that this Water Board staff member respected and took seriously the non-
experts’ comments. She also said, “I think the community is right to be concerned about 
the potential health effects of what is coming off from the stormwater […],” again 
indicating a respect for and agreement with “the public’s” comments and perspectives 
(Water Board Tr., p. 358). Similarly, Water Board member Yee stated, “And, you know, 
if I were a neighboring resident, I, too, would be extremely frustrated that, you know, we 
just can’t make the responsible parties act responsibly and get this thing taken care of” 
(Water Board Tr., p. 363). This Board member also appears to empathize and agree with 
“the public’s” position. Likewise, acting Chair Diamond asks, “what more can Boeing do 
to protect public—for me, to protect public health? […] If there was all the money in the 
world to clean up stormwater, what more could be done?” (Water Board Tr., pp. 367-
368). She later asked, “Another issue I wanted to ask about was the—the community 
groups, the organizations, talked a lot about their concern with mass versus—what is it—
concentration based limits. […]” (Water Board Tr., p. 372). She continued, “So, you 
know, given this site and given the fact that we’re concerned about public health, and 
obviously the people who live there are concerned about health issues, and well they 
should be with all the activities that have gone on at that site, why don’t we keep it [sic] 
concentration levels to protect—to protect—to be the most protective?” (Water Board 
Tr., p. 372). Each of these questions and comments suggest that the Water Board 
members and staff were indeed taking the non-experts’ concerns and comments to heart, 
notwithstanding the non-experts’ lack of formal credentials, and, in the case of some 
members of “the public,” a lack of interactional expertise and quantitative knowledge.  
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 However, other comments reflect a less positive reaction to non-experts’ input. 
For example, Water Board member Glickfeld states, “You know, what I want to add here 
is that, you know, for the community to think that we’re giving them penny ante penalties 
only, I think it’s disappointing that they don’t understand that we are making them 
[Boeing] spend whatever we can make them spend to fix this problem” (Water Board Tr., 
p. 362). This comment suggests that Glickfeld perceived “the community” not as 
understanding the fine assessments and disagreeing with them, but rather as being too 
confused or unsophisticated to understand them. In other words, Glickfeld seemed to 
presume that “the public,” who often spoke here with imprecise and non-technical 
language, lacked the ability to understand what the designated experts were up to. 
 Perhaps of greater significance, as actions speak louder than words, the actual 
revisions to the final permit (or lack thereof) in response to comments are telling. 
Regarding the written comments that Boeing, “the public,” and the Organizations 
submitted prior to the Water Board hearing, Tucker stated on behalf of the Organizations 
that “about half of Boeing’s proposed changes to the tentative permit have been accepted 
by the Board staff and made the permit even weaker. By contrast, of the comments 
submitted by the public groups trying to strengthen the permit and protections of health 
and the environment, not one has been accepted” (Water Board Tr., p. 332). Gortner 
echoed Tucker’s concern: “Our organizations were told [their] concerns were provided to 
the Board and it had decided to make no changes” (Water Board Tr., p. 318). Regarding 
revisions in response to oral comments and presentations at the hearing, the Water Board 
revised the permit to expressly retain the Expert Panel and submit a work plan, but made 
no other changes, then voted to approve the revised NPDES permit. (Water Board staff 
  207 
also stated that they would issue an order requiring Boeing to conduct a Human Health 
Risk Assessment, but that this would not be part of the permit (Water Board Tr., p. 381).) 
In other words, despite multiple Water Board members’ repeated comments suggesting 
that they valued and echoed the non-experts’ concerns, the only change they made to the 
final permit was to add a provision that explicitly retained the designated experts. None 
of the non-experts’ input was incorporated into the final permit. Uncovering precisely 
which Mediational Means—or combination thereof—impacted the outcome of the Water 
Board hearing may be impossible, but better understanding how role designations, 
structural features, and stylistic features mediated whose, what, and how information 
flowed there versus at the Work Group meeting is an important step towards developing 
public engagement mechanisms that have a greater likelihood of maximizing 
participants’ contributory potential.  
IV. Opportunities for Future Research 
 The purpose of this study was to serve as a stepping-stone on the path to creating 
more effective STE public engagement mechanisms. This study revealed some 
interesting—though nuanced—insights about how expert and non-expert role 
designations, structural features, and stylistic features operate both independently and 
concurrently as Mediational Means that mediate the flow of information in such 
mechanisms. It did not, however, allow for any broad generalizations about these 
Mediational Means, as it was a case study of only two STE public engagement 
mechanisms. Further, because this project was an observation of two real-world 
mechanisms, where these Mediational Means co-occur, it did not allow for an 
understanding of precisely how each of these Mediational Means impact information 
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flow on their own. Further research should explore whether the trends identified in this 
project are replicated in other STE mechanisms, and should consider using simulated 
public engagement mechanisms that isolate and examine the impacts of one Mediational 
Means at a time. Future projects should also test whether, and if so, how changing the 
combinations of Mediational Means impacts information flow and outcomes by 
designing new or modifying existing public engagement mechanisms to incorporate 
various combinations of Mediational Means, and seeing whether non-experts’ input is 
incorporated to a greater extent in mechanisms outcomes. This work would be 
particularly valuable in light of the fact that Rowe and Frewer explained that they were 
“hypothesiz[ing]” regarding the impacts of their “effectiveness variables” (Rowe & 
Frewer, 2005, pp. 270, 272, 285). In short, this project has begun the process of 
theorizing that role designations, structural features, and stylistic features operate as 
concurrent Mediational Means, and continuing to develop, test, and refine this theory is 
an area worthy of further study. 
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